Matturi v. United States Civil Service Commission, Civ. No. 879-53.

• Decision Date: 19 April 1955
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 879-53.
• Citation: 130 F. Supp. 15
• Parties: Alexander J. MATTURI, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

130 F. Supp. 15

Alexander J. MATTURI, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent.

Civ. No. 879-53.

United States District Court D. New Jersey.

April 19, 1955.

Robert Scherling, Newark, N. J., for petitioner.

Augustine J. Kelly, Newark, N. J., for Housing Authority.

Raymond DelTufo, U. S. Atty., Newark, N. J., for respondent.

SMITH, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a petition for review filed herein pursuant to Section 12(c) of the Hatch Political Activity Act, as amended, 5 U. S.C.A. § 118k(c). The petitioner alleges that he is aggrieved by a report heretofore made by the respondent and the order entered thereon. The entire record, certified and filed herein by the respondent pursuant to the mandate of the statute, is before the Court. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the Court's consideration is limited, therefore, to the question of law raised by the petitioner.

The respondent issued and served upon the petitioner an Amended Letter of Charges in which it was alleged: first, that the petitioner was a member of the Newark Housing Authority, a local agency "financed in whole or in part by loans or grants made by the United States or by a Federal Agency thereof"; second, that his "principal (public) employment in 1952," as distinguished from his principal employment, "was in connection with" the said Authority; and third, that during his term of office he engaged in a political activity, to wit, that he was a candidate for the House of Representatives in the primary and general elections of 1952. The petitioner filed an answer in which he admitted the jurisdictional allegations but denied that he was a person subject to the provisions of the Act.

The respondent, after hearing, dismissed the defenses interposed by the petitioner and sustained the charge. The report discloses that the decision was predicated solely on the determination that the "principal (public) employment" of the petitioner, as distinguished from his "principal employment," was in connection with the Newark Housing Authority. This determination, although supported by the evidence, does not support the respondent's ultimate determination that the petitioner was a person subject to the provisions of the Act.

The pertinent provisions of the statute, 5 U.S.C.A. § 118k(a), read as follows: "No officer * * * of any State or local agency whose Principal Employment is in connection with any activity which is financed in whole or in part by loans or grants made by the United States or by any Federal agency shall (1) use his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or a nomination for office, or affecting the result thereof, or * * *. No such officer * * * shall take an active part in political management or in political campaigns." (Emphasis by the Court.)

The petitioner admitted at the hearing before the respondent that he was an officer of the Newark Housing Authority, a position for which he admittedly received no salary or other compensation, but denied that this was his "principal employment." He testified, and his testimony is not disputed, that he was a member of the bar actively engaged in the practice of law in the City of Newark. It is not denied that he was principally employed in the pursuit of his profession. We are of the opinion that under these circumstances the petitioner is a person not subject to the provisions of the Act.

The question now before the Court was considered and discussed by Chief Judge Pray in the opinion filed in the case of Anderson v. United States Civil Service Commission, D.C., 119 F.Supp. 567. We agree with his construction of the pertinent provisions of the Act hereinabove quoted, and we quote at length from that opinion, 119 F.Supp. at pages 576 and 577:

"The Commission has in effect amended the statute by adding the word `public', making it read: `principal public employment,' thereby changing the statutory wording entirely and minimizing the importance of the word `principal', since it is unusual to find a person holding

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