Sutton v. State

• Decision Date: 19 January 1981
• Docket Number: No. 132,132
• Citation: 424 A.2d 755,289 Md. 359
• Parties: Elizabeth Ann SUTTON v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 359

289 Md. 359

424 A.2d 755

Elizabeth Ann SUTTON v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 132.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 19, 1981.

Nancy Louise Cook, Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Thomas P. Barbera, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before SMITH, DIGGES, ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON and RODOWSKY, JJ.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

In this case, at the direction of the trial court, a plea of not guilty upon an agreed statement of facts was tendered. No defense was raised. A plea bargain was entered recommending probation. The question presented is whether, under these particular circumstances, the requirements of Maryland Rule 731 c are applicable.

Rule 731 c provides:

"The court may not accept a plea of guilty without first questioning the defendant on the record to determine that the plea is made voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. The court may accept the plea of guilty even though the defendant does not admit that he is in fact guilty if the court is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea. If the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty." (Emphasis added.)

In the Criminal Court of Baltimore, xxxx Elizabeth Ann Sutton, the petitioner, was charged with assault. After the case was called to trial, the following colloquy took place:

"MR. LEWIS (State's Attorney): Your Honor the State at this time will call the case of State of Maryland versus Elizabeth Sutton.

MR. HOFFMAN (Defense Counsel): Miss Sutton step up. Your Honor this is the matter we have approached the bench on, would the Court wish to proceed by way of a guilty plea, on an Alford plea, or a not guilty statement of facts with the defendant not testifying and submitting.

THE COURT: Not guilty statement of facts. Bring the witnesses up.

MR. HOFFMAN: Miss Sutton please come up ma'am.

THE COURT: Come up here please?

THE CLERK: What is your age? (There is no response from the defendant.)

THE CLERK: How old are you?

MISS SUTTON: Fifty seven.

THE CLERK: What is your birthday?

MISS SUTTON: April 3rd, 1921.

THE CLERK: Elizabeth Sutton under warrant 47818122, the State of Maryland charges you with assault. Counsel your name and plea for the record?

MR. HOFFMAN: George Hoffman, Assistant Public Defender, on behalf of Elizabeth Sutton. Miss Sutton has been advised of her right to a jury trial. I will explain that to her, I already have, that a jury is composed of twelve people selected from Baltimore, all of whom would have to agree unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt before she could be convicted. Miss Sutton indicates she understands what a jury is and wishes to waive her right to a jury trial. Is that correct Miss Sutton?

MISS SUTTON: Yes.

MR. HOFFMAN: In addition we would enter a not guilty plea and proceed on an agreed statement of facts. I have advised Miss Sutton by so doing she is waiving her constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her, giving up the right also to later testify and deny the allegation of assault.

Miss Sutton further was advised there have been plea negotiations and that there has been a bench conference as well in relation to this particular case. That all parties in this case feel that there will be a recommendation of probation made, and a suspended sentence, the exact amount of time suspended is up to the Judge, and probation, whatever conditions the Probation Department provides will be left up to them or to the Judge. Do you understand that Miss Sutton?

MISS SUTTON: Yes.

MR. HOFFMAN: Further do you understand the Judge is not bound to give you any particular recommendation but the Judge has indicated that he will give you a probation in this case. Do you understand that?

MISS SUTTON: Yes.

MR. HOFFMAN: We are ready to proceed and the plea is not guilty.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEWIS: The statement of facts would be as follows Your Honor, Mr. Davenport, if he were called to the stand, he is right next to me at trial table, he would testify that on May 17th it is pretty hard to read the facts on this charging document. That on May 17th, 1978, he was in the 2100 block of Saint Paul Street, City of Baltimore, State of Maryland. That at that time Mr. Davenport was sitting on a neighbor's porch. At that time he saw the defendant, at trial table, who he would identify as Elizabeth Sutton, on the corner of 21st Street and Saint Paul. At that time the defendant walked across the street. Mr. Davenport did not say a word to her. At that time the defendant approached Mr. Davenport and spat into his face. Of course Mr. Davenport would testify that he did not give her permission to do this. That he also did not get up from where he was sitting. This happened in the City of Baltimore, State of Maryland Your Honor and that would be the statement of facts.

MR. HOFFMAN: Your Honor, that is an agreed statement of facts, as far as what we are stipulating this witness would have testified had he been called to testify. Is that the whole State's case?

MR. LEWIS: Yes.

MR. HOFFMAN: At this time, merely for the record, I would make a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. Miss Sutton understands Your Honor part of the plea negotiation is that she is not going to testify and deny the allegations. Is that correct Miss Sutton?

MISS SUTTON: Yes. I live alone. I have no witnesses.

MR. HOFFMAN: That would be the defendant's case Your Honor. As we have no other evidence or any other witnesses to present, at this time we would renew our Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.

THE COURT: Motion is denied.

MR. HOFFMAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: I find her guilty of assault."

After finding the petitioner guilty of assault, the trial court subsequently fined her $250 and placed her on probation for one year. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which affirmed. Sutton v. State, No. 218, September Term, 1979, decided October 31, 1979, unreported. She then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari that we granted. We shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

The petitioner contends that a plea of not guilty upon an agreed statement of facts is the practical equivalent of a guilty plea because when each of these pleas is tendered, essentially the same rights are waived. She maintains, therefore, that the requirements of Rule 731 c are applicable to a plea of not guilty upon an agreed statement of facts. She asserts that because the record does not affirmatively show that her plea was voluntary and knowing, her conviction must be reversed.

The respondent contends that a plea of not guilty upon stipulated evidence is not the practical equivalent of a guilty plea because when such a not guilty plea is tendered, a trial on the merits results, and nonjurisdictional defects are preserved for appellate review. It maintains, therefore, that the requirements of Rule 731 c are not applicable to such a plea. Finally, it asserts that, in any event, because the record affirmatively shows that the petitioner's plea was voluntary and knowing, her conviction must be affirmed. We do not agree.

In Maryland an accused is permitted to plead guilty. Md.Rule 731 a. ¹ An acceptable guilty plea is an admission of conduct that constitutes all the elements of a formal criminal charge. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712 n.5, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969); Davis v. State, 278 Md. 103, 110, 361 A.2d 113, 117 (1976). An accused who pleads guilty waives any and all defenses. See Cohen v. State, 235 Md. 62, 68, 200 A.2d 368, 371, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 844, 85 S.Ct. 84, 13 L.Ed.2d 49 (1964). See also Palacorolle v. State, 239 Md. 416, 421, 211 A.2d 828, 830-31 (1965); Holloway v. State, 8 Md.App. 618, 626, 261 A.2d 811, 815 (1970). In addition, such an accused waives the right to a jury or court trial. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Hudson v. State, 286 Md. 569, 599, 409 A.2d 692, 707 (1979). Thus, a plea of guilty, once accepted, is the equivalent of a conviction. Nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242, 89 S.Ct. at 1711-12; Gans v. Warden, 233 Md. 626, 628, 196 A.2d 632, 633 (1964); Biles v. State, 230 Md. 537, 538, 187 A.2d 850, 851, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 852, 84 S.Ct. 111, 11 L.Ed.2d 79 (1963). Of course, before a plea of guilty is accepted and judgment is rendered, a trial court must determine that the acts admitted by the accused constitute the elements of the crime charged. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244 n.7, 89 S.Ct. at 1713 n.7. See Hudson, 286 Md. at 599, 409 A.2d at 707; McCall v. State, 9 Md.App. 191, 200, 263 A.2d 19, 24, cert. denied, 258 Md. 729 (1970); Holloway, 8 Md.App. at 625, 261 A.2d at 814-15. See also Md.Rule 731 c.

Moreover, an accused who pleads guilty simultaneously waives several constitutional rights including the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243, 89 S.Ct. at 1712; Davis, 278 Md. at 111, 361 A.2d at 117. Furthermore, although the propriety of the acceptance of a plea of guilty, measured by constitutional standards, is subject to appellate review, Davis, 278 Md. at 118, 361 A.2d at 121; Lowe v. State, 111 Md. 1, 14-16, 73 A. 637, 638-39 (1909); see Gleaton v. State, 235 Md. 271, 276, 201 A.2d 353, 356 (1964); see also English v. State, 16 Md.App. 439, 443, 298 A.2d 464, 467, cert. granted, 268 Md. 748 (1973), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, July 3, 1973, an accused who pleads guilty ordinarily waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings. Treadway v. Warden, 243 Md. 680, 682, 220 A.2d 907, 908 (1966). See ...