Mayon v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 February 1986
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. B-84-61-CA.
• Citation: 632 F. Supp. 944
• Parties: Daniel E. MAYON, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

632 F. Supp. 944

Daniel E. MAYON, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. B-84-61-CA.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Beaumont Division.

February 19, 1986.

Russell L. Cook, Young, Cook & Hampton, Houston, Tex., for plaintiff.

John D. Rienstra, Jr., Mehaffy, Weber, Keith & Gonsoulin, Beaumont, Tex., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COBB, District Judge.

This action was commenced by Daniel M. Mayon on January 9, 1984. In his amended complaint, alleging that he was wrongfully discharged from the employ of the defendant Southern Pacific Transporation Company. Plaintiff contends that the defendant's actions violated 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 55, and 60, commonly referred to as the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), and that these actions constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful discharge under state law. The plaintiff seeks actual damages, punitive damages and attorney's fees.

This action is now before this court on defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint.

FACTS

Prior to plaintiff commencing this action against the defendant, he filed an FELA action, seeking damages for personal injuries sustained while he was an employee of the defendant. A jury trial was had and the plaintiff was awarded $200,000. The judgment was paid by the defendant.

At the time of trial the plaintiff was employed by the defendant and his employment continued until October 7, 1983, when the defendant disqualified him from further duty for alleged medical reasons. It is also noted that October 7, 1983, is the date on which the judgment was satisfied.

It is the medical disqualification and termination from employment that is the basis of this action, Cause No. B-84-61-CA, i.e., an action alleging that the defendant wrongfully discharged the plaintiff.

In essence, plaintiff claims that he was discharged because he was successful in pursuing his legal rights under FELA, and not because he was physically unable to perform his duties. Defendant contends that the plaintiff's discharge was legal, proper and not motivated by any ulterior motive and that if the plaintiff's discharge was in fact wrongful the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, to which he is limited.

This court finds that the doctrine of preemption prohibits the plaintiff from asserting his claims in this court. The plaintiff must instead pursue his claims under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seq. (RLA). It is, therefore, the judgment of this court that the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint should be granted.

WRONGFUL DISCHARGE UNDER STATE LAW

The plaintiff argues that he has, based on diversity jurisdiction, a cause of action under Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex.1985); however, this cause of action was viewed by the Texas Supreme Court as a limited exception to the employment at will doctrine.

In Sabine, the court stated:

We now hold that public policy, as expressed in the laws of this state and the United States which carry criminal penalties, requires a very narrow exception to the employment-at-will doctrine announced in East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott 72 Tex. 70, 10 S.W. 99 (1888). That narrow exception covers only the discharge of an employee for the sole reason that the employee refused to perform an illegal act.

Thus, the plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for wrongful discharge for two reasons; he has failed to pursue his rights under the collective bargaining agreement, see, Strachan v. Union Oil Co., 768 F.2d 703 (5th Cir.1985), and cannot avail himself of the exception created in Sabine.

INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Because of the movement of the law in this area, the court will generally review the controlling cases before discussing them in relation to the plaintiff's claims.

In Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 406 U.S. 320, 92 S.Ct. 1562, 32 L.Ed.2d 95 (1972), the Supreme Court stated:

The very concept of wrongful discharge implies some sort of statutory or contractual standard that modifies the traditional common law rule that a contract of employment is terminable by either party at will.... The only source of petitioner's right not to be discharged ... is the collective-bargaining agreement between the employer and the union.

406 U.S. at 324, 92 S.Ct. at 1565. The Court continued at p. 324, 92 S.Ct. at p. 1565:

His claim is therefore subject to the Acts requirement that it be submitted to the Board for adjustment.

Then in Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners Local 25, 430

U.S. 290, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 51 L.Ed.2d 338, (Date), the Supreme Court formulated what has been called an exception to the rule in Andrews.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Choate v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 715 F.2d 369 (7th Cir.1983) succinctly and accurately analyzed the holding in Farmer as follows:

In Farmer, the plaintiff had brought an action in in state court against his union claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress and unlawful discrimination in job referrals. The case went to trial solely on the emotional distress claim and the plaintiff prevailed. However, the California Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the entire dispute was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The United States Supreme Court vacated that decision, ruling that preemption was not appropriate in that particular situation. Utilizing a flexible analysis, the Court considered the nature of the interest being asserted and the potential effect that concurrent judicial and administrative remedies would have on the administration of national labor policies. The Court concluded that the state had a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from outrageous conduct which intentionally inflicted emotional distress. In analyzing the potential for interference with the federal labor scheme, the Court noted that the state tort action could be resolved without requiring any determinations as to the underlying labor dispute, i.e., the existence of any unlawful discrimination. The fact that the N.L.R.B. had no authority to resolve or remedy an emotional distress claim was also deemed significant. Based on those considerations, the Court concluded that preemption was not mandated since a substantial state interest was asserted and its adjudication would not interfere with the federal labor scheme. However, the Court provided the following caveat:

We reiterate that concurrent state-court jurisdiction cannot be permitted where there is a realistic threat of interference with the federal regulatory scheme. Union discrimination in employment opportunities cannot itself form the underlying "outrageous" conduct on which the state-court tort action is based; to hold otherwise would undermine the pre-emption principle. Nor can threats of such discrimination suffice to sustain state-court jurisdiction. It may well be that the threat, or actuality, or employment discrimination will cause a union member considerable emotional distress and anxiety. But something more is required before concurrent state-court jurisdiction can be permitted. Simply stated, it is essential that the state tort be either unrelated to employment discrimination or a function of the particularly abusive manner in which the discrimination is accomplished or threatened rather than a function of the actual or threatened discrimination itself. Footnote deleted. 430 U.S. at 305, 97 S.Ct. at 1066. (Emphasis added)

The Court in Choate noted that although the Supreme Court in Farmer spoke in terms of concurrent state court jurisdiction, "The same principles apply to the federal district courts since they have no jurisdiction to address claims cognizable by the National Adjustment Board," at 371, citing Missouri, K.T.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 188 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1951); Morrissette v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 299 F.2d 502 (7th Cir.1961), cert. den. 369 U.S. 874, 82 S.Ct. 1141, 8 L.Ed.2d 277 (1962).

Therefore, the central issue of this case is whether the plaintiff can avail himself of the Farmer exception.

In Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.1978), the plaintiff was discharged from his employment for allegedly failing to carry out his duties in a non-negligent manner. After being terminated he filed suit in a Montana State court, alleging a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendant removed the case to federal court and then moved to have the plaintiff's complaint dismissed. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that the action fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the R.L.A. The plaintiff appealed urging the Farmer exception was applicable to his action.

The court in Magnuson stated:

If the basic injury was his wrongful discharge, the complaint involves a minor dispute which must be arbitrated following the procedures of the R.L.A. ... His emotional distress was an incident of the wrongful discharge, rather than a result of an alleged conspiracy ... Artful pleading cannot conceal the rality that the gravamen of the complaint is wrongful discharge.

at 1369. The court refused to apply the Farmer exception because the factors were found to be "inextricably intertwined" with the grievance machinery of the collective bargaining agreement and of the R.L.A.

In the case at bar the damages claimed flow from the fact that the plaintiff was discharged. If this court adjudicates this action a determination of the propriety of the medical evaluation that led to the plaintiff's termination must be had, such a determination necessarily involves a risk of interferance with the policy and procedures under the R.L.A.

Thus, like Magnuson, the plaintiff's complaint is based on facts which are inseparable from the grievance machinery applicable in this case.

In Choate v. Louisville &...