Mattingly v. State
| Decision Date | 16 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 63A05–1509–CR–1310.,63A05–1509–CR–1310. |
| Citation | 48 N.E.3d 388 (Table) |
| Parties | Rhonda J. MATTINGLY, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Steven E. Ripstra, Ripstra Law Office, Jasper, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Tyler G. Banks, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
[1] Rhonda J. Mattingly appeals the trial court's revocation of her probation and Community Corrections placement, following a dispositional hearing. She raises one issue, namely, whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering her to serve the balance of her previously suspended sentence.
[2] We affirm.
[3] On September 16, 2014, the State charged Mattingly with three criminal offenses relating to controlled substances. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, she pleaded guilty to corrupt business influence, as a Level 5 felony, and she was sentenced to six years with five years suspended to probation. The single executed year was to be served in Community Corrections in a workrelease program.
[4] Approximately two-and-one-half months later, Community Corrections filed a notice of Community Corrections violation alleging that Mattingly had tested positive for Alpha–Pyrrolidinopentiophenone (“Alpha–PVP”), an illegal controlled substance known colloquially as “bath salts.” Appellant's App. at 46; Tr. at 12, 20. The State subsequently filed a motion to revoke Mattingly's probation based on her possession of, and positive test for the use of, AlphaPVP.
[5] At a revocation hearing on June 8, Mattingly admitted to the alleged violations, and the trial court accepted her admission. At the subsequent hearing,1 defense counsel argued for leniency given that Mattingly's criminal history involved only non-violent crimes related to drugs and alcohol and that Mattingly suffered from chronic anxiety disorder, depression, and possible bipolar disorder. Mattingly testified that she used the Alpha–PVP on only one occasion when she was on work release because she was depressed and grieving the death of her best friend. She testified that, because she could not afford to buy her prescribed medications for her mental health problems, she self-medicated with the Alpha–PVP on that one occasion. Mattingly apologized and asked that the court impose a sentence other than prison.
[6] The trial court noted that it considered the Indiana Risk Assessment System (IRAS) section of Mattingly's Presentence Investigation Report, which showed that Mattingly was in the high risk category to reoffend. The court also noted that Mattingly had “a history of criminal delinquent behavior in that she's recently violated ... probation in this matter.” Tr. at 24. The trial court also considered the fact that Mattingly admitted to the probation violation, thus saving the court time and resources. However, the trial court revoked Mattingly's Community Corrections placement and her probation, and it ordered that she serve the balance of her sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction, with a recommendation that she be placed in the Purposeful Incarceration Program. This appeal ensued.
[7] Mattingly argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her Community Corrections placement and her probation. “Probation [and Community Corrections placement are] a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind.2007) ; see also Treece v. State, 10 N.E.3d 52, 56 (Ind.Ct.App.2014), trans. denied. We review probation violation determinations and sanctions for an abuse of discretion.2 Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind.2013). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or when the trial court misinterprets the law.” Id. (citations omitted).
[8] A probation revocation proceeding is a two-step process. Id. First, the trial court must determine whether the preponderance of the evidence showed that a probation violation occurred. Id.; see also Ind.Code § 35–38–2–3 ().
When a probationer admits to violations of the terms of his probation, the procedural safeguards of [I.C. § 35–38–2–3 ] are unnecessary. Instead, the court can proceed to the second step of the inquiry and determine whether the violation warrants revocation. However, even a probationer who admits the allegations against him must still be given an opportunity to offer mitigating evidence suggesting that the violation does not warrant revocation.
Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind.2008) (citations omitted).
[9] In the second step of the process, the trial court must determine whether the probation violation warrants revocation of probation or some lesser sanction. Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 616 (); Patterson v. State, 659 N.E.2d 220, 222–23 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (). Indiana Code Section 35–38–2–3(h) provides:
Our supreme court has held that this statute “permits judges to sentence offenders using any one of or any combination of the enumerated powers.” Prewitt v. State, 878N.E.2d at 187.
[10] A single violation of a condition of probation is sufficient to permit the trial court to revoke probation. Pierce v. State, No. 28A05–1502–CR–57, 2015 WL 5589753, at *2 (Ind.Ct.App. Sept. 23, 2015). Although the trial court is not required to consider aggravating and mitigating factors when deciding whether to revoke probation, Treece, 10 N.E.3d at 59–60, “at a minimum, a probationer's mental state must be considered in the dispositional determination of a probation revocation proceeding,” Patterson v. State, 659 N.E.2d at 222–23. However, evidence of “a...
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