Mayor and Aldermen of City of Milledgeville v. Green

• Citation: 221 Ga. 498,145 S.E.2d 507
• Decision Date: 19 October 1965
• Docket Number: No. 23147,23147
• Parties: MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF CITY OF MILLEDGEVILLE v. Robert H. GREEN.
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Page 507

145 S.E.2d 507

221 Ga. 498

MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF CITY OF MILLEDGEVILLE v. Robert H. GREEN.

No. 23147.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Oct. 19, 1965.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 4, 1965.

Syllabus by the Court

Where the charter of the City of Milledgeville empowered it to take all necessary and proper means for keeping the corporate area of the city free from garbage, trash and rubbish, the ordinance requiring the city to do this and charge those having garbage, trash and rubbish a fee for removing them was not invalid because section 24 of the charter authorized the city to collect an ad valorem tax to cover expenses of government. The ordinance is valid.

This case is fully reported in Green v. Mayor etc. of Milledgeville, 112 Ga.App. 130, 144 S.E.2d 225, and needs no further discussion of the facts. The sole question for decision is whether or not the municipal charter of the City of Milledgeville authorized the ordinance establishing a schedule of mandatory rates to be made against owners, occupants, tenants and lessees of buildings and premises for the service of collecting, removing and disposing of garbage, trash and rubbish within the City of Millegeville.

G. L. Dickens, Jr., Frank W. Armstrong, III, Milledgeville, for plaintiff in error.

Robert H. Herndon, Milton F. Gardner, Milledgeville, for defendant in error.

L. Clifford Adams, Atlanta, for party at interest of party to record.

DUCKWORTH, Chief Justice.

It is error to construe section 24 of the charter of the City of Milledgeville (Ga.L.1900, pp. 345, 351) to provide the only source of revenue from which the city can obtain funds for any purpose, and we think herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. That section in part says: 'that for the purpose of raising revenues to defray the ordinary, current expenses incident to the proper support and maintenance of the city government, the said mayor and aldermen shall have full power and authority to levy and collect and ad valorem tax upon all property, both real and personal, in the corporate limits of said city.' The maximum is there fixed at one-half of one percent, but it is thereafter provided that if this is insufficient they shall have power to levy an additional tax. This is soley conferring the power to levy and collect an ad valorem tax. It does not expressly nor by implication forbid the collection of any other tax or assessment. Then section 21 of the charter authorizes the city to 'take all necessary and proper means for keeping the corporate limits of said city free from garbage, trash and filth of all kinds.' It is under this section that the ordinance, which provides for the city to remove garbage, trash and filth and charge the property owners, occupants, tenants and lessees stipulated fees therefor, and which is under attack here, was drawn. Beyond question, the ordinance other than the part that provides for the collection of fees is valid and authorized by the charter.

This reduces the case to the single question for decision, which is the charter authority of the city to collect the fees provided by the ordinance. What does the charter mean by authorizing the city to 'take all necessary and proper means' for this purpose? Undoubtedly the city could require each person to remove all such at his expense and make his failure a crime for which penalties could be imposed. Or, as the Court of Appeals said, it could provide that the residents may have it removed by the city upon paying a fee therefor. That court finds, and we think erroneously, that the city could not...