Maus v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 23 May 1956
• Docket Number: No. 34597,34597
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court
• Parties: , 59 O.O. 366 MAUS, Appellee, v. The NEW YORK, CHICAGO & ST. LOUIS RD. CO., Appellant.

Page 281

165 Ohio St. 281

135 N.E.2d 253, 59 O.O. 366

MAUS, Appellee, v. The NEW YORK, CHICAGO & ST. LOUIS RD. CO., Appellant.

No. 34597.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

May 23, 1956.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. In determining the amount of damages due a plaintiff who has suffered a wrongful personal injury resulting in loss of future earning power, the jury should take into consideration the loss of future earnings which it finds with reasonable certainty will result from the injury and also the earning power of money; and the amount awarded for future earnings should be reduced to its present value as a lump sum payable at the time of the verdict.

2. In an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq., where, among the elements of damages, there is a claim of impaired earning capacity, past and future, it is not error for the trial court to refuse defendant's written request to charge before argument that, as a matter of law, 'by virtue of the Internal Revenue Act of 1954, any amount received by the plaintiff as compensation for personal injuries is exempt from federal income taxation, and you must take this fact in consideration in arriving at the amount of your verdict in this case.'

The plaintiff, John R. Maus, was injured on February 24, 1953, while engaged in employment in interstate commerce as a railroad brakeman for the defendant railroad in an area known as the 'scrap yard' located at and near East Forty-ninth Street in the city of Cleveland. The injury occurred at night while plaintiff was approaching a derail switch preparatory to operating it. He slipped on some loose gravel which was on the side of a small depression near the switch handle and sustained injury to his back and left knee. At the time of his injury, the plaintiff was 33 years of age and was earning approximately $500 per month. He claims severe injury and serious impairment to his future earning capacity.

The plaintiff brought this action in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County against the defendant to recover damages for the injury. The issues presented to the jury were negligence of the defendant, contributory negligence of the plaintiff, and damages claimed by the plaintiff. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $35,000. The defendant's motion for a new trial was overruled, and an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, which court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The sole ground of error argued before the Court of Appeals was the refusal of the trial court at the close of all the evidence to give a special charge to the jury as submitted by the defendant, the nature and import of which will be discussed in the opinion.

The cause is before this court upon the allowance of defendant's motion to certify the record.

Hornbeck, Ritter & Victory, Edwin Knachel and Donald E. Ryan, Cleveland, for appellant.

Bernsteen, Bernsteen & Gaines, Cleveland, for appellee.

HART, Judge.

Section 104, Title 26 U.S.Code, provides as follows:

'(a) In general.--Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expense) for any prior taxable year, gross income does not include----

* * *

* * *

'(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness * * *.' (Italics supplied.)

At the close of all the evidence the defendant requested the court to charge the jury as follows:

'I charge you as a matter of law that by virtue of the Internal Revenue Act of 1954, any amount received by the plaintiff as compensation for personal injuries is exempt from federal income taxation, and you must take this fact in consideration in arriving at the amount of your verdict in this case.'

The trial court refused to give this requested charge. The defendant claims that such refusal is reversible error.

This court has heretofore held that 'where an accurate statement of law is embodied in a timely requested written charge and such charge is pertinent to issues raised and applicable to the particular state of facts to which it is intended to apply, a mandatory duty devolves upon the court to give it in the form tendered.' Bradley v. Mansfield Rapid Transit, Inc., 154 Ohio St. 154, 168, 93 N.E.2d 672, 680. See, also, Section 11420-1, General Code, Section 2315.01, Revised Code; Bartson v. Craig, 121 Ohio St. 371, 169 N.E. 291.

The sole question then before this court is whether the requested charge was pertinent to the issues and was applicable to the particular state of facts proved in the instant case.

Apparently only two of the Supreme Courts of the states have passed on this specific question. In the case of Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 The Supreme Court of Missouri held that a requested instruction on income tax under like circumstances was proper. The court in its opinion said:

'Present economic conditions are such that most citizens, most jurors, are not only conscious of, but acutely sensitive to, the impact of income taxes. Under the Federal and State income tax laws of both Arkansas and Missouri the net income of all persons is taxable except such as is specifically exempted. Few persons, other than those who have had special occasion to learn otherwise, have any knowledge of the exemption involved in this case. It is reasonable to assume the average juror would believe the award involved in this case [would] be subject to such taxes. It seems clear, therefore, that in order to avoid any harm such a misconception could bring about, it would be competent and desirable to instruct the jury that an award of damages for personal injuries is not subject to Federal or State income taxes. * * *

'Can there by any sound reason for not so instructing the jury? We can think of none. Surely, the plaintiff has no right to receive an enhanced award due to a possible and, we think, probable misconception on the part of a jury that the amount allowed by it will be reduced by income taxes. Such an instruction would at once and for all purposes take the subject of...