Mayes v. United Garment Workers of America

• Decision Date: 18 May 1928
• Docket Number: 25869
• Parties: Nellie Mayes, Appellant, v. United Garment Workers of America et al
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

6 S.W.2d 333

320 Mo. 10

Nellie Mayes, Appellant, v. United Garment Workers of America et al

No. 25869

Supreme Court of Missouri

May 18, 1928

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. William H Killoren, Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

R N. Rooks, Brownrigg, Mason & Altman and R. P Williams for appellant.

(1) Voluntary associations are suable in this State by virtue of Sec. 11, Art. 12, Constitution, and of Sec. 9722, R. S. 1919, if they have powers or privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships. State ex rel. Home Savings Inst. v. Lee, 288 Mo. 702; Williams v. U.S. Express Co., 195 Mo.App. 362; Weihtuechter v. Miller, 276 Mo. 322; United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344; Bruns v. Milk Drivers Union, 242 S.W. 419. (2) As some voluntary associations are suable in this State without regard to the constitutionality of the Amendatory Act of 1915, and as it did not appear from the record in the court below what sort of voluntary association the defendant is, except that it is a trade union; as it did not appear what powers or privileges the defendant possesses, the so-called plea in abatement was not sufficient to bring before the court the question as to whether or not the defendant was suable. If the facts out of which the jurisdictional question arises appear on the sheriff's return, the question of jurisdiction should be raised on motion to quash the return. If the want of jurisdiction appears on the face of the petition, it should be raised by demurrer. If the want of jurisdiction arises out of facts dehors the sheriff's return and the petition, those facts must be set out in the answer which may be in the nature of a plea in abatement. Newcomb v. Ry. Co., 182 Mo. 707. (3) The Amendatory Act of 1915 was not unconstitutional for insufficiency of title or for introducing a matter not germane to the act amended. The constitutional provision with reference to the subject-matter and title of bills is to receive a liberal construction so as not to unreasonably hamper the Legislature, and a bill may include a great variety of different matters if they have some natural or logical relation to each other, and a bill will not be held invalid for insufficiency of title or because it covers more than one subject unless the different matters covered are entirely without logical relation to the general subject-matter of the title, or unless the different subjects included in the bill are without logical relation to each other. Dorris Motor Co. v. Colburn, 270 S.W. 339; State ex rel. v. Hedrick, 241 S.W. 404; State ex rel. Keshlear v. Slover, 134 Mo. 10; Coffey v. Carthage, 200 Mo. 616; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Mosby, 233 S.W. 448; State ex rel. Dickason v. County Court, 128 Mo. 427; St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo. 590. (4) It was not the intention of the Legislature in passing the Amendatory Act of 1915 under consideration to provide that voluntary associations might be sued, because they were already suable. The bill did not in terms undertake to provide that such associations might be sued, but recognized the fact that they were already suable. The bill undertook to provide in what name they should be sued and how they should be served with process. The amendatory words were simply a legislative recognition of the fact, that such associations are suable, and a provision with reference to the manner in which they might be sued and served. State ex rel. Home Savings Inst. v. Lee, 288 Mo. 702.

John P. Leahy for respondents.

(1) A voluntary association cannot be sued at common law. It requires a statutory enactment for this purpose, and there is no law in this State authorizing the service of summons upon an agent of a voluntary association for the purpose of bringing the association into court, nor do the laws provide for a suit against such association by its common name. State ex rel. v. Staed, 64 Mo.App. 31; State ex rel. v. Traders Stock Exchange, 211 Mo. 181. (2) No bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in the title. Sec. 28, Art. 4, Mo. Constitution. (3) Where laws repealing and re-enacting or amending previous statutes constitute a departure from the original act, special mention of the purpose should be made, and unless so made the act is violative of the Constitution. State ex rel. v. Revelle, 257 Mo. 529. (4) Sec. 1, Laws 1915, p. 225, now Sec. 1186, R. S. 1919, is unconstitutional, void and in violation of Sec. 28, Art. 4, of the Constitution, in that it contains more than one subject, which is not clearly expressed in the title or headnote thereof. State ex rel. Green County v. Gideon, 277 Mo. 356. (5) The proposition that a voluntary association is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State is a matter of defense, to be raised, not by motion to quash, but by plea in abatement, which can be joined to a plea to the merits without waiving the matter in abatement. Stegall v. American Chemical Co., 150 Mo.App. 251.

Atwood, J. All concur except, Walker, C. J., who dissents in separate opinion.

OPINION

ATWOOD

This is an appeal from an order and judgment of the circuit court sustaining a plea in the nature of a plea in abatement interposed by defendant United Garment Workers of America, and dismissing plaintiff's suit as to said defendant.

Plaintiff's petition avers that defendant United Garment Workers of America is a trade union, having an office in the city of St Louis, Missouri; that it makes contracts for its members with the overall and clothing factories using the union label, and will not permit any employee to be employed in any factory where the union label is used unless such employee is a member of the United Garment Workers of America; that on October 31, 1922, and for several years prior thereto, plaintiff was a member of Local No. 238 of the United Garment Workers of America; that on said date she was unlawfully expelled therefrom; that soon thereafter said Local No. 238 was reorganized as Lodge No. 111 of the United Garment Workers of America; that said Lodge No. 111 refused to admit plaintiff to its membership, because of her expulsion from Local No. 238; that said expulsion was in violation of sections 8 and 15 of the constitution of the United Garment Workers of America, said sections being fully set out in the petition; that plaintiff did not wilfully slander the general officers or any of the members of the United Garment Workers of America; that one member of the trial committee made a motion that plaintiff be expelled, which motion was seconded and carried without evidence being submitted to prove said charges of slander; that defendant United Garment Workers of America, by a committee from Local No. 238 or from Lodge No. 111 of the United Garment Workers of America, went to the Red Diamond Cothing Company, where plaintiff was employed, and demanded that she be discharged; that she was thereupon discharged; that she has since made reasonable efforts to secure employment which would pay her a like sum of wages, but her efforts have proved unsuccessful. The prayer was for $ 600 damages for loss of wages and $ 10,000 for mental suffering and humiliation caused by said expulsion.

Thereafter, on November 1, 1923, defendant United Garment Workers of America filed a plea in said cause entitled, "Plea of Defendant United Garment Workers of America in the Nature of a Plea in Abatement." Said plea stated that this defendant appeared specially; that in plaintiff's petition this defendant is described as a trade union having an office in the city of St. Louis; that in the return of the Sheriff of the city of St. Louis this defendant is described as a voluntary association; that there is not or was not at the date of the alleged service of process upon this defendant any law in force in the State of Missouri authorizing the service of writs or processes of the court upon trade unions; that the statute under which the return of the sheriff was made, to-wit, the Laws of 1915 of the State of Missouri, page 225, now Section 1186, Revised Statutes 1919, is void, unconstitutional and in violation of Section 28, Article IV, of the Constitution of the State of Missouri, in that the act contains more than one subject, which is not clearly expressed in the title or headnote thereof; that said statute is void and in contravention of the provision of Section 1, Article XIV, of the Constitution of the United States in that, while it purports to provide a method by which voluntary or incorporate organizations may be sued, no reciprocal rights are given to the said voluntary organizations to sue under their names any person or persons whatever, and, therefore, the said defendant is denied the equal protection of the law; that said section is also unconstitutional and void in that it violates the provisions of the same section and article of the Constitution of the United States, because it denies to this defendant the right of not being deprived of its property without due process of law; that for said reasons this defendant cannot sue or be sued, either as a voluntary organization or a trade union, under the laws of Missouri in the matter in which service was obtained in this case, and that the court has no jurisdiction to render a judgment against the defendant.

We are not favored by either side with a copy of the judgment rendered, but the briefs apparently concede that upon consideration of the petition, the sheriff's return, the plea in abatement and the law applicable thereto, the trial court, on August 1, 1924, sustained said plea in abatement and dismissed plaintiff's cause as to said defendant United Garment Workers of America, and thereafter, on August 13, 1924, on plaintiff's motion, it was ordered by the court that said cause...