Maylone v. City of St. Paul

• Decision Date: 01 May 1889
• Citation: 40 Minn. 406,42 N.W. 88
• Parties: MAYLONE v CITY OF ST. PAUL.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

40 Minn. 406

42 N.W. 88

MAYLONEvCITY OF ST. PAUL.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 1, 1889.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

A special law, limiting the time for commencing actions against the city of St. Paul for injuries caused by its negligence, construed as not applicable to statutory actions by the personal representatives of a deceased person for negligence causing such death.

Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; BRILL, Judge.

Otto K. Sauer and Walter L. Chapin, for appellant.

W. P. Murray, for respondent.

DICKINSON, J.

This is an action under the statute to recover for the death of the plaintiff's intestate, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants, the city of St. Paul, and the St. Paul Ice Palace & Winter Carnival Association. A demurrer of the city of St. Paul to the complaint was sustained in the district court, for the reason that it was there considered that the action as to the city was barred, it not having been commenced until more than one year had elapsed from the time of the injury and death. This is the only question presented by this appeal. Its solution depends upon the construction to be put upon section 19, c. 7, Sp. Laws 1885, amending the charter of this city, which reads as follows: “No action shall be maintained against the city of St. Paul on account of any injuries received by means of any defect in the condition of any bridge, street, sidewalk, or thoroughfare, unless such action shall be commenced within one year from the happening of the injury, or unless notice shall have first been given in writing to the mayor of said city, or the city clerk thereof, within thirty days of the occurrence of such injury or damage, stating the place where, and the time when, such injury was received, and that the person injured will claim damages of the city for such injury; but the notice shall not be required when the person injured shall in consequence thereof be bereft of reason.”

In considering whether this statute was intended to apply to actions of this kind, we should bear in mind the distinct nature of such actions, maintainable only by force of the statute, by the personal representatives of a deceased person, and the common-law action for negligence, prosecuted by the person injured. It should be observed that two conditions are prescribed in this special law respecting the right to maintain actions of the class to which this enactment relates. The first prescribes the time within which...