Matulin v. Village of Lodi

Citation862 F.2d 609
Decision Date06 December 1988
Docket NumberNo. 87-3957,87-3957
Parties49 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 38,658 Patricia G. MATULIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VILLAGE OF LODI, Edward Richardson, Village of Lodi Police Department, and Stefan Siverd, in their official and individual capacities, Defendants- Appellants.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

Lawrence J. Whitney (argued), Burdon and Merlitti, Akron, Ohio, for defendants-appellants.

Edward L. Gilbert (argued), Parms, Purnell & Gilbert, Akron, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before KRUPANSKY and GUY, Circuit Judges, GRAHAM, District Judge. *

RALPH B. GUY, Jr., Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff, Patricia Matulin, a former part-time police officer, filed suit in federal district court for the Northern District of Ohio against her former employer, the Village of Lodi. The suit also named the Village of Lodi Police Department, the mayor, and the police chief. The complaint included claims of discrimination based on sex and handicap, retaliation under Title VII for participating in a charge of discrimination, retaliation for the exercise of first amendment rights, a violation of her right to due process, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. With respect to her first amendment claim, plaintiff alleged that she had been wrongfully discharged in retaliation for making statements to a newspaper reporter regarding employment discrimination claims which she had previously filed with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. The first amendment claim was submitted to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff awarding her $75,000 in damages. The remaining issues were resolved by the court prior to trial. The court dismissed the claims relating to employment discrimination and the alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress because there was no evidence to support such claims. The court also held the plaintiff had a limited property interest in her job, and that the defendants deprived her of this property interest without due process of law by discharging plaintiff without affording her a hearing. The defendants appeal both the jury's verdict granting the plaintiff damages for the violation of her first amendment rights, and the district court's judgment awarding plaintiff two weeks part-time pay for the violation of her due process rights. Plaintiff has not filed a cross-appeal with respect to her other claims. For the following reasons, the judgment in favor of plaintiff awarding damages for violation of her first amendment rights is affirmed, and the judgment in plaintiff's favor on her fourteenth amendment due process claim is reversed.

I.

In November of 1984, plaintiff accepted a position as a part-time police officer in the Village of Lodi Police Department. In March of 1985, a full-time officer resigned and plaintiff applied for the position. On April 13, 1985, Police Chief Stefan Siverd informed plaintiff that he intended to hire another applicant, a male, for the position. One of the reasons given for the decision was that plaintiff had previously suffered a knee injury, and there was some question as to whether she would be able to perform her duties on a full-time basis. On April 22, 1985, plaintiff filed a claim with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission alleging that she had been discriminated against based on her sex and her knee injury, which she claimed constituted a handicap. Thereafter, the male applicant advised the police chief that he had accepted another job and therefore could not accept the offer to work as a full-time police officer for the Village of Lodi. On May 1, 1985, the plaintiff met with Chief Siverd and after some discussion, plaintiff was offered the full-time position. On May 2, 1985, the Village Council and the mayor accepted the police chief's recommendation that plaintiff be appointed to the full-time position. Plaintiff, however, was not immediately sworn in as a full-time officer but, rather, continued to work on a part-time basis.

Seven days after the Village Council approved the plaintiff's appointment, an article appeared in the local weekly newspaper describing the employment discrimination charges which the plaintiff had previously filed against the Village. The article appeared under the title "Officer alleges descrimination [sic] By Lodi Police Department." After detailing the substance of the employment discrimination claim and the procedures of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, the article described an interview with the plaintiff:

Matulin, in an interview last weekend, said the village intended to hire a Lodi man, Jeff Plute, of Janice Street, until it learned of her discrimination charge earlier in the week.

She says village officials told her that Plute was offered another job between the time Lodi tentatively decided to hire him and when his psychological tests came back, which would have enabled Plute's official hiring.

Matulin rejects this reasoning, though.

"Everyone is very concerned about why I got the job right after the papers were served."

Matulin says she decided to go ahead with her complaint despite the job offer because "I've decided to stand up and let people know" what's going on [in] the Police Department.

"I am not looking for financial gain," she says, "I want my credibility restored and my name cleared."

Matulin says that if the village had hired Plute, it would have gotten an officer with less experience and less training than she has.

....

Shortly after she started as a Lodi officer, Matulin injured her leg in a fight while making an arrest. She says village officials were using this as one reason why they did not want to hire her full-time.

However, Matulin says the injury has not been serious enough to keep her from performing her duties.

In fact, she says, since Bannerman left the Lodi force, there was one instance when she worked 90 hours in a two-week period because the police force was short-handed. This, she says, should have shown that she could still do the job.

After reviewing this article, Police Chief Siverd contacted the reporter who wrote the article and verified the statements attributed to the plaintiff. Although the article was published after plaintiff's appointment, the interview took place prior to that time. On May 13, Chief Siverd submitted a letter to the Village Council withdrawing his recommendation that plaintiff be hired as a full-time officer and further recommended that she be terminated immediately from her present probationary position as a part-time officer. The Council voted to accept the police chief's recommendation, and the chief called the plaintiff that day to inform her of the Council's decision. On May 14, 1985, Chief Siverd sent a letter to plaintiff which stated in part:

At the May 13, 1985 Village of Lodi Council meeting, it was noted by myself, that your probationary employment as a part-time police officer would be ending on May 26, 1985. At this meeting I made no recommendation as to the continuation for employment beyond the probationary period.

This lack of a recommendation results in the immediate termination of your employment with the Village of Lodi.

At trial, Chief Siverd testified that the statements made by the plaintiff in the newspaper article violated the written rules of the police department relating to confidentiality and loyalty. 1 Chief Siverd also testified that the plaintiff's termination was based at least in part, on previous infractions to the work rules which had resulted in verbal reprimands.

As previously noted, plaintiff prevailed on her claims based on the first and fourteenth amendments. The district court subsequently denied the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

II.

Defendants raise five issues on appeal. First, defendants argue that the statements of the plaintiff which appeared in the newspaper article were not constitutionally protected because they did not involve matters of public interest. Second, defendants contend that the newspaper article was not a substantial or motivating factor in the plaintiff's termination. Third, the defendants argue that the police department's interest in maintaining discipline and morale outweighs the plaintiff's first amendment rights. Fourth, defendants claim that the damage award of $75,000 was excessive. Fifth and finally, defendants argue that plaintiff did not have a property interest in her job with the Lodi Police Department, meaning that defendants cannot be held liable for terminating her employment without affording her a hearing. We address each of these issues separately.

A. First Amendment Claim

"It is clearly established that a State may not discharge an employee on a basis that infringes that employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of speech." Rankin v. McPherson, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 2896, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987). In Rankin, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the balancing test which is used to determine whether a public employee's speech deserves constitutional protection. The test requires "a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern against the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of public services it performs through its employees." Rankin, 107 S.Ct. at 2896 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968)).

1. Matter of Public Concern

The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he threshold question in applying this balancing test is whether [the employee's] speech may be 'fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern.' " Rankin, 107 S.Ct. at 2896-97 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1689, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983)). "Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of...

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