Maxwell v. Tucker

Decision Date21 November 1968
Docket Number44005,44006.
Citation118 Ga. App. 695,165 S.E.2d 459
PartiesMAXWELL v. TUCKER; and vice versa.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Adams, O'Neal, Steele, Thornton & Hemingway, W. W. Hemingway, for appellant.

Westmoreland & Patterson, Floyd B. Chaite, for appellee.

HALL, Judge.

The plaintiff sued for $700 he had paid to the defendant real estate broker upon the execution of a contract to purchase a house and lot. The contract recites that it is made between the estate of Mrs. Dora D. McManus as the seller and by the plaintiff as the purchaser; it was signed by the plaintiff as purchaser and by "Estate of Mrs. Dora Dunwoody McManus By L. W. McManus, Jr., Mary McManus Demarest, John D. McManus" as seller. It was signed by the defendant as a witness. It recites that it was negotiated by Beard & Tucker Realty & Insurance Company as agent and the agent is to receive the regular commission as adopted by the Macon Board of Realtors; and "If the sale is not consummated due to purchaser's default, the earnest money shall be applied to agent's commission hereunder. . . In the event the sale is not consummated for reasons other than default of purchaser the earnest money is to be refunded to the purchaser." The defendant filed defenses including a counterclaim for broker's commission allegedly remaining due to him. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim and on his counterclaim, with evidence showing that the persons signing the contract for the seller were the executors and executrix of the estate. The plaintiff also filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court sustained the defendant's motion except as to the counterclaim, denied the plaintiff's motion, and dismissed the action and counterclaim. In case No. 44005 the plaintiff appeals from the denial of his motion for summary judgment; and in No. 44006 the defendant appeals from the denial of his motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim and from the dismissal of the counterclaim.

1. The defendant is entitled to his commission if his efforts resulted in an enforceable contract between the parties. Harvil v. Wilson, 11 Ga. App. 156 (74 SE 845); Brittain v. Russell, 78 Ga. App. 719, 722 (52 SE2d 38); cf. Bryan v. Rusk, 89 Ga. App. 125 (78 SE2d 853). Therefore, the parties' rights to recovery depend on whether the buyer and seller could have enforced the contract against each other.

The plaintiff contends that the defendant cannot retain the earnest money payment as commission because the contract was unenforceable. The first reason contended by the plaintiff for the unenforceability of the contract is that the seller is named as the estate of Mrs. Dora D. McManus, which the plaintiff argues is a nonentity. It is true that to satisfy the Statute of Frauds a memorandum must in some way indicate or show who are the parties to the contract. Oglesby Grocery Co. v. Williams Mfg. Co., 112 Ga. 359 (37 SE 372). The Oglesby case, however, does not support the plaintiff's position. There the memorandum did not even indicate the existence of a promisee. "Any designation of vendors, vendees, lessors, or lessees, which clearly discloses them, is sufficient under the Statute of Frauds." F. & W. Grand &c. Stores v. Eiseman, 160 Ga. 321, 329 (127 SE 872). We cannot say that the present contract does not identify the parties. The decisions relied on by the plaintiff relating to the naming of parties in law suits, and compelling conveyance of property by a person who does not own it, are not controlling.

2. The second contention that the contract is unenforceable is that it does not show on its face that the persons signing the contract were authorized to contract to sell or to convey the property. Parol evidence to show the capacity in which a person signed an instrument is admissible; it does not contradict the writing but simply explains the transaction. Burkhalter v. Perry & Brown, 127 Ga. 438 (56 SE 631, 119 ASR 343); Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Duskin, 92 Ga. App. 288, 291 (88 SE2d 421); U. S. Fidel. &c. Co. v. Coastal Service, Inc., 103 Ga. App. 133, 137 (118 SE2d 710).

The present case is unlike Brega v. CSRA Realty Co., 223 Ga. 724 (157 SE2d 738), an action by the buyer for specific performance, in which a prepared contract between the buyer and CSRA Realty Company as seller was signed by an individual as seller. There parol evidence to prove the individual acted as an agent of the seller corporation in executing the contract was held inadmissible. In the present case the contract naming the plaintiff as buyer and the estate as seller was signed by the three individuals for the estate as seller, as shown by the contract itself. We are aware of no authority prohibiting proof by parol evidence that the authority for the signing of a contract by a person for one of the parties cannot be proved by parol when the contract itself shows the signer did not act as an individual but acted in a...

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13 cases
  • Management Search, Inc. v. Kinard
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 6 Septiembre 1973
    ...Jobson v. Masters, 32 Ga.App. 60(2) (122 S.E. 724); Bayne v. Sun Finance Co., 114 Ga.App. 27(3) (150 S.E.2d 311); Maxwell v. Tucker, 118 Ga.App. 695, 698(4) (165 S.E.2d 459); Culverhouse v. Atlanta Assn. for Convalescent &c., 127 Ga.App. 574(2) (194 S.E.2d '6. Or, is the matter of whether t......
  • A. R. Hudson Realty, Inc. v. Hood
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 15 Octubre 1979
    ...to recovery depend on whether the buyer and seller could have enforced the contract against each other." Maxwell v. Tucker, 118 Ga.App. 695, 696(1), 165 S.E.2d 459, 460 (1968). Hudson clearly had the right to enforce the contract here because it specifically obligated the seller to pay the ......
  • Culverhouse v. Atlanta Ass'n for Convalescent Aged Persons, Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 16 Noviembre 1972
    ...it must be shown to entitle the plaintiff to recover. Byrd v. Ford Motor Co., 118 Ga.App. 333, 163 S.E.2d 327; Maxwell v. Tucker, 118 Ga.App. 695, 698, 165 S.E.2d 459; Household Finance Corp. v. Johnson, 119 Ga.App. 49, 165 S.E.2d Judgment reversed. QUILLIAN, J., concurs. HALL, P.J., concur......
  • Jackson v. Brinegar, Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 15 Febrero 1983
    ...which a person signs an instrument if it does not contradict the writing but simply explains the transaction. See Maxwell v. Tucker, 118 Ga.App. 695, 697(2), 165 S.E.2d 459. The contract was not under seal, and parol evidence is admissible to show the identity and existence of the principal......
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