Maurer v. Chyatte, 69110

• Decision Date: 25 January 1985
• Docket Number: No. 69110,69110
• Parties: MAURER v. CHYATTE et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 543

326 S.E.2d 543

173 Ga.App. 343

MAURER v. CHYATTE et al.

No. 69110.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Jan. 25, 1985.

Glenville Haldi, Atlanta, for appellant.

J. Kenneth Moorman, Marjorie M. McCaw, Atlanta, for appellees.

CARLEY, Judge.

The instant case arises from a three-car collision. Appellee-defendant Scott Chyatte was driving a vehicle owned by his mother, appellee-defendant Helen Chyatte. Mr. Chyatte drove his mother's vehicle into the rear of the preceding car. As a result, this second car struck the rear of the vehicle that appellant-plaintiff was driving. Appellant brought the instant suit against appellees, alleging that she had been physically injured as the result of the collision. The case was submitted to a jury and a verdict for appellees was returned. Appellant's motion for new trial was denied and she appeals.

1. Appellant enumerates the general grounds. Appellees did not contest the issue of liability for negligence in connection with the causation of the collision itself. They did, however, strongly contest the existence of the requisite causal connection between the collision and the physical injuries that appellant alleged she had sustained therein. We have reviewed the record and find that a verdict based upon the evidence supporting appellees' defense was not unauthorized. See generally King v. Loyd, 170 Ga.App. 638, 639(1), 317 S.E.2d 879 (1984); Hiter v. Shelp, 134 Ga.App. 814, 216 S.E.2d 666 (1975); Brown v. Nutter, 125 Ga.App. 449, 188 S.E.2d 133 (1972).

2. Likewise, the issue of whether appellant had suffered a "serious injury" as the result of the collision was correctly submitted to the jury. See generally Dabney v. Ammons, 150 Ga.App. 737, 258 S.E.2d 551 (1979); Pinkston v. Hagin, 157 Ga.App. 2, 3(2), 276 S.E.2d 67 (1981).

3. The giving of the following charge is enumerated as error: "[T]he testimony of a party who offers themselves as a witness in their own behalf is to be construed more strongly against that person when it is contradictory, vague or equivocal, and is not entitled to a finding in their favor if that version of their testimony the most unfavorable to them shows the verdict should be against them." (Emphasis supplied.)

The above-quoted portion of the trial court's charge does state two correct and interrelated abstract principles of law. See generally Mattison v. Travelers Indemn. Co., 167 Ga.App. 521, 525(4), 307 S.E.2d 39 (1983). First, as indicated by the unemphasized portion of the contested charge, the testimony of a party who offers himself as a witness in his own behalf is to be construed most strongly against him when that testimony is self-contradictory, vague, or equivocal. See White v. Rainwater, 205 Ga. 219, 224, 52 S.E.2d 838 (1949). However, the correct legal principle that is contained in the emphasized portion of the contested charge has no applicability in a case unless there is no testimony--other than the party's own vague, contradictory and equivocal testimony--upon which a verdict in his favor might be returned. Ray v. Green, 113 Ga. 920, 39 S.E. 470 (1901); Clark v. Bandy, 196 Ga. 546, 561, 27 S.E.2d 17 (1943). See also Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Evans, 96 Ga. 481, 23 S.E. 494 (1894); Castile v. Burton, 200 Ga. 877, 882(2), 38 S.E.2d 919 (1946); Fowler v. Glover, 105 Ga.App. 216, 123 S.E.2d 903 (1962); Mattison v. Travelers Indemn. Co., supra.

Appellant was not the only witness who testified as to the crucial causation issue. In addition to her own testimony with regard to causation, appellant's physician was a witness on her behalf. However, appellees contend that the contested charge was nonetheless applicable and properly given in the instant case. According to appellees, the medical testimony that was given by appellant's physician was insufficient to authorize a finding of the requisite causal connection between the collision and appellant's physical condition, and the jury was thus, in effect, left with only appellant's testimony upon which it could base a finding in her favor as to this issue. Appellees further characterize appellant's testimony in this regard as having been contradictory, vague and equivocal, and they therefore make the assertion that the contested charge was applicable and properly given.

Because it is the underlying premise of appellees' assertion regarding the applicability of their requested charge, the asserted evidentiary insufficiency of the testimony of appellant's physician will be the first issue addressed. Thus, "[a]ssuming, but not deciding, that the [appellant's] testimony was such that it should be construed most strongly against [her]," (Fowler v. Glover, supra at 217, 123 S.E.2d 903), we will initially determine whether appellant may nevertheless have been "entitled to have a jury decide" the causation issue based solely upon the testimony of her physician, in which event the emphasized portion of the charge was not adjusted to the case. Fowler v. Glover, supra at 218, 123 S.E.2d 903.

In cases that involve "issues of causation which, by the nature of the situation, [can] be resolved solely by expert medical evidence standing alone, ... the evidence must naturally be based at least on reasonable probability. 'It appears to be well settled that medical testimony as to the possibility of a causal relation between a given accident or injury and the subsequent death or impaired physical or mental condition of the person injured is not sufficient, standing alone, to establish such relation.' [Cit.]" (Emphasis deleted.) Nat. Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Durham, 115 Ga.App. 420, 422-423, 154 S.E.2d 752 (1967). The essence of the testimony given by appellant's physician was as follows: Although only a post-mortem examination would constitute conclusive proof, the symptoms that appellant exhibited would "only arise from damage to the spinal canal and spinal cord"; appellant had no pre-existing condition to account for these symptoms, all diseases had been "effectively ruled ... out," and the "most plausible explanation was that [appellant's condition] was somehow related to scar tissue that had developed within the spinal cord"; sitting in an automobile that had been struck from the rear afforded "a reasonable description as to how injuries of this type occur" and, disease having been eliminated, "the most probable cause of [appellant's condition] was the accident." (Emphasis supplied.) It was the conclusion of the physician...