Maxson v. Delaware, L.&W.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 March 1889
• Citation: 20 N.E. 544,112 N.Y. 559
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: MAXSON v. DELAWARE, L. & W. R. Co.

112 N.Y. 559

20 N.E. 544

MAXSON

v.DELAWARE, L. & W. R. Co.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 5, 1889.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, Seventh department.

Action by Edwin Maxson, to recover damages for an alleged injury to the person of his wife, occasioned by the alleged negligence of the defendant, the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Charles J. Bissell, for appellant.

F. C. Peck, for respondent.

GRAY, J.

The question presented by this appeal is whether the action was barred because it was not commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued. It was brought to recover damages alleged by plaintiff to have been sustained by him in the loss of his wife's services and of the comforts of her society, as the result of injuries inflicted upon her through the negligence of the defendant. The general term, in affirming the judgment of the special term which sustained plaintiff's demurrer to the defense of the statutory limitation, in their opinion held that, in so far as the plaintiff's cause of action was for the loss of his wife's services, it was an injury to property, and could be brought within six years. We think they were in error, and that the defense interposed was complete. Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes a limit of six years for the commencement of ‘an action to recover damages for * * * a personal injury, except in a case where a different period is expressly prescribed in this chapter.’ Such an exception is found in the following section of the Code, (section 383, subd. 5,) where a limit of three years is prescribed for the commencement of ‘an action to recover for a personal injury resulting from negligence.’ It might be supposed that the reading of these two sections would suffice for the conclusion that, where a cause of action existed for damages, in any way suffered by reason of an injury to the person through another's negligence, in order to escape the statutory defense of delay, it must be acted upon within the period of three years prescribed by section 383. But the opinion of the able judge at general term, and the authority which he relies upon, in the case of Groth v. Washburn, 34 Hun, 509, are of such weight as to require some discussion of the question.

In Webber v. Railroad Co., 109 N. Y. 311, 16 N. E. Rep. 358, we held that, where the source of the personal injury complained of is in the negligence of the defendant, the action must be commenced within three years, and that, in all such actions against carriers of passengers, the liability of the defendant is based solely upon negligence. In this case there is no question but that the gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint is the alleged negligence of the defendant or of its servants, by reason of which his wife received bodily injuries of such a character as, in addition to causing her pain and suffering, disabled her from performing such services as a husband may be presumed to be entitled to on the part of his wife. The law gives to the husband, to the parent, and to the master a right of action for any injury to the wife, minor child, or servant, when caused by the actionable acts of another, per quodservitum amisit. This fiction of the law, which sustains such an action against others, is not without its admirable features; inasmuch as it gives a remedy for an injury to domestic rights, and serves as a check upon their molestation. At the bottom lies the personal injury suffered by the plaintiff and, where it is suffered through the negligent conduct of the defendant towards the individual, whose relation to the plaintiff gives rise to the right to maintain the action, it is difficult to understand the argument that the limitation of time prescribed in section 383 does not apply. It is certainly a ‘personal injury resulting from negligence’ in the defendant. To hold that the sense of these words is in their application to the body of the plaintiff seems as much a narrowing of the ordinary import of language as it is really contrary to the interpretation which we find given elsewhere in the Code.

By reference to subdivision 9 of section 3343, in the chapter of definitions in our Code, we find that a ‘personal injury’ is ‘an actionable injury to the person, either of the plaintiff or of another.’ This provision was derived from the second section of chapter 449 of the Laws of 1876. As originally enacted there, a personal injury was ‘an actionable injury to the person of the plaintiff, or of his or her wife, husband, child, or servant.’ It is evident that the legislature, in...