Maynard v. Tyler

• Decision Date: 27 February 1897
• Citation: 168 Mass. 107,46 N.E. 413
• Parties: MAYNARD v. TYLER et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

168 Mass. 107

46 N.E. 413

MAYNARD v. TYLER et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

February 27, 1897

Benjamin F. Tyler died February 10, 1895, at the age of 72. He left a widow, whose maiden name was Annie F Simonds, and three children, Marie L. Tyler, Emeline B Simonds (wife of Calvin Simonds), and John Tyler. His first wife died February 1, 1890, and on May 1, 1893, he married Annie Simonds, who was a grandniece of his first wife, and was then only about 30 years of age. There was evidence tending to show that illicit relations had existed between testator and Annie Simonds prior to the marriage. Evidence also tended to show that during most of his life testator had been in the daily habit of using intoxicating liquor, and occasionally drank to excess. It appeared that on January 12 1892, he had been found intoxicated and almost incontrollable in company with Annie Simonds at a hotel in Boston; that he had been taken home, Annie Simonds accompanying him, and she had remained in the house ever since. In November, 1892 testator had notified his daughter Marie to leave the house telling her that he never wished to see her face again. She and her brother remained estranged from the father during the remainder of his life. There was no testimony that the wife ever conversed with testator on the subject of making the will, or that she knew of the making of the will or codicil, or of his intention to make either of them, except that she was in the room with him and others a few moments while the codicil was being executed. There was nothing to show directly that she had actually used undue influence over him to induce him to make either of the instruments, and the uncontradicted evidence in regard to the value of the different parts of his estate tended to show that the amount given to the widow by the will and codicil was in fact less in value than she would have been entitled to receive had he died intestate. At the close of the testimony the appellants' counsel asked the court to instruct the jury as follows: "If the jury shall find upon the evidence that the relation of man and mistress existed between the testator and Annie Simonds up to the date of the marriage, and if they shall believe upon the evidence that the marriage was brought about for the purpose of unduly influencing the testator to make a will in favor of Annie Simonds, or in accordance with Annie Simonds' desire, the jury will be justified in rendering a verdict that the will was obtained by undue influence." The judge declined to give this instruction, and instructed the jury that they had no right to consider, for the purpose of affecting the legal standing of the widow after the death of her husband, any questions as to who or which of the parties was most influential in bringing about the marriage; that they were to consider the question whether the will was procured by undue influence in reference to the relations existing when the will was made; that in the eye of the law her position at the time when the will was made, and at the time when the codicil was made, in reference to her relation to her husband, was precisely the same as that of the most honored wife in the land; that she had a right, when the will was made and when the codicil was made, to a share of his estate, and that if he had seen fit to make a will depriving her of a very large portion of his estate, and giving her little or nothing, the law gives her a right to waive the provisions of the will, and to have one-third of all his personal property absolutely, and the use of one-third of all his real estate for her life. The judge also said in the course of the charge: "I am not aware of any direct evidence in this case that either the will or codicil was procured by undue influence of the wife of the testator. If there is any such evidence as that, I haven't it in mind." And he then submitted the case to the jury at length, on the issues relating to undue influence, upon the circumstantial evidence that bore upon these issues. The appellants' counsel asked for the following instruction: "If the jury shall find that at the time of making the will or the codicil the testator was acting under any hallucination or delusion, or erroneous opinion amounting to delusion, as to facts in the conduct of any of the beneficiaries under the will, this will be evidence that at that time he was not of sound and disposing mind." This instruction the judge did not give in terms, but instructed the jury as follows: "In regard to the question as to whether this testator was of sound and disposing mind, it is true, of course, that if a person is under an insane delusion in reference to the subject-matter, or has an insane delusion concerning a fact which affects his duty and responsibility in preparing a will, if such an insane delusion is proved, that would affect what would otherwise be considered a good will. The...