Maxwell v. Olmsted Cnty.
| Decision Date | 13 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 10-3668 (MJD/AJB) |
| Parties | BRENT ALLAN MAXWELL, Plaintiff, v. OLMSTED COUNTY, OLMSTED COUNTYADULT DETENTION CENTER, STACY SINNER, Director of Detention Services, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
MEMORANDUM OF LAW & ORDER
Mark G. Stephenson, Stephenson & Sutcliffe, PA, Counsel for Plaintiff.
Gregory J. Griffiths and Hilary R. Stonelake, Dunlap & Seeger, P.A., Counsel for Defendants.
This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. [Docket No. 23.] The Court heard oral argument on December 16, 2011.
Plaintiff Brent Maxwell was involved in an automobile accident in 2003. (Maxwell Dep. 22:8-13.) The accident left him with severe injuries thatnecessitated the amputation of his right leg and construction of an artificial hip and pelvis. (Id. at 23:14-23.) Maxwell now uses a prosthetic leg. (Id. at 23:1-7.)
Maxwell was arrested on a warrant on July 20, 2009 and was incarcerated at the Olmsted County Adult Detention Center ("ADC") until October 2009. At the time of his intake at the ADC, Maxwell completed "Initial Classification Listing" and "Mental Health Screening" forms in which he indicated that he suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD") and was taking the medications Trazodone and Zoloft. (Griffiths Aff., Ex. B.) An ADC nurse made orders allowing Maxwell to continue taking Trazodone and Sertraline, a generic substitute for Zoloft. (Id., Ex. D.).
Because of his disability, Maxwell was placed in a cell on the first floor of the ADC, was allowed to use his prosthetic leg, and was issued a walker. (Id., Ex. E.) The ADC also made allowances for Maxwell to have access to rubbing alcohol and an electrical charger for his prosthesis. (Id.) Upon his request, he was given an extra mattress and pillow for support and comfort (id.), although Maxwell alleges that he made further requests for padding which were denied (see Maxwell Aff. ¶¶ 13-14). Maxwell was also given permission to wear shortsrather than the ADC's standard pants to avoid entanglements with his prosthesis. (Id., Ex. F.)
Sometime on or before July 24, 2009, Maxwell informed ADC personnel that he also had an open prescription for the narcotic pain reliever Percocet. (See id., Ex. G.) Because it was ADC policy not to distribute narcotics "unless [they were] absolutely necessary" (Molella Dep. 13:17-18), ADC personnel contacted Maxwell's treating physician—Dr. Justice—to determine whether an alternate medication would suffice (Griffiths Aff., Ex. G). On July 24, Dr. Justice wrote a prescription for Oxycodone—a generic substitute for Percocet. (Id.) Four days later, Dr. Justice apparently stopped Maxwell's Percocet/Oxycodone prescription and prescribed Ibuprofen, three times a day as needed, instead. (Id.) It appears that Maxwell did not receive any pain relievers until July 28, when he began receiving regular doses of Ibuprofen. (Id., Ex. I.) As discussed in further detail below, from July 28, 2009 until his release, Maxwell received doses of either Ibuprofen or Oxycodone. (Id.) It is undisputed that Maxwell did not receive any counseling or treatment for his PTSD during his incarceration at the ADC.
As originally built, the ADC had "grab bars" in its showers to allow for easier access for inmates with disabilities. (Sinner Aff. ¶ 5.) The grab bars wereremoved after an incident at a correctional facility in Sherburne County, Minnesota in which one inmate beat another to death using a grab bar that had been detached from the wall. (Sinner Aff. ¶ 7.) Prompted by discussions with the ADC's architect, ADC officials decided to remove the grab bars and accommodate disabled inmates on an individual basis. (Sinner Aff. ¶¶ 10-11.) According to Maxwell, it was very difficult for him to use the showers without grab bars and, on or around September 15, 2009, he fell while using such a shower. (Griffiths Aff., Ex. F.) He states that he repeatedly asked for accessible shower facilities but that those requests went unanswered. (Maxwell Dep. 30:15-18, 31:10-32:5.)
On August 23, 2010, Maxwell filed a pro se complaint against Defendants Olmsted County, the ADC, and Stacy Sinner, Director of Detention Services at the ADC (collectively "the County"). In his complaint, Maxwell alleges violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Eighth Amendment, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Maxwell claims that the ADC failed to provide him with accessible bathing facilities, sufficient padding, adequate mobility aids, his prescribed medications, and treatment forhis PTSD. Maxwell was subsequently referred to counsel through the Pro Se Project of the Minnesota Chapter of the Federal Bar Association.
The County now moves for summary judgment, arguing that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to Maxwell's ADA and Eighth Amendment claims and that Sinner is immune from suit.
Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Id. at 323. Summary judgment is only appropriate when "there is no dispute of fact and where there exists only one conclusion." Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
"Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "Factual disputes thatare irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. "[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party's evidence 'is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party's] favor.'" Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999).
Maxwell's pro se complaint contained some errors which he has since acknowledged. For one, Maxwell has conceded that his claims under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") are "off the table." (Maxwell Dep. 18:22.) Maxwell has also conceded that since his Eighth Amendment claims are against municipal actors, not federal officers, they are most appropriately brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
The Court will therefore dismiss Maxwell's UDHR claims and construe his Bivens claims as § 1983 claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (); see also Davis v. Hall, 992 F.2d 151, 152 (8th Cir. 1993) (); Whitson v. Stone Cnty. Jail, 602 F.3d 920, 922 n.1 (8th Cir. 2010) () (citations omitted).
Maxwell has asserted that the County violated his rights under Title II of the ADA ("Title II"), which provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Title II applies to programs and services offered by state and local correctional facilities. See Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998). "[D]eliberate refusal of prison officials to accommodate [an inmate's] disability-related needs in such fundamentals as mobility, hygiene, medical care, and . . . prison programs" may constitute a violation of Title II. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157 (2006); see Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 681 F. Supp. 2d 899, 916 (N.D. Ill. 2009) ()
Of course, the right to reasonable accommodations is not absolute. Correctional facilities are not liable for failing to provide accommodations which were not requested, nor are they required to provide preferential treatment todisabled inmates. Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 858 (8th Cir. 1999); Lue v. Moore, 43 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1994). Moreover, a defendant may defeat a Title II claim by "demonstrat[ing] that the requested accommodation would constitute an undue burden." Randolph, 170 F.3d at 858. Title II does not require "jails or prisons to take actions that unduly jeopardize their safety and security." See Baribeau v. City of Minnneapolis, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1221 (D. Minn. 2008) (Ericksen, J.), aff'd in part and rev'd on other grounds, 596 F.3d 465, 484 (8th Cir. 2010).
There is no dispute between the parties that Maxwell is a "qualified individual with a disability" under Title II. The question here is whether the County failed to provide him accommodations such that he was, "by reason of" his disability, "excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the jail's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise subjected to discrimination by the jail." Baribeau, 596 F.3d at 484.
Maxwell has claimed Title II violations due to the County's failure to provide him with (1) accessible bathing facilities, (2) adequate padding for support and to alleviate his pain, (3) crutches, (4) prescribed medication, and (5) treatment for his PTSD.
Maxwell argues that the County violated Title II by failing to provide accessible bathing facilities through its removal of grab bars from the showers in the ADC and its failure to provide alternate accommodations.
The ADC's showers were originally built with grab bars to assist disabled inmates. The County contends that its subsequent decision to remove the...
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