May v. Topping, Cleric, etc.
| Decision Date | 04 May 1909 |
| Citation | 65 W.Va. 656 |
| Parties | May v. Topping, Cleric, etc. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Statutes Appropriation Bills Veto ''Disapproval."
In no event has the Governor power to disapprove a bill making appropriations of the public money, embracing distinct items, or to disapprove any item therein, without communicating his disapproval thereof, with his reasons therefor, to the house in Which the bill originated before the adjournment of the legislative session. (p. 659.)
Application of Mancle May for writ of mandamus against C. L. Topping, Clerk-of the House of Delegates.
Peremptory Writ Awarded.
Molloiian, McClintic & Mathews, for petitioner.
Wm. G. Conley, Frank Lively, and Wm. M. 0. Dawson, for respondent.
Maude May has applied for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the Clerk of the House of Delegates of West Virginia, Keeper of the Rolls of the State, to make and deliver to her, upon payment of the fees therefor, a certified copy of House Bill No. 342, entitled "An Act making appropriations of public money to pay general charges upon the Treasury," and to include in such certified copy of that act the following: as one of the acts legally passed by the Legislature of the State of West Virginia and duly enrolled pursuant to law, and also to include in the printed copy of the Acts of the Legislature of 1909, to be published and issued by the Keeper of the Rolls according to law, House Bill No. 342, entitled as aforesaid, containing therein the item appropriating the sum of $2,080.00, as in the words and figures given above, as a valid subsisting act in law, duly passed by the Legislature of the State of West Virginia, according to the provisions of the Constitution. The application for such mandamus is resisted by respondent. He maintains that the item appropriating the sum of $2,080.00, in the words and figures recited above, was vetoed by the Governor. He, therefore, presents as his defense that such portion of the bill did not become a law and.that he has no power to certify and publish it as such.
The Legislature which passed the bill in question met on Wednesday, the 13th day of January, 1909. It adjourned, by operation of the Constitution, wherein it limits the session to for ty-five clays, on Friday, the 26th day of February, 1909. The journals of the Senate and House of Delegates, printed by the authority of the respective houses, show that House Bill No. 342 was constitutionally passed by each of them, presented to the Governor and report of such presentation made to each house. The journals further show that a joint committee of the two houses waited upon the Governor, that he directed them to inform the two houses of the Legislature that he had no further communication to make to either of them, that the committee made such report, and that, thereupon, each house adjourned sine die. These printed journals bear the date of Friday, February 26, 1909. They show no extension of the session beyond the constitutional period.
Enrolled House Bill No. 342 was presented to the Governor, as attested by the printed journals of the two houses of the Legislature, on February 26, 1909. It remained in his possession and control until Friday, the 5th day of March, 1909. At the hour of 8 o'clock A. M., on that day, it was filed in the office of Secretary of State. As presented to the Governor it contained the item of appropriation in favor of Mrs. May. As filed in the office of Secretary of State this item was stricken out by red ink, and there was endorsed on the bill, under the signature of the Governor and the date of March 3, 1909, his disapproval of all items indicated in the bill by red ink erasure, and his approval of all items not so indicated.
The right of petitioner to the remedy by mandamus, invoked to compel the certification and delivery to her of a copy of an act passed by the Legislature and to compel the Keeper of the Bolls to promulgate the same with the other acts passed, has been determined and upheld by this Court in the cases of Capito, Sutherland and Beese, applying for similar writs, at this term. The opinion in those cases is, to further extent, controlling in this case., We need not inquire to what extent. A reference suffices. Aside from the questions therein determined this case involves but one. That question is: Can the Governor veto an item in the general appropriation bill after the adjournment of the Legislature?
The question is, wre are of opinion, answered by the plain terms of the Constitution wherein it prescribes that which governs in such cases. Art. 7, sec. 15. This organic constitutional provision in view of its character and purpose is necessarily mandatory. It provides: How is it ordained by this supreme and mandatory law that an item in an appropriation bill embracing distinct items shall be disapproved by the Governor? Plainly is it stated therein that if he disapprove such item he shall communicate such disapproval, with his reasons therefor, to the house in which the bill originated. It is this action of the Governor in communicating such disapproval, with his reasons therefor, to the house in which the bill originated, that consummates and effects a veto of the item. The communication of his disapproval, with his reasons therefor, is the disapproval itself. The obligation upon the Governor to communicate his disapproval of an item, with his reasons therefor, to the house in which the bill originated, is a mandatory one to bring about the qualified veto that is given him in such instances. Unless he communicate as directed by this constitutional provision, he approves and does not disapprove. The last clause of the section clearly discloses such interpretation. It says: "Any item or items so disapproved shall be void, unless re-passed by a majority of each House." What do the words "so disapproved" mean? The use of these words makes one to inquire: How disapproved? Clearly they relate not simply to disapproval in the mind of the Governor, but to some act of disapproval, some manner of disapproval. That act or manner of disapproval, provided for just above these words, and to which "so disapproved" clearly relates, is by communication with reasons to the house in which the bill originated. "Any item or items so disapproved shall be void, unless repassed." The very connection between the words "so disapproved" and "unless re-passed" show that the Constitution intends that the disapproval of the Governor, to be a disapproval at all, must be communicated to the house of the Legislature in Which the bill originated, so that the Legislature may again act upon the item; so that it may re-pass it, if the Governor's reasons for disapproval do not persuade it to do otherwise, by a majority of each house according to the rules and limitations prescribed. Only by being "so disapproved" is the item declared void by the Constitution. Disapproval in any other form or manner does not affect it.
The plain terms of this constitutional provision should prevail. A Constitution is made for the people and by the people. The interpretation that should be given it is that which reasonable minds, the great mass of the people themselves, would give it. "For as the Constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed, but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be derived at is that of the people, and it is not to be supposed that they have looked for any dark or obstruse meaning in the words employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that that was the sense designed to be conveyed." Cooley's Const, Lim. 81. The great Chief Justice Marshall, in the interpretation of a provision of the national Constitution, said: "iis men whose Intentions require no concealment generally employ the words which most distinctly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who adopted it must be understood to have, employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they said." Gibbons v. Of/den, 9 Wheat. 188. There is no ambiguity in section 14, of Article 7. It is plain. It needs no construction. The terms used, in common every day interpretation, can mean nothing but that the Governor disapproves a distinct item in an appropriation bill by communicating his dissent, and his reasons therefor, to the house that originated the bill, so that house may set in motion, if it desire, after hearing the Governor's reasons against the item, legislate action to re-pass the item by a majority of each house. The section plainly contemplates further legislative action, if the Legistature sees fit. Can there be such action after the Legislature has adjourned? The very fact that there cannot be determines that the Governor must express his disapproval before the adjournment.
The people of this State most evidently intended that the sovereign will, the Legislature, should have the ultimate power in the general expenditure of the public revenue. They have so...
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