May v. State
Decision Date | 04 February 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 113-85,113-85 |
Citation | 726 S.W.2d 573 |
Parties | Wanda MAY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Kim R. Thorne, Grand Prairie, for appellant.
Henry Wade, Dist. Atty. and Anne B. Wetherholt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before the Court en banc.
OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
This is a pretrial habeas proceeding in which appellant contends that a pending DWI prosecution must be dismissed because she has been convicted of involuntary manslaughter arising out of the same automobile accident. The trial court denied relief; the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed. Ex parte May, 682 S.W.2d 326 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1984).
The Dallas Court relied alone on declarations in Ex parte McWilliams, 634 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), viz:
Id., at 824. 1 It found that each offense requires proof of facts the other does not: involuntary manslaughter, intoxication of defendant causing death of an individual; DWI, operating a motor vehicle upon a public road, highway, street or alley. The Dallas Court did not consider either allegations in the respective charging instruments or the extent to which issues already resolved in the involuntary manslaughter trial would be relitigated in the DWI prosecution.
Although McWilliams noticed opinions of the Supreme Court after Blockburger dealing "with other double jeopardy matters," it considered them "matters not pertinent to the decision in this case." 2 As will be shown, however, they are in this cause.
Since McWilliams we have been given to understand that when one act or transaction violates "two distinct statutory provisions," the "Blockburger test" is purely a rule of statutory construction, utilized in what is "essentially a factual inquiry as to legislative intent [rather than] a conclusive presumption of law," Garrett v. United States, supra, 471 U.S. at 779, 105 S.Ct. at 2411-2412, 85 L.Ed.2d at 771-772; Whalen v. United States, supra, 445 U.S. at 708, 100 S.Ct. at 1446 (Rehnquist dissenting); Rathmell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (Clinton dissenting, n. 6). Whether by Blockburger or other means a court has determined that the legislative body intended punishment for both offenses, it then must decide whether successive prosecutions are barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, and in order "to properly analyze that issue, we must examine not only the statute ..., but also the charges which form the basis of the Government's prosecution here." Garrett v. United States, supra, 471 U.S. at 786, 105 S.Ct. at 2415-2416, 85 L.Ed.2d at 776; see also Whalen v. United States, supra, 445 U.S. at 709-710, 100 S.Ct. at 1447 (Rehnquist dissenting).
Blockburger being but a rule of statutory construction, the "other double jeopardy matters" alluded to in McWilliams--"additional protection offered by Ashe and Nielsen"--may become very pertinent in a given case. Illinois v. Vitale, supra, 447 U.S. at 420, 100 S.Ct. at 2267; see, e.g., Ex parte Rogers, 632 S.W.2d 748 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Ex parte McWilliams, supra, at 836 (Clinton dissenting).
In the Fifth Circuit current understanding of that other applicable aspect of jeopardy law is stated succinctly in Davis v. Herring, 800 F.2d 513 (CA5 1986), viz:
"Successive prosecutions [as distinguished from multiple punishments at a single trial] will be barred in some circumstances where the second prosecution requires the relitigation of factual issues already resolved by the first."
That is, of course, a paraphrase of note 6 in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166-167, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2226, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977), part of which in turn is derived from the "common incidents" doctrine of In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 188, 9 S.Ct. 672, 676, 33 L.Ed. 118 (1889), viz:
"[W]here ... a person has been tried and convicted for a crime which has various incidents in it, he cannot be a second time tried for one of those incidents without being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense."
Id., at 188, 9 S.Ct. at 676. See, e.g., Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 97 S.Ct. 2912, 53 L.Ed. 1054 (1977) ( ).
Illustrative of application of Blockburger and Nielsen, respectively, to bar a second prosecution is Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980), in deciding whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the State of Illinois "from prosecuting for involuntary manslaughter the driver of an automobile involved in a fatal accident, who previously had been convicted for failing to reduce speed to avoid the collision." After restating triple guarantees of the Double Jeopardy Clause, revisiting Blockburger and finding governing Illinois law unclear ("The point is that if manslaughter by automobile does not always entail proof of a failure to slow, then the two offenses are not the 'same' under the Blockburger test."), in part IV the Supreme Court discussed the possibilities presented, viz:
Id., 447 U.S. at 420-421, 100 S.Ct. at 2267. 3 Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded:
"By analogy, if in the pending manslaughter prosecution Illinois relies on and proves a failure to slow to avoid an accident as the reckless act necessary to prove manslaughter, Vitale would have a substantial claim of double jeopardy under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution."
Id., at 421, 100 S.Ct. at 2267. 4
From all that it is clear an accused may acknowledge that involuntary manslaughter proscribed in V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 19.05(a) and driving while intoxicated denounced by Article 6701l -1, Acts 1979, 66th Leg., Ch. 1071, p. 1608, prescribe an element of offense that the other does not--yet after conviction of the former still insist that jeopardy principles of Nielsen and followings preclude prosecution of the latter.
Turning to the instant cause, we first note that both offenses are alleged to have been committed June 12, 1983. The indictment for involuntary manslaughter alleged in part that in Dallas County appellant did:
"then and there by accident and mistake when operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and by reason of such intoxication, cause the death of [a named individual], by then and there driving her automobile across a center median and colliding with a vehicle occupied by [named individual], and thereby cause the death of said individual."
The information for DWI alleged in pertinent part that appellant:
"was intoxicated, and under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and while so intoxicated and under the influence of intoxicating liquor, did then and there unlawfully drive and operate a motor vehicle upon a public street and highway, in Dallas County, Texas."
Facially allegations of the greater offense of involuntary manslaughter required proof of the lesser offense, i.e., that appellant operated her motor vehicle upon a public roadway while intoxicated and collided with another vehicle after driving across a center median. 5 The record clearly shows that the State will rely on and seek to prove in the DWI case the same act of driving while intoxicated on public roadway as "the reckless act necessary to prove [involuntary] manslaughter." Vitale, supra, at 421, 100 S.Ct. at 2267. 6
Thus the record, including charging instruments, judgment of conviction for involuntary manslaughter and habeas testimony, demonstrates that appellant has been convicted of a crime having several elements included it and is now facing a trial for a lesser offense consisting solely of one or more of the elements of the crime for which she has already been convicted. In this Court the State practically concedes the point by relying on the fact that the judgment in State v. Padilla, 101 N.M. 58, 678 P.2d 686, 101 N.M. 82, 678 P.2d 710 (1984), was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court, Fugate v. New Mexico, 470 U.S. 904, 105 S.Ct. 1858, 84 L.Ed.2d 777 reh. den. 471 U.S. 1112, 105 S.Ct. 2349, 85 L.Ed.2d 865 (198...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Houth
...It also protects against successive prosecutions for the "same offense" following acquittal or conviction. E.g., May v. State, 726 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). The constitutional meaning of "same offense" "may vary" depending upon which of these protections is at issue. Whalen v. United St......
-
Nowack v. State
...State v. Grampus, 288 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26 (1986); Ex parte Peterson, 738 S.W.2d 688 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); May v. State, 726 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (en banc); c.f. Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 290 S.E.2d 442 (1982); Haynes v. State, 249 Ga. 119, 288 S.E.2d 185 Several courts have ......
-
State v. Lonergan, 13640
...358 (1987); State v. Carter, 291 S.C. 385, 353 S.E.2d 875 (1987); State v. Grampus, 288 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26 (1986); May v. State, 726 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). The state appropriately indicates, however, that a number of courts have construed United States Supreme Court precedent ......
-
Ex parte Perry
...testimony from prosecutor that the prior case and the pending case involved theft of the same items); May v. State, 726 S.W.2d 573, 574, 576 n.6, 576–77 (Tex.Crim.App.1987)(styled (correctly) in the court of appeals as Ex parte May, 682 S.W.2d 326 (Tex.App.–Dallas 1984)) (considering the te......