Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc.

• Decision Date: 04 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-2495.,03-2495.
• Citation: 359 F.3d 885
• Parties: Thomas MATTSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CATERPILLAR, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

359 F.3d 885

Thomas MATTSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CATERPILLAR, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 03-2495.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued January 14, 2004.

Decided March 4, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Catherine J. Trafton (argued), International Union, UAW, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Michael A. Warner (argued), M. Andrew McGuire, Seyfarth Shaw, Chicago, IL, Johna G. Anderson, Caterpillar Incorporated, Peoria, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and POSNER and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Chief Judge.

In 2001, Thomas Mattson filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that his employer, Caterpillar, Inc., retaliated against him in response to a charge of sexual harassment that he had filed with the Illinois Department of Human Rights ("IDHR") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The district court granted Caterpillar summary judgment, and Mattson now appeals. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1999, Thomas Mattson worked as an electrician in the engine test cell area of Caterpillar's manufacturing facility in Mossville, Illinois. The test cell area is quite noisy, and as a result employees are required to wear earplugs and must stand in close proximity to one another to converse. One of Mattson's supervisors in the test cell area was production supervisor Beth Cone. Cone was responsible for contacting electricians like Mattson whenever there were maintenance problems. Mattson and senior electrician Paul Hart were generally uncooperative when contacted by Cone, and they resisted taking orders from her.

During this time period, Cone and Mattson had several encounters. On one occasion, Cone observed Mattson sleeping at work, and reported this to Mattson's direct supervisor. In April 1999, Mattson and Hart left a test cell unattended when they were in the process of repairing it. When Cone challenged this disregard of proper safety procedures, Hart became angry and stepped toward Cone, which prompted Mattson to restrain him. Hart was subsequently transferred, leaving Mattson as the electrician dealing most directly with Cone.

Approximately five days later, Mattson and two co-workers told a maintenance manager that they were concerned about physical contact with Cone. The entirety of Mattson's complaint consisted of one instance where one of Cone's breasts had touched his arm during a conversation in the test cell area, and one instance where Cone had reached around him to get a clipboard but had not touched him. When Caterpillar's EEO Coordinator Lynda White later interviewed Mattson about the incident where Cone's breast allegedly touched Mattson's arm, Mattson stated that he did not know whether Cone had touched him in a suggestive way and that he did not believe that she was attracted to him. Mattson further stated that the contact may have been inadvertent. Based upon this, White concluded that Mattson's complaint was without merit. Caterpillar then issued Mattson a warning letter which stated that making false accusations of sexual harassment could lead to disciplinary action and discharge. However, Caterpillar also counseled Cone to be careful of how closely she stood to people.

Three months later, Mattson filed a charge of sexual harassment with the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission based upon the aforementioned incidents with Cone. Caterpillar's new EEO Coordinator Christine Troglio then began another internal investigation into the charges. At this point, Mattson's co-worker, Chuck Hollis, came forward with new information. Hollis submitted a signed affidavit in which he stated that Cone's breast did not touch Mattson. Hollis further stated that Mattson had told him that Mattson's goal was to get Cone "out of here any way possible." After receiving this information, Caterpillar concluded that Mattson's charges against Cone were made in bad faith in an attempt to retaliate against her. Caterpillar thereafter decided to discharge Mattson, and contends that the discharge was due to Mattson's dishonesty and retaliatory conduct.

Mattson filed suit against Caterpillar in 2001, alleging that his discharge violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the district court found that Mattson had failed to offer direct evidence of discrimination and could not prove discrimination through indirect evidence because Caterpillar had articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Mattson's discharge. The district court therefore granted summary judgment in favor of Caterpillar, and Mattson now appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Stockett v. Muncie Indiana Transit Sys., 221 F.3d 997, 1000 (7th Cir.2000). Summary judgment is appropriate only where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

In this case, the district court found that Mattson was unable to prove retaliatory discharge through either the direct or indirect methods of proof. Under the direct method, the plaintiff must provide either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence that shows that the employer acted based on prohibited animus. See Venturelli v. ARC Comty. Servs., Inc., 350 F.3d 592, 599 (7th Cir.2003). Under the indirect method, the plaintiff must provide evidence that "after filing the charge only he, and not any similarly situated employee who did not file a charge, was subjected to an adverse employment action even though he was performing his job in a satisfactory manner." See Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir.2002). If the plaintiff provides this evidence, the defendant must then present evidence of a non-invidious reason for the adverse action. Once the defendant presents a legitimate, non-invidious reason for the adverse action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's reason is pretextual. See Sitar v. Indiana Dept. of Transp., 344 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir.2003). Both methods of proof require that the plaintiff show that he or she was retaliated against after engaging in activity protected under Title VII. See Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir.2002).

We therefore begin by analyzing whether Mattson's activity was protected under Title VII. It is clear that Mattson was not sexually harassed when Cone's breast allegedly brushed against his arm on a single occasion or when Cone reached around Mattson without touching him. See, e.g., Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001) (stating that "sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII only if it is `so "severe or pervasive" as to "alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment"'"); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (stating that simple teasing, "offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the `terms and conditions of employment'"). It is also clear that no reasonable person could believe this constituted sexual harassment. See Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 362 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that no reasonable person could believe that a poke to the buttocks constitutes sexual harassment because such conduct is too "tepid or intermittent or equivocal"). Finally, even Mattson himself did not believe that he had been sexually harassed, as is evidenced by his admissions that he did not believe Cone was attracted to him and that the touch could have been inadvertent, as well as his statements to co-worker Chuck Hollis that he wanted to get Cone "out of here any way possible." Thus, the sexual harassment charge Mattson filed with the IDHR and EEOC was both objectively and subjectively unreasonable, as well as made with the bad faith purpose of retaliating against his female supervisor.

Still, Mattson insists that Title VII protects those who file charges that are unreasonable, false, and even malicious and defamatory. Mattson structures his argument by drawing a distinction between the "opposition clause" and "participation clause" of Title VII. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) provides that

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against [an employee] ... because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.

Mattson asserts that the opposition clause, which protects an employee who opposes "any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter," may include a good faith or reasonableness requirement, but that the participation clause, which protects an employee who "participated in any manner in an investigation" does not require either good faith or reasonableness for the employee to receive Title VII protection.

Mattson finds support for this interpretation of Title VII in dicta from several cases. See, e.g., Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir. 2000); Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292 1298 (8th Cir.1980); Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir.1989) (stating that under the participation clause, protection "is not lost if the employee is wrong on the merits of the charge, nor is protection lost if the contents of the charge are malicious and defamatory as well as wrong" (internal citations...