Maynard v. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co.

• Decision Date: 11 May 1956
• Docket Number: No. 3243,3243
• Citation: 291 S.W.2d 363
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Parties: Buckley A. MAYNARD, Appellant, v. DALLAS RAILWAY & TERMINAL COMPANY, Appellee.

Page 363

291 S.W.2d 363

Buckley A. MAYNARD, Appellant, v. DALLAS RAILWAY & TERMINAL COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 3243.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Eastland.

May 11, 1956.

Rehearing Denied June 15, 1956.

Carter, Gallagher, Roberts, Jones & Magee, Dallas, for appellant.

Burford, Ryburn, Hincks & Ford, Dallas, for appellee.

GRISSOM, Chief Justice.

Maynard sued the railway company for damages sustained by his wife in a collision with defendant's bus. Mrs. Maynard had ridden the bus north on Harwood Street and alighted at the intersection of Harwood and Ross Avenue preparatory to walking across Ross to its north side when the operator turned the bus to the right and drove partially across the walk which crosses Ross Avenue on Harwood Street when Mrs. Maynard either ran into the bus or the bus struck her. Plaintiff alleged defendant was guilty of the following acts of negligence and that each was a proximate cause of Mrs. Maynard's injury: failing to keep a proper lookout; failing to have the bus under control; failing to apply the brakes; failing to timely apply the brakes; failing to yield the right of way and failing to sound the horn. Failure 'to have the bus under control', as such, was not submitted but all other acts of negligence alleged were directly submitted. The jury failed to find defendant was guilty of any of the acts of negligence submitted. The jury found (5) that Mrs. Maynard was proceeding on the cross walk north across Ross on a green light. The jury failed to find from a preponderance of the evidence either (6) that defendant's bus operator failed to yield the right of way to Mrs. Maynard or (11) that the failure of Mrs. Maynard 'to stop after she stepped from the curb and before the impact was a failure to exercise ordinary care.' In answer to issue seventeen the jury failed to find from a preponderance of the evidence that the accident was 'not unavoidable.' Unavoidable accident was defined as an event that happens without being proximately caused 'by the negligence of any party to it.' Judgment was rendered on the verdict for defendant. Plaintiff has appealed.

Plaintiff's points are that the court erred in (1) overruling plaintiff's motion for a new trial, (2) rendering judgment for defendant and (3) submitting the issue of unavoidable accident because (a) the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's answer and (b) there is no evidence to support said answer and (c) the evidence was insufficient to warrant submission of the issue of unavoidable accident. Plaintiff's fourth point is that the court erred in overruling his motion for a new trial and in rendering judgment for defendant because the evidence required a finding that the accident was avoidable and, further, that a finding that the collision was not avoidable would have been in irreconcilable conflict with the findings that neither plaintiff nor defendant was guilty of negligence proximately causing the collision.

Plaintiff did not except to the submission of the issue of unavoidable accident. However, we think it is immaterial how the jury answered that issue because plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence, as he was required to do in order to recover, that defendant was guilty of any act of negligence submitted. Plaintiff does not complain that the submission of unavoidable accident affected the answers to the issues on primary negligence. No complaint is made that by submission of unavoidable accident, or the manner in which it was submitted, plaintiff was prevented from obtaining a favorable finding on the primary negligence issues. Plaintiff complains of the failure to find the accident was avoidable. He says there would have been an irreconciable conflict requiring a mistrial in a finding that it was an avoidable accident and findings that neither plaintiff nor defendant was guilty of any act of negligence submitted, which proximately caused the collision.

In Blanton v. E. & L. Transport Co., 146 Tex. 377, 207 S.W.2d 368, 369, our Supreme Court approved the holding in Brown v. Dallas Gas Co., Tex.Civ.App., 42 S.W.2d 869 (Writ. Ref.), that where the jury acquitted both plaintiff and defendant of negligence it was immaterial that the issue of unavoidable accident was not answered. Judge Brewster said in referring to that case and Ripley v. Dozier Construction Co., Tex.Civ.App., 45 S.W.2d 661, 'In both those cases the winning party was entitled to judgment no matter what the jury may have said in response to the unanswered issues.' We think the questions presented by appellant's first four points must be overruled because the jury acquitted defendant of all acts of negligence submitted or requested by plaintiff. Plaintiff could not recover because the jury answered all issues as to defendant's primary negligence against him. Regardless of what the finding might have been on the issue of unavoidable accident plaintiff could not recover. We do not believe that Bishkin v. Campbell, Tex.Civ.App., 107 S.W.2d 919, relied on by appellant, requires a contrary holding. In Adkins v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 233 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Writ Ref.), a jury found the defendant was not guilty of the only negligence submitted; that plaintiff was not negligent and that plaintiff's injuries were the result of an unavoidable accident. The court held that 'the unavoidable accident issue, or any alleged error with respect thereto, becomes immaterial', citing Brown v. Dallas Gas Co., Tex.Civ.App., 42 S.W.2d 869 (Writ Ref.). The Supreme Court refused a writ of error. See also Smith v. Morgan, Tex.Civ.App., 235 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Writ Dis.); Price v. Leon, Tex.Civ.App., 202 S.W.2d 309, 311 (RNRE); Farmer v. Denton, Tex.Civ.App., 231 S.W.2d 908, 910; Kindy v. Willingham, Tex.Civ.App., 205 S.W.2d 435, 437, reversed on other grounds, 146 Tex. 548, ...