Maynard v. Taco Bell of Am., Inc.

Decision Date31 May 2013
Docket NumberNo. 2D11–5390.,2D11–5390.
PartiesLamar MAYNARD, Appellant, v. TACO BELL OF AMERICA, INC., a Delaware corporation, and Daniel Peterson a/k/a Dan Peterson, an individual, Appellees.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Christopher M. Palermo, Tampa, for Appellant.

F. Robert Radel, II, of Unice Salzman Radel, P.A., Palm Harbor; and Cory J. Person, and Ezequiel Lugo of Butler Pappas Weihmuller Katz Craig, LLP, Tampa, for Appellees.

DAVIS, Judge.

Lamar Maynard challenges the trial court's final judgment entered in favor of Taco Bell of America, Inc., and Daniel Peterson, a former employee of Taco Bell. Maynard's civil complaint contained five counts against Taco Bell and five counts against Peterson individually. In his first count, which was brought against Taco Bell, Maynard alleged a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act. The trial court dismissed this count for Maynard's failure to timely meet a required condition precedent before filing suit. The trial court also entered summary judgment in favor of Taco Bell and Peterson on the remaining nine counts. Because Maynard sufficiently alleged in his complaint that he met the condition precedent to filing his lawsuit by filing his claim with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR), we reverse the trial court's dismissal of count one. We affirm as to the remaining nine counts without further discussion.

Maynard is a young African–American male. On April 15, 2007, he and another African–American male drove Maynard's vehicle up to the drive-thru lane of a Taco Bell and placed an order. After driving forward to the pick-up window, Maynard attempted to order his friend a soft drink that was not included in his original order. Peterson, the employee working at the pick-up window, refused to accept the additional order and made remarks that Maynard interpreted as racially motivated and demeaning. In response, Maynard turned off his car's engine and refused to pull his car out of the drive-thru lane, blocking traffic and preventing Taco Bell from doing drive-thru business for about twenty minutes.

Inside the restaurant, Peterson pressed a silent alarm button that automatically alerted local police officials, who then responded to the scene. 1 Maynard found himself surrounded by Tampa Police officers approaching his car with weapons drawn. He attempted to get out of his car, striking his knee on the steering wheel in the process. He immediately was seized by the police officers and frisked for weapons. During the pat down, Maynard's elbow struck the car. The search of Maynard's person and his car disclosed no weapons or other contraband, and neither he nor his passenger was arrested.

Pursuant to section 760.11, Florida Statutes (2005), Maynard had 365 days—or until April 14, 2008—to file a complaint with FCHR. He filed an initial FCHR questionnaire form on April 8, 2008, and a formal complaint with FCHR on April 24, 2008. According to the agency record, which is included in the record on appeal, FCHR determined that the complaint was timely filed by relying on its relation back policy to deem the complaint filed as of the April 8, 2008, filing of the original questionnaire. FCHR then processed Maynard's claim pursuant to the statute, and on January 13, 2009, issued its standard notice of dismissal acknowledging that the complainant had voluntarily withdrawn his complaint in favor of filing suit in the state court of competent jurisdiction.

Once Maynard opted to withdraw his FCHR complaint and file a complaint in the circuit court, Taco Bell moved to dismiss count one as having failed to meet the requisite condition precedent. Taco Bell maintained that the April 24 filing of the formal administrative complaint was untimely under the requirements of section 760.11 and that the date of filing should not relate back to Maynard's April 8 questionnaire form because that form specifically stated that it was not a complaint. The trial court agreed with Taco Bell and dismissed count one with prejudice. This was error.

A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint to state a cause of action and is not intended to determine issues of ultimate fact. And on a motion to dismiss the trial court is limited to consideration of the...

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4 cases
  • Gonzalez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
    • September 27, 2013
    ...to reweigh the administrative agency's treatment of his initial administrative complaint as timely.4 See Maynard v. Taco Bell of America, Inc., 117 So.3d 1159 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ("[T]he determination of whether [an administrative] complaint is timely filed rests with FCHR. Accordingly, as l......
  • Gallon v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 2D13–2853.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • September 12, 2014
    ...on its face contains allegations that are legally sufficient to state a cause of action. See, e.g., Maynard v. Taco Bell of Am., Inc., 117 So.3d 1159, 1160–61 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (quoting Reyes ex rel. Barcenas v. Roush, 99 So.3d 586, 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) ). Notably, the court may consider......
  • Orange Cnty. v. McLean
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 27, 2020
    ...complaint with the FCHR is a condition precedent that must be pled when filing the civil action. Maynard v. Taco Bell of Am. , Inc. , 117 So. 3d 1159, 1161 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ; Martinez v. Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc. , 891 So. 2d 579, 581 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). McLean pled that he had compli......
  • Ling v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • August 1, 2013

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