Mattix v. Swepston
| Decision Date | 22 April 1913 |
| Parties | MATTIX et al. v. SWEPSTON. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Certiorari to Court of Civil Appeals.
Action by J. M. and G. D. Mattix against W. W. Swepston. A judgment sustaining a plea to the court's jurisdiction was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals and the case remanded and defendant petitions for a writ of certiorari. Judgment of Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.
C. L Marsilliot and A. H. Murray, both of Memphis, for plaintiffs.
Randolph & Randolph, of Memphis, for defendant.
This case is before us upon petition of the defendant, Swepston for writs of certiorari to the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals. The only question for determination is whether the cause of action asserted by the declaration against the defendant is local or transitory.
A brief statement of the case made in the declaration is that the plaintiffs bought a boundary of timber in Crittenden county, Ark., from one Maudlin. The contract of purchase gave the plaintiffs five years in which to cut and remove the timber, and also granted to them a right of way over adjacent lands of Maudlin, for the purpose of hauling the timber, when cut, over Maudlin's lands to the railroad. The plaintiffs entered into the possession of the land and cut and manufactured timber under their contract for about one year, when Maudlin leased the lands over which plaintiffs had acquired the right of way to the defendant, Swepston. Maudlin did not expressly reserve plaintiffs' right of way in his contract with Swepston, but Swepston knew of plaintiffs' rights in the premises at the time he made his contract of lease. Soon after acquiring the leasehold estate from Maudlin, Swepston obstructed the roadway over which plaintiffs had the easement, and by threats of violence maintained the obstruction and prevented plaintiffs from using the right of way. As a result of this interference upon the part of Swepston, the plaintiffs were unable to cut and remove the timber purchased from Maudlin. They defaulted in the performance of certain contracts for delivery of the timber, made after the purchase from Maudlin, and as a result of which they were forced into bankruptcy. They allege that they are damaged $4,000 in the loss of the timber and the breach of contracts, and $3,500 resulting from a sacrifice sale of their milling plant in the bankruptcy proceedings.
Swepston was found in Shelby county and sued there upon the foregoing facts. He interposed a plea that the cause of action was local and the venue was in Crittenden county, Ark., and not in Shelby county, Tenn. This plea was sustained by the trial judge and the suit dismissed, and his judgment was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals and the case remanded for further proceedings.
We think the Court of Civil Appeals was manifestly correct in its holding. A great variety of definitions of a cause of action may be found in the unreported cases. It is stated in volume 1 of the American & English Encyclopedia of Law & Practice, at page 1010, that the most accurate definition of cause of action is the one which identifies the cause of action with the defendant's delict or wrong, and many cases are cited in the notes to the text to support the definition; but it is stated in volume 1 of the A. & E. Encyclopedia of Pleading & Practice, at page 106, that a cause of action is generally held to be a union of the right of the plaintiff and its infringement by the defendant, and many cases are cited in the notes to the text to support the statement.
It may be safely said that no attempt so far to give an accurate definition of the term so as to meet the exigencies of all cases which may arise has been successfully made, and, indeed, such a general and inflexible definition could serve no particular purpose, and should not be attempted. With this qualification, it may be stated generally that the cause of action includes all the facts which together constitute the plaintiffs' right to maintain the action. This definition has the approval of such eminent authority as Mr. Justice Cooley in Post v. Campau, 42 Mich. 96, 3 N.W. 272, and Mr. Justice Johnson in Marquat v. Marquat, 12 N.Y. 341. Mr. Pomeroy, in his work on Remedies, gives substantially the same definition at section 521.
A true statement of the test between a local and a transitory action is whether the injury is done to a subject-matter which, in its nature, could not...
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Whitson v. Tennessee Cent. Ry. Co.
...A cause of action includes all the facts which, taken together, constitute the suing party's right to maintain the suit. Mattix v. Swepston, 127 Tenn. 693, 155 S.W. 928. next of kin could not maintain the action given exclusively to the administrator. Nashville & C. R. Co. v. Sprayberry, 8 ......
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Burns v. Duncan
... ... all the facts which together constitute the plaintiffs' ... right to maintain the action" ( Mattix v ... Swepston, 127 Tenn. 693, 697, 155 S.W. 928, 929); hence ... we may look to the plaintiff's declaration for a fuller ... statement of the ... ...
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Adaven Mgmt. v. Mountain Falls Acquisition
...1356 n. 1. We note that Dermody incorrectly quotes and attributes the definition of "appurtenant" used therein to Mattix v. Swepston, 127 Tenn. 693, 155 S.W. 928, 930 (1913); that definition may be correctly attributed to Black's Law Dictionary 103 (6th ed. 13. 122 Nev. at 1119, 146 P.3d at......
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...However, not every action that involves a specific tract of land is considered a local action. For example,in Mattix v. Swepston, 127 Tenn. 693, 155 S.W. 928 (Tenn. 1913), a suit that arose from obstruction of an easement was determined to be a transitory action, because the damages complai......