Matzker v. Herr, 82-3104

• Decision Date: 07 November 1984
• Docket Number: No. 82-3104,82-3104
• Citation: 748 F.2d 1142
• Parties: Edward James MATZKER, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Raymond HERR, Sheriff, Richard A. Schaab, Lt. and Mary Pearsall, Corrections Officer, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 1142

748 F.2d 1142

Edward James MATZKER, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Raymond HERR, Sheriff, Richard A. Schaab, Lt. and Mary

Pearsall, Corrections Officer, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 82-3104.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 16, 1984.

Decided Oct. 31, 1984.

As Amended Nov. 7, 1984.

Carl S. Nadler, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.

Gary L. Bement, State's Atty., Belleville, Ill., for defendants-appellees.

Before, WOOD, CUDAHY, and COFFEY, Circuit Judges.

COFFEY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Edward James Matzker appeals from the dismissal of his pro se civil rights action seeking damages for injuries suffered while he was a pretrial detainee in the St. Clair County Jail in Belleville, Illinois for denial of adequate medical care, failure to protect him from assault and for infringement of his right of access to court. We reverse the decision of the magistrate.

I.

Matzker filed his complaint on July 6, 1979. Matzker, a Caucasian, alleges that he "had some trouble" with black inmates shortly after he was confined in the jail and transferred to another cell block. He was involved in an inter-racial fight in his new cell block and, as a result, was transferred to segregation. Matzker's attorney brought the transfer to segregation to the attention of the trial judge and Matzker was then moved to a third cell block, Cell Block A. Matzker alleged that while in Cell Block A, black inmates "gave Matzker problems" because of the earlier inter-racial fight. Matzker informed Defendant Schaab, an assistant supervisor at the jail, of his problem with the black inmates, specifically inmate Willie B. Lewis, and asked to be transferred out of Cell Block A. According to Matzker, Schaab refused to help him because Matzker had complained to the court about being placed in segregation.

On March 8, 1979, four days after his transfer to Cell Block A, Matzker was beaten by Lewis and another black inmate. As a result of the beating, Matzker suffered the loss of three teeth, his nose was fractured and his left eye was injured. The Defendant Pearsall, a corrections officer, allegedly was aware of Matzker's previous trouble with black inmates and was responsible for guarding Cell Block A on the day Matzker was assaulted. Further, according to the complaint, Matzker alleges he was beaten for fifteen to twenty minutes before Pearsall "came to see what was happening."

Matzker initially was taken to the prison infirmary and later was transferred to a hospital for X-rays. On March 9, 1979, doctors at the hospital operated on Matzker's fractured nose but did not treat the injuries to his eye or his teeth. After his visit to the hospital, Matzker again complained to the guards and to the jail's medical staff that the injuries to his eye and to his teeth had not been treated. According to Matzker, after his return from the hospital the jail medical staff advised him that they were not equipped to treat those injuries. The injuries to Matzker's teeth and eye were not treated for a period of some three months, and, as a result, he allegedly suffered permanent injuries.

Matzker's complaint ¹ named as defendants Sheriff Raymond Herr, Lieutenant Richard Schaab and Guard Mary Pearsall. In a brief filed in response to a motion to dismiss, Matzker stated that Sheriff Herr was partly responsible for the violence at the St. Clair County Jail in that he failed to properly enforce the jail rules concerning prisoner control and care. Matzker also stated that Herr exerted an "inadequate level of [s]upervision" over jail employees. The case was referred to a magistrate and the parties entered into a stipulation allowing the entry of final judgment by the magistrate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(c) (West's Supp.1984). ² The magistrate dismissed Matzker's complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The magistrate held the complaint insufficient to state a claim against Sheriff Herr ruling that it failed to allege any personal involvement by the Sheriff. The magistrate also ruled that Matzker's allegation that Herr was responsible for the overall operations of the jail was insufficient as it attempted to hold Herr liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The magistrate concluded that Matzker's complaint failed to state a claim based on the denial of medical care because he admitted that he was in fact transferred from the jail to a hospital and then to the jail's infirmary. The magistrate ruled that, because Matzker received treatment for his broken nose at the hospital, the defendants' alleged failure to treat Matzker's injured eye and teeth did not amount to the "deliberate indifference" necessary to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Finally, the magistrate held that the complaint alleged, at most, that the defendants were negligent in failing to protect Matzker from assault. The magistrate reasoned that, because "deliberate indifference" must be proven to sustain a constitutional claim, the complaint failed to state a claim based on the defendants' failure to protect Matzker.

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II.

In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1872 n. 16, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), the Supreme Court set out the standard of constitutional review applicable to procedures, policies or practices affecting pretrial detainees. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits "punishment" of persons unless they have been convicted of a crime. Id. at 533-37 and n. 16, 99 S.Ct. at 1870-73 and n. 16. The detainee's right to be free from punishment is not limited to the length of his pretrial detention but also includes the right not to be subjected to conditions imposed for the purpose of punishment. Id. at 535-42, 99 S.Ct. at 1871-75. Courts must decide whether a condition imposed during pretrial detention is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose. Id. at 539, 99 S.Ct. at 1874.

"Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detentional facility officials, that determination generally will turn on whether an alternative purpose to which the restriction may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it. Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to 'punishment.' "

Id. at 539-40, 99 S.Ct. at 1874-75. Accordingly, any act or practice which has been found to violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment also violates the due process rights of pretrial detainees; by definition, whatever is cruel and unusual punishment is punishment. Id. at 545, 99 S.Ct. at 1877. However, the Due Process Clause does not require a showing of deliberate indifference. Kincaid v. Rusk, 670 F.2d 737, 743 n. 8 (7th Cir.1982). In Kincaid, this court specifically held that a pretrial detainee does not have to demonstrate "that the official's acts must be unnecessary and deliberate or wanton or intentionally reckless or wrongful to constitute a constitutional deprivation actionable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983." Id. at n. 8. Since a pretrial detainee does not have to demonstrate that the official's acts were deliberately indifferent, the magistrate erred in applying the deliberate indifference standard in dismissing this complaint.

III.

Our inquiry turns, therefore, to the question of whether Matzker stated a cause of action when judged under due process standards. A complaint drafted by a pro se litigant "however inartfully pleaded," is held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S.Ct. 173, 175, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980). The district court's role is to ensure that the claims of pro se litigants are given "fair and meaningful consideration." Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1214, 103 S.Ct. 1212, 75 L.Ed.2d 451 (1983). Accordingly, courts must construe pro se complaints liberally. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court, after examining the pleadings, must determine only whether the plaintiff should be allowed to present evidence on his claims. Mescall v. Burrus, 603 F.2d 1266, 1268 (7th Cir.1979). The court may dismiss the complaint only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Hughes, 449 U.S. at 10, 101 S.Ct. at 176.

A cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 has two elements: (1) the defendants acted under color of state law; and (2) their actions deprived a plaintiff of a constitutional right. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). The record reflects that the defendants in the instant case, while acting as law enforcement officials, were clearly acting under color of state law. State Bank v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140, 1143 (7th Cir.1983). We must now direct our attention to the issue of whether the defendants allegedly infringed upon Matzker's constitutional rights.

A. Denial of Medical Care.

Matzker's complaint alleged that he received a broken nose in addition to suffering three broken teeth and an injured eye in the assault. According to the complaint, the defendants failed to provide adequate medical care for the injuries to Matzker's teeth and eye resulting in permanent injury. Matzker was transferred to the hospital for examination but the record discloses that he was only treated and operated on for his broken nose. The record fails to disclose that he was examined or treated by a dentist for his dental problems or that he was examined by a...