Maye v. City of New Haven

• Decision Date: 29 November 2022
• Docket Number: Civil 21-CV-00040 (MEG)
• Parties: Solomon Maye, Plaintiff, v. City of New Haven, Detective Carr, Detective Folch, and Detective Soto, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

Solomon Maye, Plaintiff,
v.
City of New Haven, Detective Carr, Detective Folch, and Detective Soto, Defendants.

Civil No. 21-CV-00040 (MEG)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

November 29, 2022

RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Hon. Maria E. Garcia United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Solomon Maye, proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the City of New Haven and New Haven Police Department Detectives Carr, Folch, and Soto. Pending is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. ## 62; 108.)^[1]Defendants oppose summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff's arguments are based on “misapplications or misunderstandings of the law and/or facts, and self-serving statements and affidavit, and there remain genuine issues of material fact as to each claim asserted.” (Doc. # 114, at 1.) For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. ## 62; 108) is DENIED.

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I. STANDARD OF LAW

A. Section 1983

Plaintiff brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), which permits imposing civil liability upon persons who, acting under color of state law, deprive an individual of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Patterson v. County of Oneida, New York, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983, however, “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights.'” Id. (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). Rather, § 1983 “merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Id. To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish the challenged conduct “(1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Whalen v. County of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997).

B. Summary Judgment

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense-or the part of each claim or defense-on which summary judgment is sought.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Rule 56 requires the movant to cite to particular materials in the record, such as depositions, documents, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials, showing that they do not establish a genuine dispute regarding the claims. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The local rules of this Court “require any party that moves for summary judgment to file a statement of undisputed material facts along with supporting evidence.” D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)1.

Summary judgment may be granted only if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Sullivan v. Stein, 487 F.Supp.2d 52, 63 (D. Conn. 2007), affd, 319 Fed.Appx. 42 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Williams v. Utica College of Syracuse Univ., 453 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir.2006)). The Court must “view the facts in the light most favorable to the party who opposes the motion for summary judgment and then decide if those facts would be enough-if eventually proved at trial-to allow a reasonable factfinder to decide the case in favor of the opposing party.” Cooper v. Doe, No. 3:19-CV-01794 (JAM), 2021 WL 66437, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 7, 2021). The role of the Court on summary judgment “is not to judge the credibility of witnesses or to resolve close contested issues of fact but solely to decide if there are enough facts that remain in dispute to warrant a trial.” Id. (citing Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656-57 (2014) (per curiam); Pollard v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., 861 F.3d 374, 378 (2d Cir. 2017)).

In support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff filed a Brief in Support (Doc. # 62-1); Declaration of Solomon Maye, (Doc. # 62-2); Statement of Undisputed Facts (Doc. # 623); and a video (Doc. ## 62-5; 62-4 (notice of manual filing)). He also filed a “Motion for Court to Give State Court Decision ‘Full Faith and Credit' On This Case” and appended a copy of an order of the State Superior Court regarding an affidavit of noncompliance with stipulationsummary process, dated March 11, 2021. (Doc. # 63, Maye v. Canady, No. NHH-CV-20-5004733-S, (Doc. # 112.10) (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2021).)

Defendants deny all allegations and contend that Maye's Declaration is not sworn or attested to, but if it were that the statements are conclusory and contain “conjecture and supposition”; “allegations of a non-party that has not given testimony”; and/or contain “no allegations of fact regarding the conduct of any member or agent of the New Haven Police

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Department.”^[2] (See Doc. # 114-1, at ¶¶ 1-6.) Defendants filed two D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)2 statements (Doc. # 114-1; Doc. # 114-2); a copy of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 114-2); and at Exhibit B a document that they contend is “proof of training, both in academy and in-service.” (Doc. # 114, at 8; Doc. # 114-2 Ex. B.) Defendants offered no other evidence in opposition to summary judgment. The Court notes that Defendants' D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)2 statement does not correspond to Plaintiff's D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a) 1 statement. Compare (Doc. ## 114-1; 114-2) to (Doc. # 62-3). Rather, Defendants filed two Rule 56(a)2 statements responding to the facts asserted in Plaintiff's Declaration. See (Doc. ## 114-1; 114-2; 62-2.)

Oral argument was held on November 7, 2022.

II. BACKGROUND

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff filed this action pro se, in other words, he is proceeding without an attorney. Where one party is proceeding pro se, the court reads the pro se party's papers liberally and interprets them to raise the strongest arguments suggested therein. See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006). “Nonetheless, ‘ [proceeding pro se does not otherwise relieve a litigant of the usual requirements of summary judgment, and a pro se party's bald assertions unsupported by evidence, are insufficient to

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overcome a motion for summary judgment.'” Houston v. Teamsters Loc. 210, Affiliated Health & Ins. Fund-Vacation Fringe Ben. Fund, 27 F.Supp.3d 346, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Rodriguez v. Hahn, 209 F.Supp.2d 344, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).

1. Federal Court Action

As is required on a motion for summary judgment, the Court relates the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

At all times relevant, Mr. Maye operated a business called Get'Em Boy Boxing, LLC at 746 Orchard Street, New Haven, CT. (Doc. # 1-1, Compl. Maye Decl., at 2.) He sub-let the premises from Elephant in the Room Boxing (“EIR”) that was owned and operated by Devonne Canady. (Id.) On or about August 12, 2020, a “notice to quit possession to Solomon Maye and Get'Em Boy Boxing LLC from EIR URBAN YOUTH BOXING, INC and DEVONNE CANADY for non-payment of rent and or laps[e] of time” was left at the door of Plaintiff's business. (Id., at 3.); Maye v. Canady, 214 Conn.App. 302, 457-58 (Conn. App. 2022). The Notice to Quit further stated that he had to leave the building by August 31, 2020. (Id.)

The incident at issue occurred on September 4, 2020 between Mr. Maye and Defendants New Haven Police Detectives Carr, Folch, and Soto (“Defendant Detectives”).^[3] (Doc. # 62-2, Maye Decl. ¶ 1; Doc. # 62-3, Pl. Stat. of Fact ¶ 1.) Plaintiff states that the officers were acting under color of state law, a material fact which Defendants do not dispute.^[4] (Pl. Stat. of Fact ¶ 2.) He avers that Defendant Detectives arrived at his place of business to escort him off of the

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premises. (Maye Decl.¶ 1; Pl. Stat. of Fact ¶ 2.) He states that Defendant Detectives were “summon[ed] to the gym location by Devonne Canady” to “order him to leave the gym” (Maye Decl ¶ 2; Pl. Stat. of Fact ¶ 2), that Ms. Canady “did not have, or show, an ‘eviction order'” to Defendant Detectives (Maye Decl. at ¶ 5), and that Defendant Detectives put him out of business, without an eviction order, as is required, in C.G.S. § 47a-42a(a). (Maye Decl. at ¶ 6; Pl. Stat. of Fact ¶ 4.)

A video recording from September 4, 2020, shows the three Defendant Detectives at Plaintiff's place of business talking to him and eventually escorting him from the building.^[5] It is not clear from the recording how Defendant Detectives were called to the business premises. The recording begins after their arrival and while they are inside the building speaking to Plaintiff. At one point in the video, one of the male officers states “Please hear me out, we spoke to Housing Court, we spoke to our boss . . . this is your chance to collect what you need and we'll all leave.” (VIDEOTS 16:42-17:02.) Plaintiff stated that he “wanted to see the paperwork” and added, “I have the eviction notice right here.” (VIDEOTS 17:13-17:18.)

Defendants did not respond to the video content in their Rule 56(a)2 Statement. During oral argument, counsel for the Defendant Detectives stipulated that: (1) the three officers named

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in the complaint are the officers seen in the video; (2) during all times relevant to this case, the officers were acting under color of state law; (3) the interaction at issue in this lawsuit took place on September 4, 2020; and (4) State Superior Court Judge Baio issued an order returning Plaintiff to his place of business.

2. State Superior Court-New Haven Housing Session Actions

The following facts and procedural history are relevant as background to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.^[6]

In October 2020, EIR Urban Youth Boxing, Inc. commenced a summary process action in State Superior Court-New...