Mayo v. Secondary Schools Activities Com'n

• Decision Date: 13 November 2008
• Docket Number: No. 33838.,33838.
• Citation: 672 S.E.2d 224
• Parties: O.J. MAYO, Plaintiff Below, Appellee v. The WEST VIRGINIA SECONDARY SCHOOLS ACTIVITIES COMMISSION, Defendant Below, Appellant.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

672 S.E.2d 224

O.J. MAYO, Plaintiff Below, Appellee v. The WEST VIRGINIA SECONDARY SCHOOLS ACTIVITIES COMMISSION, Defendant Below, Appellant.

No. 33838.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: October 7, 2008.

Decided: November 13, 2008.

Syllabus by the Court

1. "Three factors to be considered in deciding whether to address technically moot issues are as follows: first, the court will determine whether sufficient collateral consequences will result from determination of the questions presented so as to justify relief; second, while technically moot in the immediate context, questions of great public interest may nevertheless be addressed for the future guidance of the bar and of the public; and third, issues which may be repeatedly presented to the trial court, yet escape review at the appellate level because of their fleeting and determinate nature, may appropriately be decided." Syl. Pt. 1, Israel v. Secondary Schools Activities Comm'n, 182 W.Va. 454, 388 S.E.2d 480 (1989).

2. "In determining whether a particular organization is a state agency, we will examine its legislative framework. In particular, we look to see if its powers are substantially created by the legislature and whether its governing board's composition is prescribed by the legislature. Other significant factors are whether the organization can operate on a statewide basis, whether it is financially dependent on public funds, and whether it is required to deposit its funds in the state treasury." Syl. Pt. 1, Blower v. Educational Broad. Auth., 182 W.Va. 528, 389 S.E.2d 739 (1990).

3. Under the five-part test adopted by this Court in Blower v. Educational Broadcasting Authority, 182 W.Va. 528, 389 S.E.2d 739 (1990), the West Virginia Secondary Schools Activity Commission is not a state agency.

William R. Wooton, The Wooton Law Firm, Beckley, Counsel for the Appellant.

Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General, Kelli D. Talbott, Deputy Attorney General, Anthony D. Eates, II, Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, Counsel for Amicus Curiae, West Virginia Board of Education.

Matthew J. Woelfel, Michael A. Woelfel, Woefel & Woelfel LLP, Huntington, Counsel for the Appellee.

Mark A. Sadd, Matthew R. Bowles, Lewis Glasser Casey & Rollins LLP, Charleston, Counsel for Amici Curiae, Charleston Catholic High School and John S. Yelenic, as Superintendent of the Department of Schools of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Wheeling-Charleston.

C. David Morrison, Clarksburg, Counsel for Amicus Curiae, Notre Dame High School.

Robert P. Fitzsimmons, Robert J. Fitzsimmons, Fitzsimmons Law Offices, Wheeling, Counsel for Amicus Curiae, Wheeling Central Catholic High School.

Michael E. Nogay, Sellitti Nogay & McCune, PLLC, Weirton, Counsel for Amicus Curiae, Weirton Madonna Catholic High School.

McHUGH, Senior Status Justice.¹

The West Virginia Secondary Schools Activities Commission ("SSAC") appeals from the May 21, 2007, order of the Circuit Court of Cabell County, through which the trial court struck down certain legislative rules promulgated by the SSAC as unconstitutional or arbitrary and capricious; ruled that the SSAC is a state agency; and awarded attorney's fees and costs to Appellee O.J. Mayo. The proceeding below was initiated on January 30, 2007, when O.J. Mayo sought an injunction to prohibit enforcement of the two-game suspension he received for committing two technical fouls in an interscholastic basketball contest on January 26, 2007. By the time the trial court held a hearing on February 9, 2007, the matters relating to the injunction had been resolved by agreement of the parties. Despite the resolution of the suspension-related issues, the trial court ruled that SSAC Rule² 127-3-8.5,³ a forfeiture rule never invoked or at issue in the proceeding below, is unconstitutional; that SSAC Rule 127-3-15.3,⁴ a rule proscribing the protest of a contest or ejection, is unconstitutional due to the absence of immediate administrative review following a student's ejection from an athletic contest; that the SSAC is a state agency; and that O.J. Mayo is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs. Upon our review of these rulings, we find that the trial court committed error and, accordingly, we reverse.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

During a basketball game between Huntington High School and Capitol High School on January 26, 2007, O.J. Mayo, a student at Huntington High School, was ejected from the game for committing the second of two technical fouls called against him. Under SSAC rules,⁵ a student athlete ejected from a basketball game is automatically suspended for two additional games.⁶ Following the ejection, O.J. Mayo approached and had physical contact with a referee. That act required an additional sanction for violating the SSAC rule which prohibits players from "lay[ing] hands" on a referee.⁷

O.J. Mayo instituted a civil action in the circuit court on January 30, 2007, through which he sought injunctive relief to prohibit the SSAC from enforcing the automatic two-game suspension prompted by his ejection from the January 26, 2007, basketball game. By ex parte ruling on that same date, the trial court entered a temporary injunction, the terms of which provided that O.J. Mayo would remain eligible to participate in interscholastic athletics until the matter could be fully heard. A hearing was set for February 9, 2007.

Before the February hearing was held, the SSAC learned that Huntington High School had decided to subject O.J. Mayo to a fourteen-day suspension for having physical contact with an official. This period of suspension, if implemented, would have made O.J. Mayo ineligible to participate in four basketball games. In view of the action taken by Huntington High School,⁸ the SSAC proposed that the temporary injunction be vacated by agreement among the parties. As part of the proposed agreement, the SSAC would defer to Huntington High School on the sanction imposed for the physical contact with a referee and would permit the automatic two-game suspension for the ejection to be served concurrently with the suspension imposed by the school. O.J. Mayo declined to accept the settlement proposal outlined by the SSAC and the matter proceeded to hearing on February 9, 2007.

During a break from the hearing, Huntington High School agreed to decrease the suspension period from fourteen to thirteen days, which had the effect of reducing the number of basketball games missed to only three. As a result, O.J. Mayo decided to accept the SSAC's previous proposal of coterminously serving the school and SSAC suspension periods. The parties then informed the trial court that they had reached an agreement which resolved the merits of the case. Under the agreement, the automatic two-game suspension period stemming from O.J. Mayo's ejection was to be served concurrently with the thirteen-day suspension period imposed by Huntington High School as a sanction for having physical contact with the referee.

The trial court entered an order on April 5, 2007, through which it recited the terms of the parties' agreement. Rather than limiting its ruling to the agreed-upon terms, however, the circuit court proceeded to address the constitutionality of SSAC Rule 127-3-8.5⁹—a forfeiture rule that was neither mentioned in the pleadings nor raised by any party during the proceeding. The trial court sua sponte determined that, excepting those instances where "a judge makes a specific finding in a final determination that the restraining order or injunction was not justified," the forfeiture rule is unconstitutional. See W.Va.C.S.R. § 127-3-8.5. As part of its additional rulings, the trial court decided to award attorney's fees and costs to O.J. Mayo.

Following the issuance of the April 5, 2007, ruling, the SSAC filed a motion to alter or amend the ruling. After hearing argument on this issue, the trial court issued an amended order on May 21, 2007. Through this ruling the circuit court: (1) granted O.J. Mayo's request to supplement the record; (2) vacated the injunction entered on January 30, 2007; (3) found SSAC Rule 127-3-8.5 unconstitutional except as it applies to injunctive relief where a trial judge makes a specific finding that the restraining order or injunction was not justified; (4) ruled SSAC Rule 127-3-15.3¹⁰ unconstitutional based on the lack of administrative review following ejection from an athletic contest; (5) held that the SSAC is a statutorily-created state agency; (6) awarded attorney's fees and costs to O.J. Mayo; and (7) ordered the SSAC to amend its rules to comport with its rule-related directives.

With the exception of the mandates pertaining to supplementing the record and vacating the temporary injunction, the SSAC seeks a reversal of the relief granted by the trial court through its May 21, 2007, order.

II. Standard of Review

As is our custom concerning matters that are purely legal in nature, our standard of review is plenary. See Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995) (holding that "[w]here the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review"). Accordingly, we proceed to determine whether the trial court committed error in making the various legal rulings that have been challenged on appeal.

III. Discussion

A. Due Process

As an initial matter, we address the trial court's reasoning that the absence of certain due process protections from the SSAC rules impels the conclusion that the rules lack fundamental fairness and therefore run afoul of the constitution. Of specific concern to the trial court was the lack of an opportunity for administrative review before a multi-game suspension is imposed as a sanction for violating an SSAC rule. Observing that the SSAC rules do not permit the "protest of a contest or ejection,"¹¹ the trial court ruled that:

The...