Mayes v. Lemonte
Citation | 122 S.W.3d 142 |
Decision Date | 06 June 2003 |
Docket Number | No. M2002-00625-COA-R3-CV.,M2002-00625-COA-R3-CV. |
Parties | Brian C. MAYES v. Ronald R. LEMONTE, Jr. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Tennessee |
Ronald R. LeMonte, Jr., Clarksville, Tennessee, Pro Se.
Brian C. Mayes, Clarksville, Tennessee, Pro Se.
In this dog bite case, the trial court awarded a meter reader $5000 in compensatory damages against the dog owner. The dog owner claims on appeal that he was not negligent in handling his dog and that the sitting trial judge was biased and prejudiced against him. We affirm.
On January 17, 2001, the Montgomery County General Sessions Court awarded Brian C. Mayes $3000 in compensatory damages for a dog bite which Ronald R. LeMonte's, Jr. dog, Blackie, inflicted on Mayes' ankle on May 17, 2000. LeMonte took a de novo appeal to the Montgomery County Circuit Court, which found in favor of Mayes and awarded him $5000 in damages on December 13, 2001, after a bench trial.
In this pro se appeal, LeMonte raises two issues before this Court. First, he claims the Trial Court was biased and prejudiced against him and therefore the judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted. Second, LeMonte contends Mayes did not prove he was negligent, thereby exonerating him from any liability. We will address these issues in reverse order.
The following facts are undisputed by the parties. On May 17, 2000, Mayes entered LeMonte's fenced-in yard in order to read the meter, as was his profession with the Clarksville Gas and Water Department. When Mayes approached the fence, LeMonte's three dogs were barking and growling. A picture of the fence shows LeMonte prominently displayed a "Beware of the Dog sign." Mayes asked LeMonte whether the dogs would bite. He answered that they would not. Unconvinced, Mayes requested LeMonte hold the black dog before he entered and while he read the meter. According to Mayes, Blackie "was acting strange." Recognizing that all the dogs were acting more aggressive than usual, LeMonte agreed to hold Blackie.
Subsequently, Mayes entered the yard and began reading the meter. As Mayes read the meter, Blackie bit Mayes' ankle. Mayes' injuries from the bite required serious medical attention.
The only significant disputed fact in this case is whether LeMonte even told Mayes to stay out until Blackie was put into a pen. Mayes testified LeMonte had hold of Blackie and clearly motioned with his hand to enter the yard after he had hold of the dog. LeMonte asserted he did not have hold of Blackie and that he held up his hand in a motion to stop Mayes so he could grab Blackie and then put the dog inside a pen. Neighbor Mike Flood testified he saw someone holding up his hand in a stopping motion but was unaware of the identity of the individual.
The trial judge apparently accepted Mayes' testimony that LeMonte invited him in before the dog could be penned, which was as follows:
Concerning a pen to contain the dog, LeMonte admitted that he and his father had built a pen for all the dogs. There was also a "Beware of the Dog" sign. It is clear from LeMonte's own testimony that he knew the pen was available and that he believed the dog, Blackie, should have at least have been penned-up before Mayes entered and read the meter. In fact, the testimony is replete with references to how threatening Blackie was acting while Mayes was outside the fence. Mayes testified that Blackie "was growling and jumping on the fence with his hair sticking up," that Blackie "was acting a lot more aggressive than the other two dogs," and that Blackie "was acting strange." LeMonte himself testified Blackie was "barking and growling" and all the dogs were "acting more aggressive than usual."
Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d) establishes that this Court shall conduct a de novo review of findings of fact by the trial court in a non-jury trial, with the trial court's findings accompanied by a presumption of correctness, unless contrary to the preponderance of the evidence.
If the trial judge has not made a specific finding on a particular issue, this Court reviews the record to determine where the preponderance of evidence applies without applying a presumption of correctness. Devorak v. Patterson, 907 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tenn.App.1995).
We also note that, as a general rule, this Court does not pass on the credibility of witnesses. The trial court, having seen and heard witnesses testify, is in the best position to determine their credibility. Implicit in the trial court's judgment are determinations of witness credibility. Bowman v. Bowman, 836 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tenn.App.1991). Since the trial court is in the best position to observe the witnesses and to assess their demeanor, this Court will not reevaluate the trial court's assessment of witnesses' credibility in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Wells v. Tennessee Bd. of Regents, 9 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tenn.1999).
Accordingly, this Court therefore must accept that LeMonte invited Mayes into the fenced-in area before he had securely placed the dog into the pen.
With respect to the keeping of domestic animals, the applicable law has been stated as follows:
McAbee v. Daniel, 60 Tenn.App. 239, 445 S.W.2d 917, 923 (1968).
We believe this case is governed by general negligence principles, not that aspect of dog bite law which imposes liability on an owner where there are "injuries resulting from known vicious tendencies or propensities." Id.
"A duty rests on everyone to use due care under the attendant circumstances, and negligence is doing what a reasonable and prudent person would not do under the given circumstances." Dixon v. Lobenstein, 175 Tenn. 105, 132 S.W.2d 215, 216 (1939); Dooley v. Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn.App.1990).
We conclude that a reasonable and prudent person in LeMonte's circumstances would not have invited Mayes in to read the meter until after insuring that Blackie was put away. The evidence preponderates in favor of this conclusion. Accordingly, LeMonte was negligent and the Trial Court was justified in assessing damages for such negligence.
The next issue is directed toward the alleged bias and prejudice of the trial judge towards LeMonte. A trial judge should be disqualified when "the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding." Caudill v. Foley, 21 S.W.3d 203, 214 (Tenn.App.1999).
Id. See also, Wilson v. Wilson, 987 S.W.2d 555, 562 (Tenn.App.1998), as follows:
Bias or prejudice in the disqualifying sense must stem from an extrajudicial source and not from what the judge hears or sees during the trial. Id. (Quoting State ex rel. Wesolich v. Goeke, 794 S.W.2d 692 (Mo.App.1990); Jack Farenbaugh and Son v. Belmont Const. Inc., 194 Cal.App.3d 1023, 240 Cal.Rptr. 78 (1987)). Otherwise, any judge that...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Harris v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
......Everett , 805 S.W.2d 380, 384 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) ; Mayes v. LeMonte , 122 S.W.3d 142, 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (same, quoting Dixon v. Lobenstein , 175 Tenn. 105, 132 S.W.2d 215, 216 (Tenn. 1939) ); ......
-
Murr v. Tarpon Fin. Corp.
......Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2008) ("[A] plaintiff's pleading in general sessions court, in the form of a civil warrant, may be very informal . . . ."); Mayes v. LeMonte, 122 S.W.3d 142, 147 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 6, 2003). Tennessee courts, however, have also referred to the civil warrant as "informal." ......
-
Searcy v. Axley
...liability even in the absence of such knowledge, based upon theories of general negligence or failure to control. Mayes v. LaMonte, 122 S.W.3d 142, 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)("We believe this case is governed by general negligence principles, not that aspect of dog bite law which imposes lia......
-
Ouyang v. Chen, No. W2004-00335-COA-R3-CV (TN 8/26/2005), W2004-00335-COA-R3-CV.
...... Mayes v. LeMonte, 122 S.W.3d 142, 146 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Other than his astonishment at how the trial judge could possibly disbelieve his testimony or ......