Mattox v. State

• Decision Date: 20 March 1961
• Docket Number: No. 41709,41709
• Citation: 128 So.2d 368,240 Miss. 544
• Parties: Jon N. MATTOX v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 368

128 So.2d 368

240 Miss. 544

Jon N. MATTOX v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 41709.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

March 20, 1961.

Barnett, Montgomery, McClintock & Cunningham, Jackson, W. L. Sims, Columbus, Jesse Stennis, Macon, for appellant.

Joe T. Patterson, Atty. Gen., by G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

JONES, Justice.

This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Lowndes County. The charge was murder, the verdict guilty, the sentence life. The appellant was a young man approximately 19 years of age. The deceased was a young matron, the mother of four children. They were next door neighbors on a quiet residential street in the college town of Columbus, Mississippi. The appellant was attending Mississippi State University at Starkville, commuting.

In view of the disposition of the case, it is unnecessary to go into a detailed statement of the facts. The case was one of circumstantial evidence. The deceased was found on Sunday morning, January 31 1960, on the floor of her garage, a coat hanger and a scarf twisted around her neck to the extent that her neck was constricted two inches according to the doctor's testimony. Her clothes were not in disarray, and there was no evidence of larceny, robbery, or attempted rape. The evidence justified the jury in finding that appellant was present in or around his home, which was located about six feet from the garage where deceased was found, during the time appellant was murdered, and that he had the opportunity to commit the crime at a time when deceased was alone in her home. The evidence, in our opinion, was sufficient to go to the jury on the theory that the defendant was the guilty party, having as a prompting force behind his act the victim's termination of an affair that had existed for sometime. A shirt shown to have been the shirt of the defendant and which the jury might have inferred was worn by him on the morning of the occurrence was introduced in evidence. A laboratory expert from the FBI testified that the fibers from this shirt were 'in every microscopic detail' similar to fibers found on the clothes worn by the deceased at the time of her death. Miss Sara Grayson, student at Mississippi State University, testified in detail that appellant, over a period of time, told her of an involved affair with someone whom the jury could have found was the deceased, of his frustrations because deceased had discontinued it, and of threats to kill her, including the method and means actually employed by the perpetrator of the crime. This testimony, it is argued, was inadmissible, but we think it was. Sandifer v. State, Miss., 192 So. 342; Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Ed., Vol. 1, Secs. 192, 193, 194 and 195. This is a brief outline of the facts upon which the jury found the defendant guilty. It is sufficient to say that the State made a rather strong case against appellant, although circumstantial.

Complaint is made of several of the instructions given in the case because they omit the necessity of the State proving the guilt of the defendant 'to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis.' Several of the instructions did omit such requirement; however, we find no error here because such omission was included in several other instructions requested by each side.

The court also granted to the State an instruction on the presumption of innocence that is almost word for word a copy of the instruction quoted in Smith v. State, 161 Miss. 430, 137 So. 96. In this case, Judge Anderson said of this instruction: 'A careful analysis of this instruction, we think, shows that it embodies correct legal principles. Nevertheless, it is so adroitly drawn as to go very near the border line. The lay mind, in reading it, might get the idea that the jury, in making up their verdict, were not to take into consideration the burden of proof and the presumption of innocence. At first glance, the instruction is calculated to convey that impression. We cannot say it was error for the court to give this instruction, but we think that on another trial it should be left out of the case. The instruction is too illusive for the ordinary juror to get hold of and understand its meaning; it is too smart.'

The same instruction was involved in McLaurin v. State, 205 Miss. 554, 37 So.2d 8. In that case, after the instruction had been given by the trial judge, when he heard it read to the jury he was doubtful of it and then withdrew it, and the jurors did not have it before them in their deliberations. The instruction was again before the Court of Williams v. State, Miss., 14 So.2d 216, and the Court refused to reverse on it. In the instant case we would not reverse on that instruction alone, but prosecuting attorneys should not use this instruction for the reasons stated in the Smith case, supra.

The State also obtained the following instruction: 'The Court instructs the jury for the State, as a matter of law, that the defendant has put in evidence his general reputation for peaceableness; that such evidence is permissible under the law and is to be considered by the jury as a circumstance in this case. But the Court further instructs the jury, that if, from all the evidence in this case, you are satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis, of the guilt of the accused, then it is your duty to find him guilty, notwithstanding the fact that heretofore the accused may have borne a very good character for peaceableness.'

Instructions on general reputation or character of the accused are said to be both argumentative and a comment upon the weight of the testimony. Mississippi Jury Instructions, Alexander, Sec. 1461, p. 350. They were also condemned in Coleman v. State, 59 Miss. 484, Calloway v. State, 155 Miss. 706, 125 So. 109, and other cases. The Court would not reverse on either one of the above instructions taken alone but they should not be used on another trial. The next question requires that the case be reversed and remanded for another trial.

Miss Sara Grayson was the key witness for the State. On cross-examination by one of the defense attorneys, and not in direct response to a question propounded by the attorney for defense, she volunteered: 'After that, sir, they carried me to Birmingham, the 24th, and * * *.' At this point, defense objected and moved that the testimony be developed in the absence of the jury. The jury was permitted to retire and in the absence of the jury, the following answer of the witness appears: 'On April 24 I went to the Police Department in Birmingham at 1 o'clock and from 1 o'clock until 6:30 they gave me a lie detector test.' Objection was made by attorney for the defense on the ground that this statement, as well as the statement in the presence of the jury, was not responsive to any question propounded by him. This objection was overruled, and the witness then said: 'Captain Evans and Sergeant Harris administered this test to me from 1 to 6:30. They asked me specific questions of questions that I have told today. I think you can probably obtain the results of the test from the police department.' At this point, counsel for defense objected to any testimony about any alleged lie detector test given this witness for the reason that it was inadmissible. The trial court held that it was not the test but the result of the test that the Supreme Court had passed on; that the fact the test was made could be shown but the result could not be shown. Attorney for defendant then objected to her testifying that she had taken a lie detector test. This objection was overruled.

After the jury returned, counsel for the State examined Miss Grayson in redirect examination, in which the following occurred:

'Q. All right, don't say what they say. What did you do then? A. The next day I went to Birmingham, left for Birmingham where I underwent a lie detector test.

'Q. Who went with you to Birmingham?

'Mr. Stennis: We object to that, if your Honor please, and move that since we have proof that such evidence is incompetent, we move that it be developed and the Court pass on its admissibility in the absence of the jury.

'Mr. Burgin: May it please the Court, you passed, the Court has passed on it once.

'The Court: Well, that's true. I let the jury go out Saturday and it was never developed any further than just where we have gone now and I believe the request was made by the attorney for the defendant at that time. All right, proceed.

'Mr. Stennis: Your Honor's ruling on that?

'The Court: Overruled.

'Mr. Stennis: Yes, sir.

'A. On, on, on this day on Saturday we met Louis Harper at ten o'clock and went to Birmingham. I spent Saturday night with my aunt in Birmingham, and Sunday at 1:00 o'clock we went to the Police Station where from 1:00 to 6:30 I was given a lie detector test on all the things that I have made, said in my statement.

'Mr. Stennis: Now we object, if your Honor please, on the ground that the Supreme Court has held that lie detector tests are so unreliable and depend to such a high degree on the personal interpretation of the person administering such test that they have never been admitted into any court, any superior court, or approved by any superior court in the entire United States.

'The Court: Well this was made, the Court will pass on those. Overruled.

'Mr. Stennis: Now we object further unless it is shown that the man who gave the lie detector test was skilled and unless it is shown what type of lie detector test was given, that he was skilled and that he was trained and that this thing was absolutely accurate.

'The Court: I think that is perhaps proper and the Court will sustain that objection. Anything further, Mr. Burgin?

'By Mr. Burgin:

'Q. You say that you underwent a lie detector test?

'Mr. Stennis: We renew our objection.

'The Court: Overruled.

'A. Yes, sir, I did, from 1:00 o'clock until 6:30 I was, I was at the Police Station where I underwent...