Mayer Oil Co. v. Schnepf

• Decision Date: 07 June 1937
• Docket Number: 14017.
• Citation: 100 Colo. 578,69 P.2d 775
• Parties: MAYER OIL CO. et al. v. SCHNEPF.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

69 P.2d 775

100 Colo. 578

MAYER OIL CO. et al. v. SCHNEPF.

No. 14017.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

June 7, 1937

Error to Larimer County Court; Albert P. Fischer, Judge.

Action by Verner Schnepf against the Mayer Oil Company and another. To review a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendants bring error.

Affirmed.

Bartels, Blood & Bancroft and Arthur H. Laws, all of Denver, for plaintiffs in error.

Chester A. Bennett, of Fort Collins, for defendant in error.

KNOUS Justice.

In the court below the defendant in error was the plaintiff and the plaintiffs in error were the defendants. We shall here refer to them as they were aligned in the trial court.

The action was instituted by the plaintiff to recover for services rendered and labor performed by himself and his assignors in connection with certain oil well drilling operations in Larimer county. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the court denied defendants' motion for nonsuit and defendants elected to stand upon the motion. Judgment was thereupon entered in favor of the plaintiff for the amount claimed under the complaint less attorney's fees and certain statutory penalties waived by plaintiff.

At some time previous to the period covered by this suit, the defendant the Mayer Oil Company assumed the liabilities of a contract with one Mosher for drilling a well on certain premises or on lands in which the company was interested. The Johnson Ranch Royalty Company, Inc., was interested in the well to the extent of some royalty arrangement. Mr. Mayer was the president and manager in control of operations, and a Dr Wilson was the secretary of both defendant companies. Mr. Gee was a director of both companies, and Mayer, Wilson, and Gee constituted the full board of directors of the Johnson Ranch Royalty Company, Inc., and three of the five directors of the Mayer Oil Company. The plaintiff and his assignors were employed by Mosher, the contractor, to work upon the well and on January 24, 1932, he was indebted to them for back wages. The plaintiff alleges that on or about that date the plaintiff and his assignors suspended work and refused to continue until they were paid, and for the purpose of inducing the men to return to work the Mayer Oil Company with knowledge of the insolvency of the contractor and to avoid any delay, promised and agreed with the plaintiff and his assignors that if they would return to work and not suspend operations, the Mayer Oil Company would pay all the amounts due and to become due the said employees in drilling the well to completion, and that in consideration of this arrangement the employees continued to render labor and services until June 10, 1932, at which time the balance alleged to be due them was unpaid.

With reference to the Johnson Ranch Royalty Company, Inc., the complaint alleges that this defendant promised to pay plaintiff and his assignors for the work done on the well, and that the company did make some payments and then defaulted, leaving the amounts sued for due.

The complaint further alleged liability against the defendant companies and particularly the Mayer Oil Company, under the provisions of what is generally known as the 'wage act,' chapter 55, Sess.Laws 1901 (page 128), as amended by chapter 183, Sess.Laws 1919, (page 617), alleging a violation of said act in the failure of the companies to pay the employees their wages every fifteen days, and alleging that under chapter 97, § 205, '35 C.S.A. (section 4231, C.L. 1921), being section 5 of the act of 1919, supra, relating to work done for private corporations by a contractor, the defendants by operation of law were liable to the unpaid employees of the contractor. The defendants questioned the constitutionality of this act and particularly C.L. § 4231 supra, and also contend that plaintiff's cause of action, in so far as it is based upon said section, is barred by the one-year statute of limitations (section 6399, C.L. 1921).

A considerable portion of the briefs is devoted to discussion of the provisions and applicability of the wage act to the case at bar. However, under the disposition we make of the case there is no necessity of our passing upon these issues.

As we have indicated, the plaintiff pleaded an original agreement and undertaking on the part of the defendant companies to pay the plaintiff and his assignors for their labor. The defendants' motion for nonsuit admits the truth of the evidence produced by the plaintiff in the sense most unfavorable to the defendants and every inference of fact legitimately deducible therefrom. Whitehead v. Valley View Consol. Gold Min. Co., 26 Colo.App. 114, 141 P. 138; Robinson v. Belmont-Buckingham Holding Co., 94 Colo. 534, 31 P.2d 918; City of Longmont v. Swearingen, 81 Colo. 246, 250, 254 P. 1000; Arps v. Denver, 82 Colo. 189, 257 P. 1094.

Dr. Wilson, the secretary of the two companies, was called by the plaintiff as an adverse witness under the statute, and testified that at the time plaintiff's alleged independent contract was made he knew that Mosher, the contractor, had not paid his employees and that he had discussed the matter with Mr. Mayer and Mr. Gee, who held the official positions in the company we have indicated, and that they all knew of the situation; that Mayer, in witness' presence, had told the men at or about the time they had ceased work in January, 1932, he would see they were paid. The plaintiff testified that upon the occasion of their suspending work, plaintiff and his assignors went to the town of Berthoud and talked to Dr. Wilson, who, according to plaintiff, stated: 'He would look after it himself and see that we got our money if we promised to go out next morning and get things going,' and that he went back to work on the basis of these representations. Plaintiff's testimony in this respect was substantiated by that of his assignors, and the conversation was not denied by Dr. Wilson. It would further appear that on other and different occasions both Wilson and Mayer told plaintiff and his assignors they would guarantee the money if the men would continue to work on the well. It is undisputed that after the men returned to work a number of payments were made to them by checks of the Johnson Ranch Royalty Company, Inc., or by Mayer's personal checks. These checks were delivered to the men either by Dr. Wilson or by Mayer and were sometimes written by the latter at the site of the drilling operations.

Defendants point out that in none of these conversations was there any definite statement by Dr. Wilson or Mr. Mayer that either of the companies assumed the obligation of paying the accrued or future wages due the plaintiff and his assignors. We cannot say, however, as a matter of law, that it might not be inferred from the testimony that in making the definite promise attributed to them they were acting, and intended to act, in behalf of the companies of which they were the principal officers. The...