May v. Golden Partners, Inc.
Decision Date | 13 October 2020 |
Docket Number | No. SD 36638,SD 36638 |
Citation | 611 S.W.3d 591 |
Parties | Julie N. MAY, Claimant-Respondent, v. GOLDEN PARTNERS, INC., Employer-Appellant, and Missouri Division of Employment Security, Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Attorneys for Appellant – Paul W. King of Springfield, MO, and Richard L. Rollings of Camdenton, MO.
Attorney for Respondent May – Raymond Lampert of Springfield, MO.
Attorney for Respondent Division of Employment Security – Todd A. Scott, Andrea M. Follett of Jefferson City, MO (No brief filed.).
Julie N. May ("Respondent") received unemployment benefits when the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission ("the Commission") found that she was involuntarily terminated without misconduct from her employment with Golden Partners, Inc. ("Appellant"). Appellant claims in Point I:
The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission erred in finding that Claimant May was discharged by Golden Partners, because the facts found by the Commission do not support the award pursuant to § 288.210, and Claimant May twice did not comply with the requirements of § 288.050.1(1)(d), in that Claimant May was on medical leave relating to her pregnancy, was released by her doctor to return to work on March 12, 2019, but failed to return to work as soon as she was physically able, and then failed to provide competent medical proof that she was forced to leave work on March 21, 2019.
In Point II, Appellant claims:
The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission erred in finding that Claimant May was discharged by Golden Partners, because there was no sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award pursuant to § 288.210, in that the Commission's factual findings are against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as Claimant May sought to take an extended maternity leave, did not comply with the Employee Handbook, did not communicate with her General Manager or any of the Assistant Managers, and did not follow the same procedure she and other employees previously followed regarding maternity leave.
We disagree with both contentions and affirm the judgment.
For ease of discussion, we will begin with the second point. Point II appears to challenge both the weight of the evidence and that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant the making of the award. It is clear that this point does not comply with Rule 84.041 in that it raises two entirely separate judicial concepts. J.A.R. v. D.G.R. , 426 S.W.3d 624, 630 n.10 (Mo. banc 2014). As admitted by Appellant, there is not a review process in this type of case for an against the weight of the evidence challenge. Because Appellant appears to argue in its second point and Respondent replied to the opening argument as a challenge to whether there is sufficient competent evidence to support the award, we will address that issue.
We review the findings of the Commission. McGuire v. Christian County , 442 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014). The Commission found:
To summarize, the Commission found that Appellant had an informal leave policy allowing for extended leave for pregnancy and a six-month leave was not uncommon. Likewise, the Commission found that Respondent had testified she did not intend to quit, that she had not abandoned the job. Further, Respondent continued to have contact with Appellant about obtaining hours though she was not put on the schedule. The Commission noted she did not seek unemployment benefits until after she was told she was discharged. No one notified Respondent that she was terminated until August of 2019, although Appellant predated the termination to April 2019 for "no rhyme or reason."
To counter the evidence as cited by the Commission, Appellant dwells upon the requirements of subsection 288.050.1(1)(d), that a person is disqualified from receiving benefits if they voluntarily leave work without good cause. As just stated, the Commission found Respondent did not leave work until she was discharged. Appellant appears to be laboring under the assumption that taking an extended period of time for a pregnancy or birth is forbidden under section 288.050.1(1)(d), that employers may not allow employees extended pregnancy leave. Such is not the case and such is not the finding of the Commission.
In determining whether the facts as found by the Commission are sufficient, we start with Appellant's informal approach to its leave policy. There was evidence that although Respondent did not provide any documented medical proof that she was forced to leave work due to pregnancy, "there was nothing in the actions of [Appellant] that would have prompted [Respondent] to seek any additional medical documentation to support her leave." Respondent was not put on the schedule nor did she fail to show up for a shift. Respondent was in contact with Appellant's representative about her work schedule. Even the predating of the discharge notice indicates Respondent was not discharged in response to any failure of Respondent to perform her job. As such, the Commission found that she was discharged in June and did not voluntarily quit her job in March, that she intended to return, and there was no allegation of misconduct. There was sufficient competent evidence to support the finding that Respondent was discharged rather than quit her job. The statute that Appellant relies on did not come into play. Point II is denied.2
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