Maus v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 1987
• Docket Number: Nos. 19,54 and 66,s. 19
• Citation: 532 A.2d 1066,311 Md. 85
• Parties: Leonard Joseph MAUS v. STATE of Maryland. Nathan Donnell WILKES v. STATE of Maryland. Richard Allen EDGE v. STATE of Maryland. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 85

311 Md. 85

532 A.2d 1066

Leonard Joseph MAUS v. STATE of Maryland.

Nathan Donnell WILKES v. STATE of Maryland.

Richard Allen EDGE v. STATE of Maryland.

Nos. 19, 54 and 66, Sept. Term, 1987.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 4, 1987.

Nancy S. Forster, Asst. Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for Maus and Wilkes, Sherrie B. Glasser, Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore, on the brief for Maus.

Jose' Felipe' Anderson, Asst. Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for Edge.

Mary Ellen Barbera, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, for appellee State.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, ADKINS and BLACKWELL, JJ.

ADKINS, Judge.

The three cases we now consider present a common question: When a probationer has admitted violations of probation, the probation has been revoked, and a sentence of incarceration imposed, does § 12-302(e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Art. (1984 Repl.Vol.) require that further review be by application for leave to appeal, or does that statute impose that procedure only upon review of a judgment entered after a plea of guilty in a criminal case? The Court of Special Appeals believed that § 12-302(e) applies in the probation context. We do not agree and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in each case. ¹

I. Section 12-302(e) of the Courts Article

In the Circuit Court for Worcester County, Leonard Joseph Maus was charged with violations of probation. He admitted them, presenting evidence and argument only as to disposition. The court found that he had violated probation and imposed the full five year sentence that it had originally suspended in favor of that probation. Essentially the same events occurred with respect to Nathan Donnell Wilkes in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County (original ten year sentence reimposed) and to Richard Allen Edge in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County (original five year sentence reimposed). Each of them noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. In each case the State moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that under the circumstances, § 12-302(e) allowed no appeal as of right, but instead permitted only an application for leave to appeal. In each case the Court of Special Appeals granted the motion to dismiss. In each case we granted a petition for the writ of certiorari. We now explain why the intermediate appellate court misread the statute.

Section 12-301 of the Courts Art. provides a broad right of appeal: "Except as provided in § 12-302, a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court." Section 12-302(e) limits that right. Enacted by Ch. 295, Acts of 1983, it reads:

Section 12-301 does not permit an appeal from a final judgment entered following a plea of guilty in a circuit court. Review of such a judgment shall be sought by application for leave to appeal.

The words of this statute strongly suggest that it applies only to criminal cases. Guilty pleas are not filed in civil cases, and a revocation of probation proceeding is, in Maryland, "firmly established as a civil action...." Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224, 239, 522 A.2d 1348, 1355 (1987). More specifically, in Howlett v. State, 295 Md. 419, 423-424, 456 A.2d 375, 377-378 (1983), we explained that the Maryland rules dealing with guilty pleas and how they may be tendered and accepted simply do not apply in probation revocation cases. Howlett's teaching has now been embodied in the rules. Rule 4-346(c) explicitly states that "[t]he provisions of Rule 4-242 [dealing with pleas in criminal cases] do not apply to an admission of violation of conditions of probation." It is, of course, just such admissions that we have before us. ²

The State, nevertheless, asserts that the purpose of § 12-302(e) was and is to lessen the workload of the Court of Special Appeals, and that this laudable purpose will be advanced by applying the statute to dispositions following admissions of probation violations. It further argues that an admission of violation in a probation revocation case is in many respects the functional equivalent of a guilty plea in a criminal case. In both instances, for example, it asserts that the facts are established and not reviewable on appeal. "Nothing remains," after the plea or admission "but to give judgment and determine punishment." Sutton v. State, 289 Md. 359, 364, 424 A.2d 755, 758 (1981) (discussing effect of guilty plea).

While we are not persuaded that the analogy between guilty pleas and probation violation admissions is necessarily as perfect as the State would have it, it is at least conceivable that the legislature might have intended to extend § 12-302(e) to the latter situation, despite the inaptness of the language used, if that was the desired result. There is no doubt that divination of the legislative goal or objective is basic to the task of statutory construction, Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987), and that in seeking to ascertain that goal or objective, we often should "pursue the context of statutory language" by reviewing what may in general be characterized as "legislative history." Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514-515, 525 A.2d at 632-633. "The purpose, in short, determined in light of the statute's context, is the key." Id. 309 Md. at 516, 525 A.2d at 633. We turn, then, to consideration of the legislative history of § 12-302(e).

As we have observed, the measure was enacted by Ch. 295, Acts of 1983. But its roots extend further back than the 1983 session of the General Assembly.

On 6 October 1977 the Legislative Committee of the Maryland Judicial Conference ³ "considered [Chief] Judge Gilbert's [recommendation] that further review after a guilty plea at the circuit court level should be by application for leave to appeal" and "[t]he committee voted to propose legislation in this regard." Md.Jud.Conf., Minutes of 6 Oct. 1977 meeting of the Legislative Committee at 4. Shortly thereafter, the Executive Secretary of the Judicial Conference wrote Delegate Owens, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, about a bill to "provide for an application for leave to appeal ... in connection with a conviction entered on a guilty plea in the circuit court." Executive Secretary's letter of 21 December 1977 to Chairman Owens at 2 [emphasis supplied]. Legislation was introduced. Senate Bill 617 and House Bill 881, both of 1978, contained language almost identical to that of present § 12-302(e). Neither bill emerged from committee.

The same results occurred at the 1979 legislative session, when S.B. 326 and H.B. 887 both died in committee. The Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee file, however, contains the following comment on S.B. 326:

The Bill provides that review of final judgment in cases when the Defendant entered a guilty plea shall be on petition ... praying [for] leave to appeal and not by right as now exists. This procedure ... is aimed at reducing the number of frivolous appeals after conviction following the Defendant's entry of a guilty plea.

Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee file on S.B. 326 (1979) [emphasis supplied]. This document, like the Executive Secretary's 1977 letter, has a distinctly "criminal" sound, with its mention not only of "guilty plea" but also of "conviction."

The Judicial Conference at that point temporarily suspended further activity on the proposal. Minutes of 30 July 1979 meeting of Criminal Law Subcommittee of the Legislative Committee at 2. But the concept was resuscitated by the Commission to Study the Judicial Branch of Government.

That Commission (often denominated the "Fisher Commission" in recognition of its Chairman Charles O. Fisher, Esq.) was created pursuant to Resolution 25 of 1981. As directed by that Resolution, the Commission studied "all aspects of the operations of the Judicial Branch of government" including the operations of the appellate courts. In its report, it identified "the major problem of the appellate level" as "the workload of the Court of Special Appeals." Report of the Commission to Study the Judicial Branch of Government (1982) at 14 [hereinafter Report ]. After a perceptive analysis of this problem and various possible solutions, it rejected major proposals for structural and jurisdictional changes, emphasizing instead procedural and administrative approaches. Report at 15-37. It did, however, identify "one narrow area for the addition of discretionary review by the Court of Special Appeals." Report at 28. It recommended that review of a conviction following a plea of guilty should be ... made discretionary. Such a proposal was made by the Judicial Conference in 1979.

The Commission reasoned:

A guilty plea is an admission of guilt. When sentence is imposed following such a plea, the factual details of the criminal offense and the issues of guilt or innocence are usually no longer issues for appellate review. Generally, the only appellate issues are whether the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered with full appreciation of the potential consequences, whether a particular plea bargain was followed, and whether the sentence was lawful. These issues can readily and properly be handled through the application for leave to appeal process. Adoption of this recommendation would affect an estimated 100 cases annually (about 5.8 percent of the court's 1981 Term filings).

Report at 28 [emphasis supplied; footnotes omitted].

We again note the vocabulary of the criminal law--"conviction," "guilty plea," "sentence," "guilt or innocence," "plea bargain." It is difficult to believe that the 12 distinguished judges and lawyers who comprised three-quarters of the Commission did not understand the meaning of these terms and did not use them in their technical senses.

Supporting this view is the...