Mayle v. Mayle

• Decision Date: 08 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–0344.,11–0344.
• Citation: 727 S.E.2d 855,229 W.Va. 179
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Constance Lourenda MAYLE, Respondent Below, Petitioner v. Mark Douglas MAYLE, Petitioner Below, Respondent.

229 W.Va. 179

727 S.E.2d 855

Constance Lourenda MAYLE, Respondent Below, Petitioner

v.Mark Douglas MAYLE, Petitioner Below, Respondent.

No. 11–0344.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted April 10, 2012.

Decided June 8, 2012.

Syllabus by the Court

1. “In reviewing a final order entered by a circuit court judge upon a review of, or upon a refusal to review, a final order of a family court judge, we review the findings of fact made by the family court judge under the clearly erroneous standard, and the application of law to the facts under an abuse of discretion standard. We review questions of law de novo.” Syl., Carr v. Hancock, 216 W.Va. 474, 607 S.E.2d 803 (2004).

2. “Questions relating to alimony and to the maintenance and custody of the children are within the sound discretion of the court and its action with respect to such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that such discretion has been abused.” Syl., Nichols v. Nichols, 160 W.Va. 514, 236 S.E.2d 36 (1977).

3. “In divorce actions, an award of attorney's fees rests initially within the sound discretion of the family law master and should not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. In determining whether to award attorney's fees, the family law master should consider a wide array of factors including the party's ability to pay his or her own fee, the beneficial results obtained by the attorney, the parties' respective financial conditions, the effect of the attorney's fees on each party's standard of living, the degree of fault of either party making the divorce action necessary, and the reasonableness of the attorney's fee request.” Syl. pt. 4, Banker v. Banker, 196 W.Va. 535, 474 S.E.2d 465 (1996).

William L. Frame, Esq., Wilson, Frame, Benninger & Metheney, PLLC, Morgantown, WV, for Petitioner.

Amber Urtso Sellaro, Esq., Sal, Sellaro, Stephens, DeVall & Culpepper, PLLC, Morgantown, WV, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:

The petitioner, Constance Lourenda Mayle (hereinafter “petitioner” or “Mrs. Mayle”) appeals from the order of the Circuit Court of Monongalia County entered January 21, 2011, which affirmed the order of the Family Court of Monongalia County entered December 6, 2010. The family court order awarded the petitioner rehabilitative alimony or spousal support in the amount of $1,500 per month for six months and permanent spousal support in the amount of $5,500 per month for ten years, after which the amount would be reduced to $1,500 per month. The family court order denied the petitioner's request for reimbursement spousal support and her request for attorney fees and costs.

The petitioner challenges the amount of the spousal support, the reduction of the spousal support after ten years as well as the lack of an award of attorney fees and costs. While we conclude that there was no error in the award of rehabilitative spousal support for six months or in the amount of the permanent spousal support for the first ten years, we find that the circuit court and family court were clearly wrong in reducing the amount of spousal support to $1,500 after ten years. In addition, we find that the lower courts erred in denying the petitioner's request for reimbursement of attorney fees. We therefore affirm, in part, reverse, in part and remand this case for further proceedings as detailed herein.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The petitioner and Mark Douglas Mayle, (hereinafter “respondent” or “Dr. Mayle”), were married on February 18, 1984. Three children were born of this marriage, all of whom were emancipated by the time of the final hearing. ¹ During the parties' early married years, they were recent college graduates who both worked, earning approximately the same amount of money. Newly into their marriage the petitioner and respondent agreed that the husband would return to West Virginia University to take the prerequisite classes needed to enter medical school. During this time period and while Dr. Mayle was in medical school, the petitionerworked outside of the home. In addition, the petitioner's parents provided substantial financial support to the family, whose number had grown to include two children.² By the time the respondent completed his formal medical education, the parties' family had expanded to three children. At this time the petitioner and respondent decided that Mrs. Mayle would leave the workforce and become a full-time homemaker and caretaker for the children.

Dr. Mayle began practicing ophthalmology in Morgantown. The parties accumulated marital assets, including residential real estate, investments, personal property, a vacation cabin, retirement accounts and other items. The respondent's income continued to grow; at the time of the parties' separation his yearly income was in excess of $300,000 per year.

The petitioner and respondent separated in August of 2007, after the respondent's alleged extramarital affair ³ was revealed to the petitioner. They remained separated for approximately three years before formal divorce proceedings were instituted in the Family Court of Monongalia County. During the parties' separation, the husband gave his monthly paycheck to his wife, from which she paid marital bills, maintained the household and took care of the children, including paying for the youngest child's private high school tuition and assisting the older children who were in college. The family court order stated that during this time the petitioner and respondent “continued to co-mingle their financial affairs” up to the date of the final hearing. These payments were in lieu of a formal child support and formal spousal support award. The respondent supported himself during this time using other income, including the money from his part-time job performing refractive eye surgery for another practice and living off of the parties' investments.

The matter proceeded to hearing on the unresolved issues of equitable distribution and spousal support. In terms of distribution of the parties' marital property, the family court ordered the equitable distribution of the parties' marital estate, including awarding the marital home and indebtedness associated therewith to the petitioner and equally splitting the parties' retirement accounts. The family court recognized that the equitable distribution was not completely equal and declared that the respondent was owed the amount of $24,919.50 by the petitioner to make even the equitable distribution. This amount was not reduced to judgment. Instead, the family court order provided that this amount should be offset “based upon the wife and her family's past contributions as well as the other equities involved in the present case.”

In terms of spousal support, the family court found that the petitioner was entitled to permanent spousal support because of the duration of the parties' marriage and the respective financial circumstances and needs. The family court concluded that spousal support was necessary and appropriate to address financial inequities between the parties which were related to the marriage, including the past decision regarding Mrs. Mayle's leaving the workforce to care for the children. While the petitioner had claimed monthly expenses totaling $10,000 to $12,000, the family court revised those expenses to what it claimed was a more realistic $6,295. On the basis of these revised expenses, and imputing income to the petitioner, who was unemployed, the family court rejected the petitioner's request for spousal support in the amount of $12,000. The family court did award permanent spousal support in the monthly amount of $5,500 and additional rehabilitativesupport in the monthly amount of $1,500 for a period of six months. The family court rejected the petitioner's claim for reimbursement spousal support for the moneys she and her family paid toward the respondent's medical education, finding that such costs were “somewhat remote in time.” The family court found that “the Wife has enjoyed significant benefits by virtue of her husband's employment over the past 18 years, including her standard of living, the accumulation of significant assets, and the Husband's current ability to provide support to the Wife in the future.”

The family court order gave little weight to the respondent's fault in causing the dissolution of the marriage, although it noted that the petitioner's claim had some merit. The family court found that the respondent had been providing significant and regular support during the parties' separation, had lived modestly over the past three years and had given most of his income to the petitioner. The family court found that the amount of past support “is probably in excess of what this Court might have ordered if the parties had filed for divorce” when they separated.

The family court ordered the respondent to pay Mrs. Mayle permanent spousal support in the amount of $5,500 per month, with an additional $1,500 per month for six months designated as rehabilitative support. After a period of ten years, the family court ordered that the monthly spousal support be reduced to $1,500 per month, continuing until the petitioner's remarriage, engaging in a de facto⁴ marriage or as otherwise provided under West Virginia law. The family court's reasons for this reduction were as follows:

This is essentially a 21 year marriage. While the parties were married 26 years at the time of the final hearing there were two lengthy separations prior to the final hearing totaling 4–5 years. The parties' children are grown. The Wife appears in good health, very smart and organized, reasonably well educated, and with a good head for business per her training and prior work experience. While the Wife has been out of the workforce for a lengthy period, the Court believes the Wife has abilities that will eventually make her successful. It appears the Wife's family has two businesses in Charleston. It seems a distinct...