Mayes v. U.S., 1:99-CV-356.

Decision Date31 March 2000
Docket NumberNo. 1:99-CV-356.,1:99-CV-356.
Citation93 F.Supp.2d 882
PartiesDavid MAYES v. UNITED STATES of America.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

David Mayes, Chattanooga, TN, pro se.

Gregg L. Sullivan, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Chattanooga, TN, for U.S.

MEMORANDUM

COLLIER, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of pro se petitioner1 David Mayes ("Mayes") to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Court File No. 1, Petition). Pursuant to the Court's Order, the United States filed a response to petitioner's motion (Court File No. 6, Government's Response).

The underlying criminal case in this Court was United States of America v. Renee Kinney and David Mayes, Criminal Docket No. 197-cr-24, filed on March 18, 1997. For the following reasons, the Court will DENY Mayes's motion.2

I. BACKGROUND

Mayes was indicted on March 19, 1997, in a three-count indictment returned by a Grand Jury for the Eastern District of Tennessee charging him and Renee Kinney, in Count One, with conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and in Count Two and Three, charging him and Kinney with distribution of crack cocaine and marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Crim. Court File No. 1, Indictment). Also on March 19, 1997, Mayes appeared before United States Magistrate Judge John Y. Powers for his initial appearance (Crim. Court File No. 5). At the initial appearance local attorney Neal L. Thompson was appointed to represent Mayes. Mr. Thompson is a very experienced, quite competent, and highly regarded criminal defense attorney. Mr. Thompson represented Mayes from the arraignment through the appeal. On April 10, 1997, Mayes filed a motion for a psychiatric examination and a competency hearing (Crim. Court File Nos. 14 and 15). The motion was granted. After a psychiatric examination had been conducted and the results of that examination provided to counsel and the Court, Mayes was determined to be competent to stand trial and was found not to suffer from any mental disease or defect (Crim. Court File No. 34).

On September 5, 1997, Mayes entered a plea of guilty to Count One of the indictment pursuant to a plea agreement with the government (Crim. Court File Nos. 38 and 39). Mayes's plea of guilty was made pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 11.3 In accordance with Rule 11 and the Court's standard practice, Mayes was placed under oath. At the beginning of the guilty plea hearing, the Court asked Mayes whether he had had sufficient time to discuss his case with Mr. Thompson and whether he was satisfied with Mr. Thompson's representation. Mayes answered both questions affirmatively. During the guilty plea hearing the Government introduced the plea agreement agreed to by petitioner and the Government into evidence (Crim. Court File No. 39, Plea Agreement). In paragraph seven of the plea agreement the factual basis for Mayes's guilty plea was provided.

After the plea agreement was offered into evidence, the Court asked Mayes directly whether the document was the actual plea agreement he had negotiated with the Government. The Court also directly asked Mayes whether the contents of paragraph seven of the plea agreement were correct. Mayes answered both questions affirmatively while under oath.

After entering his guilty plea, Mayes filed a second motion for a psychological examination. Being provided with no basis for this request the Court denied the motion.

On December 5, 1997, the Court held Mayes's sentencing hearing and committed him to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a period of 188 months (Crim. Court File No. 49, Judgment).4 Petitioner was sentenced under the offense statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841, and the Guidelines. See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("USSG" or "Guidelines") (Nov. 1997). During the sentencing hearing Mayes moved to withdraw his guilty plea. This motion was denied.

Mayes filed his notice of appeal on December 11, 1996 (Crim. Court File No. 138). On appeal he claimed the Court erred when it (1) denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, (2) assessed a two-level increase for distributing drugs inside a correctional facility, (3) declined to downwardly depart due to mental condition, and (4) declined to downwardly depart due to physical condition. His claims were rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and his conviction was affirmed on May 26, 1999. United States v. Mayes, 181 F.3d 105 (Table), 1999 WL 357827 (6th Cir. May 26, 1999).

On November 23, 1999, Mayes filed this petition to vacate his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The petition was timely within the statutory one-year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(1)5. In his petition, he claims (1) his guilty plea was involuntary, (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, (3) his prior convictions were improperly used to enhance his sentence, and (4) his sentence should have been reduced due to his diminished mental capacity.

Having reviewed the materials thus submitted, together with the complete record of the underlying criminal case, the Court finds they show conclusively petitioner is not entitled to relief on the claims asserted. Accordingly, the Court will decide the matter without an evidentiary hearing, explaining the reasons as each of petitioner's asserted grounds for relief is addressed. See United States v. Todaro, 982 F.2d 1025, 1028 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 943, 113 S.Ct. 2424, 124 L.Ed.2d 645 (1993).

II. DISCUSSION
A. Petitioner's Allegations

Section 2255 of Title 28, United States Code, provides that a prisoner in custody under sentence of a federal court may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, correct, or set aside a sentence, on the grounds:

the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack....

28 U.S.C. § 2255. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Petitioner has the burden of establishing any claim asserted in the Petition. See United States v. Abbott, 975 F.Supp. 703, 705 (E.D.Pa.1997).

Where a constitutional error is alleged, in order to obtain relief under § 2255, the record must reflect a Constitutional error of such magnitude it had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the proceedings. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1721-22, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993); Watson v. United States, 165 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir.1999). "To prevail under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a defendant must show a `fundamental defect in the proceedings which necessarily results in a complete miscarriage of justice or an egregious error violative of due process,'" Gall v. United States, 21 F.3d 107, 109 (6th Cir.1994) (citing United States v. Ferguson, 918 F.2d 627, 630 (6th Cir.1990)).

As stated previously, Mayes seeks to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence because he claims his conviction was invalid because his guilty plea was involuntary, he received ineffective assistance of counsel, his prior convictions were improperly used to enhance his sentence, and his sentence should have been reduced due to his diminished mental capacity.

B. Petitioner's Guilty Plea was Involuntary

In his first assignment of constitutional error, Mayes asserts his guilty plea was the product of coercion and threats and that he pleaded guilty without knowing the consequences of his guilty plea or the rights he was waiving as a result of his plea. No where in his petition does he name or identify the individuals who coerced or threatened him.

By failing to name or identify the individuals who allegedly coerced or threatened him and by failing to offer any factual support for this claim, Petitioner has only offered conclusive allegations without any support or effort to develop the factual and legal framework within which to analyze his claims.

It is well settled that conclusive allegations are insufficient to entitle a petitioner to relief under section 2255. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977); Machibroda v. U.S., 368 U.S. 487, 495-496, 82 S.Ct. 510, 514, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962). When a petitioner files a Section 2255 motion, he must set forth facts which entitle him to relief. O'Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733, 735 (6th Cir.1961). "Conclusions, not substantiated by allegations of fact with some probability of verity, are not sufficient to warrant a hearing." Id. A motion under section 2255 must consist of something more than legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations. Short v. United States, 504 F.2d 63 (6th Cir.1974); Ramsey v. United States, 223 F.Supp. 605 (E.D.Tenn.1963). A motion which merely states general conclusions of law without substantiating factual allegations, is without legal merit. Loum v. Underwood, 262 F.2d 866 (6th Cir.1959); United States v. Johnson, 940 F.Supp. 167, 170 (W.D.Tenn. 1996).

Mayes provides no specific information to support his claim his plea was involuntary, and this allegation is refuted by the record and the prior findings of this Court and the Court of Appeals. Mayes raised the claim he was "duped" into pleading guilty when his attempt to withdraw his guilty plea was denied. When the motion was raised for the first time on the day of sentencing, this Court allowed Mayes an opportunity to argue why his plea should be withdrawn. He declined to make an argument. (Crim. Court File, Sentencing Transcript, page 2). Defense counsel explained to the Court Mayes was now denying he knew drugs were contained in the packages he transferred from his co-defendant to a cooperating inmate. (Id. at 3). That Mayes had made admissions to the FBI prior to his arrest in which he admitted he...

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