Mayer v. Mayor

• Citation: 101 N.Y. 284,4 N.E. 336
• Parties: MAYER v. MAYOR, ETC., OF NEW YORK.
• Decision Date: 19 January 1886
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

101 N.Y. 284

4 N.E. 336

MAYER

v.MAYOR, ETC., OF NEW YORK.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

Filed January 19, 1886.

John C. Shaw, for plaintiff.

D. J. Dean, for defendant.

FINCH, J.

Both parties appeal from the order of the general term; the city from so much of it as applies upon the assessment a pro rata share of the amount saved from commissioners' fees, and the plaintiff from that part of it which leaves interest to run from the beginning of the liability instead of from the date at which the true amount to be collected is ascertained. The plaintiff alleged that, after the confirmation of the report of the commissioners, which fixed and established the assessment partly upon property benefited and partly upon the city at large, and in which was included an item of $165,632.40 for commissioners' fees and expenses, the city resisted that claim, and succeeded in effecting a settlement by a reduction of the charge to $97,531.82, which saving was alleged to be two and one-fifth per cent. of the aggregate assessment; that the amount charged upon plaintiff's property was $10,928, and the proper assessment payable is $10,687.59; that such sum was duly tendered and refused, whereby an invalid and improper lien remains. The specific relief sought was that the whole original assessment be modified by deducting the total amount saved; that plaintiff's assessment be reformed by deducting its pro rata share of the amount saved; that the assessment be canceled and discharged; that interest be computed only from the entry of judgment in the action; and then for further or other relief.

It is evident that all the specific relief sought went upon the basis that the assessment should be vacated in whole or in part. But, when confirmed, it had the force and conclusiveness of a judgment, and the plaintiff alleges against it neither fraud nor mistake. In re Arnold, 60 N. Y. 26. In street opening cases the confirmation is by the court, and after a hearing of all parties interested, or an opportunity to be heard it becomes in effect a judgment of the court, which cannot be attacked in a collateral action except for reasons not alleged in this action. Errors and irregularities in street opening cases must be corrected and reviewed in the proceedings themselves, and cannot be reached by a collateral action in equity. Dolan v. Mayor, etc., 62 N. Y. 472;Astor v. Mayor, etc., Id. 580.

There is another difficulty. Section 897 of the consolidation act forbids a suit in equity to vacate any assessment in the city, or remove a cloud on title. Whatever may have been true of the original act of 1858, the section in question, as it now stands, is broad and unqualified,...