Mattison v. State

• Decision Date: 30 June 1834
• Citation: 3 Mo. 421
• Parties: MATTISON v. THE STATE.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

3 Mo. 421

MATTISON

v.THE STATE.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

June Term, 1834.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY.

M'GIRK, C. J.

This was an indictment on the 43d section of the act of the General Assembly respecting crimes and misdemeanors, which section is as follows: that if any person shall counterfeit, or cause or procure to be counterfeited, any of the species of the gold or silver coins now current, or hereafter to be current in this State, or shall pass or give in payment, or offer to pass or give in payment, the same, or shall permit, cause or procure the same to be altered or passed, with an intention to defraud any person or body politic or corporate, being thereof duly convicted, shall be fined, imprisoned, &c. The indictment charges that the defendant did counterfeit a Spanish milled dollar, which was current in the State. On the trial the defendant was found guilty and judgment was given against him. A motion was made in arrest of judgment, for the cause that the indictment does not charge that the defendant counterfeited the Spanish milled dollar with an intent to defraud any person. The indictment is, as stated by the cause, in arrest. The court overruled the motion. This is assigned for error.

To sustain the indictment, Mr. Allen, the Circuit Attorney, relies on the following argument. That the word counterfeit, ex vi termini, shows that the act was done with intent to defraud; to counterfeit means to copy or imitate without authority or right and with a view to deceive or defraud by passing the imitation for the original. Webster's Dictionary, title Counterfeit. Secondly, that by a view of the section in question, the words, with intent to defraud, are satisfied when only referred to the passing of counterfeit money, without saying with an intention to defraud. As to the first point we are of opinion that the word counterfeited is not a technical term legally meaning that the act was done to defraud. The law requires every thing which is necessary to constitute the crime should be laid in the indictment. In this case we understand that the counterfeiting must be done to defraud and so laid in the indictment, by express words and not by circumlocution, 4 Bl. Com. 243. The rule is, that when the intent constitutes a part of the offense, the intent must be laid expressly in the indictment as well as the act to which it is to be joined. The next point is, whether the intent to defraud by counterfeiting is to be considered a part of the offense. This subject scarcely admits of any argument, it depends on the wording of the act and the arrangement of the sentences in the section. The first part of the section declares, that if any person shall counterfeit any Spanish milled dollar or pass the same, or cause the same to be passed with intent to defraud, &c. Why the intent here mentioned should be restrained so as only to act on the passing we cannot conceive. We conceive the accumulative words with intent to defraud, attaches to all the preceding acts mentioned before it. We see nothing in the words nor the nature of the subject to forbid it. The judgment of the Circuit Court on this point is reversed.

Another point has been raised by Mr. Strother, counsel for the plaintiff in error, which is, that by the Constitution of the United States the subject of coining money and fixing the value of foreign coin, and to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the same, is given to Congress, and that Congress has acted on that power by providing for the punishment of counterfeiting the Spanish milled dollars, therefore the State cannot. The reversal of the judgment on the first point in the cause will not necessarily entitle the prisoner to a release, the cause might be remanded and new indictment found; but if this last point is decided for him, no indictment which could be framed would be good, it therefore becomes necessary to consider this point. The Constitution of the United States declares that Congress shall have power to coin money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin, &c., and to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States, 1 art., 8 sec., clauses 5 & 6. By several acts of Congress, and particularly by the act of 1806, the Spanish milled dollar was made current money of the United States. By the 20th sec., of an act of Congress, passed 3d March, 1825, entitled an act more effectually to provide for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States and for other purposes, it is provided “that if any person or persons shall falsely make, forge or counterfeit, in the resemblance or similitude of the gold or silver coin which by law now is, or hereafter may be made current in the United States, with intent to defraud any body politic or corporate, or any other person or persons, every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of felony, and shall on conviction thereof be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, and by imprisonment and confinement at hard labor not exceeding ten years. By the 43d section of an act of the General Assembly of Missouri respecting crimes, it is provided, “that if any person shall counterfeit, or cause or procure to be counterfeited, any of the species of the gold and silver coin now current, or hereafter to be current in this State, with an intention to defraud, &c., every person so offending, being thereof duly convicted, shall be imprisoned not exceeding ten years, be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars, be whipped not exceeding thirty-nine lashes, stand in the pillory two hours, and be rendered incapable of being a witness or juror, or voting at any election, or holding any office of profit, honor or trust within this State. The question to be decided by this court is, whether under the laws and constitution of the United States the Congress and the State can concurrently legislate on the subject of counterfeiting the current coin; provide different or the same identical punishment for the same act, committed by a citizen. To be subject to two masters in respect to one and the same duty, is in its nature intolerable. Yet it is admitted, that one case arises out of the Constitution and laws of the Union, and the laws of the State where duties of a like kind must be required--that is, in the case of paying taxes. The General Government may lay and collect taxes, and when this is done it forms no bar to a like demand on the part of the State. The General Government by special grant have a right to collect taxes from the citizens. This grant to Congress cannot, upon any sound rule of logic, be holden to be exclusive in Congress and exclusive to the States, inasmuch as it would be unreasonable to suppose the States could intend to part with and grant away their essential means of existence: without money no State could exist. We have seen that the power to punish for counterfeiting the current coin of the United States has been expressly given by the Constitution to Congress. It is also declared by the 1st sec. of the 1st art. that all legislative power granted by the Constitution shall be vested in Congress, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives, and by the 17th clause of the 8th section of the same article it is further declared that Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. By the 2d section of the 6th art. it is declared that this Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, &c., shall be the supreme law of the land: and again by the second section of the 3d art. of the Constitution, it is declared that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, &c. From this view of the Constitution I conclude that wherever the power is given to Congress to legislate on any particular subject or crime, they cannot transfer that power to any of the States, nor to any other court than a court of the Federal Government. The act of Congress above referred to in the last section provides that nothing in that act shall be construed to prevent the State Legislatures from providing punishments against the crimes therein made punishable. It is argued by Mr. Allen, in behalf the State, that this proviso authorizes the State to legislate on the same subject. My view of this matter is this, that Congress cannot, by any permission they may give, shift from themselves the duty of providing a punishment for counterfeiting the current coin, much less can they create a power on the part of the States to legislate on any subject, where they had none before. The Federalist, No. 45, has been cited to show that where the Constitution of the United States has given exclusive jurisdiction to Congress, as in the case of the exclusive jurisdiction given to legislate over the District of Columbia, then the States cannot legislate: and secondly, where the States are expressly forbidden, as in the case where they are forbidden to coin money, to emit bills of credit, &c., there they cannot act and thirdly, where the power to legislate is given to Congress and is not forbidden to the States, yet if the exercise of legislation by both would be repugnant to the nature of a due exercise of the power on the part of Congress, then the States are forbidden to exercise the power, and that in all other cases the powers mentioned in the Constitution may be exercised concurrently. Supposing this classification to be correct, which I will admit is correct for the present, then how is the present power to be classed? Clearly with the third class. How can Congress exercise the power to punish counterfeiters, if at the same time the States can...