Maynard v. B. F. Goodrich Co.
| Decision Date | 02 August 1944 |
| Docket Number | 29789. |
| Citation | 56 N.E.2d 195,144 Ohio St. 22 |
| Parties | MAYNARD v. B. F. GOODRICH CO. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. A motion for a new trial is not required in order to review a judgment for alleged error in taking the case from the jury and entering such judgment as a matter of law. (Jacob Laub Abking Co. v. Middleton, 118 Ohio St. 106, 160 N.E 629, approved and followed.)
2. Pursuant to Section 1465-68, General Code, as amended (117 Ohio Law, 109) by adding the provision that 'the term 'injury' * * * shall include any injury received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment,' an injury to be compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act must have some causal connection with the employment and such connection does not exist unless the injury is accidental in character and result. (Malone v. Industrial Commission, 140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E.2d 266, approved and followed.)
3. A plaintiff who, as dependent of a deceased employee, seeks on appeal under Section 1465-90, General Code, to recover compensation in the form of death benefits, is required to show, inter alia, that the injury complained of was the proximate cause of decedent's death. (Weaver v. Industrial Commission, 125 Ohio St. 465 181 N.E. 894, and Aiken v. Industrial Commission, 143 Ohio St. 113, 53 N.E.2d 1018, approved and followed.)
Appeal from Court of Appeals, Summit County.
This action was brought on August 27, 1941, in the Court of Common Pleas of Summit county, by the plaintiff, Virginia I Maynard, against the defendant, the B. F. Goodrich Company, as an appeal from an order of the Industrial Commission disallowing her claim for compensation, namely, death benefits for the death of her husband, Everett A. Maynard, which occurred on or about April 22, 1940. The decedent left surviving him two persons, his wife, who is the plaintiff herein, and a daughter under two years of age.
Regarding decedent's employment and injury, plaintiff's amended petition contains the following allegations:
'As a direct and proximate result of this injury and subsequent connected complications, he came to his death on or about the date previously mentioned [April 22, 1940].'
On the trial of the cause, the defendant, at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, made a motion for the withdrawal of the evidence from the jury and for a directed verdict in defedant's favor. Thereupon the court 'took the case from the jury and rendered judgment for the defendant.' No motion for a new trial was filed.
On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, for prejudicial error in rendering such judgment for the defendant at close of plaintiff's evidence, and remanded the cause for further proceedings.
This court allowed a motion to certify the record.
Other facts are stated in the opinion.
Wise, Roetzel & Maxon, William A. Kelly, and C. D. Russell, all of Akron, for appellant.
Harrison & Marshman, of Cleveland, and Werner & Lengyel, of Akron, for appellee.
Two controlling questions are presented: (1) Was a motion for a new trial necessary for a review of the judgment, and (2) If not, did the Court of Appeals commit prejudicial error in rendering the judgment of reversal.
Before considering the effect of not filing a motion for a new trial, it is well to point out that the action of the trial court in taking the case from the jury and rendering judgment for the defendant, presents exactly the same question as if a verdict had been directed and judgment entered for the defendant thereon. Either method may be employed. In discussing the question we shall, to some extent, speak of the method in which the directed verdict is employed for, according to the reported decisions, that method seems to have been more commonly used in this jurisdiction.
A motion for a new trial is not always essential as a basis for review. Judgments challenged for error of law in empanelling the jury, in the admission and rejection of evidence and in the charge of the court, may be reviewed without motion for a new trial. Earp v. Pittsburg, Ft. Wayne & C. R. Co., 12 Ohio St. 621, and State v. Langenstroer, 67 Ohio St. 7, 13, 65 N.E. 152.
In Lockwood v. Krum, Adm'r, 34 Ohio St. 1, the court in the first paragraph of the syllabus used this language: 'Where a court, upon the trial of questions of fact, states its conclusions of fact separately from its conclusions of law, it is not necessary to the right of a party to have the decision reviewed on questions of law arising upon the facts found, that he should have made a motion for a new trial.' Likewise in the case of In re Estate of Hinton, 64 Ohio St. 485, 60 N.E. 621, the court used this language in the syllabus: 'Where the facts are conceded or agreed upon in a trial, the judgment of the court, rendered upon such facts, may be reviewed in a higher court by petition in error, without a motion for a new trial.'
It is definitely settled by these authorities that rulings on questions of law made in the course of the trial may be reviewed without the filing of a motion for a new trial. In passing upon a motion for directed verdict, or in taking the case from the jury and entering judgment, as was done herein, the trial court determines merely a question of law, and therefore the same rule should apply as in other instances in which questions of law are determined during the trial.
The difficulty in the instant case arises from the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of the syllabus in Jacob Laub Baking Co. v. Middleton, 118 Ohio St. 106, 160 N.E. 629, which reads:
When we look to the part of the opinion of Judge Jones in which he deals with the fifth paragraph of the syllabus, we find this language at page 119 of 118 Ohio St., at page 633 of 160 N.E.:
The precise question that we have in this case, the necessity of a motion for a new trial where a directed verdict has been asked for lack of proof of an essential fact, has not been determined by this court in any reported syllabus. However, it was necessarily determined in the case of State v. Wirick, 81 Ohio St. 343, 90 N.E. 937. The reported case does not disclose whether a motion for a new trial was filed by Wirick in the probate court, but the original papers and briefs on file in this court indicate that no such motion was filed. The judge delivering the opinion, in alluding to the necessity of such a motion, said, [81 Ohio St.] at page 346, 90 N.E. 938: 'If the question here were whether the judgment below was against the weight of the evidence, a motion for a new trial would be necessary; but the question being whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts, the absence of a motion for a new trial is not material.'
'Where, therefore, the trial court is not called upon to weigh the evidence, but to apply the law where the ultimate fact is not in dispute, the case assumes a legal phase and no motion for a new trial need be filed.'
This language states the rule clearly and definitely, and makes it applicable to any party aggrieved by a ruling on a motion for a directed verdict. Following this quotation, Judge Jones makes this statement: It is then pointed out in the opinion that a defendant may rest his case upon the ruling on the motion for a directed verdict, and should not be required to ask for a new trial, which he may not desire.
The party seeking a review, in that case, was the defendant and the only relief sought was a final judgment in its favor. In the instant case the plaintiff sought relief in the Court of Appeals on the ground that it was error to enter judgment for defendant as a matter of law. The only way she could get that relief was by being granted a new trial. The contention of defendant's counsel is that in this jurisdiction 'a plaintiff and a defendant stand on a different footing insofar as what may be done by way of granting relief to a party because of an erroneous ruling by the trial court.' In other words to have a review of such a ruling the plaintiff would be required to file a motion and the defendant would not.
Such a contention, if it prevailed, would lead to discrimination as between plaintiffs and defendants generally, or even to discrimination as between a party plaintiff and a party defendant in the same case in certain instances. For example a plaintiff properly joins two independent causes of action in his petition in a suit against a single defendant. On trial the defendant moves for a directed verdict on both causes of action. The motion is sustained as to the first cause of action and overruled as to the second. Thereupon the jury returns a verdict in...
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