Mayor and Aldermen of Town of Morristown v. Inman
| Decision Date | 05 May 1960 |
| Citation | 342 S.W.2d 71,47 Tenn.App. 685 |
| Parties | MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF TOWN OF MORRISTOWN, Plaintiff in Error, v. Alma June Painter INMAN, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
S. J. Anderson, Paul R. Capps, Morristown, for plaintiff in error.
Taylor & Inman, Morristown, for defendant in error.
This is an action brought under the Wrongful Death Statute (T.C.A. § 20-607) by Alma June Painter Inman, as the surviving widow of Lewis Edward Inman, deceased, seeking to recover damages from the Town of Morristown for the death of her husband. The plaintiff widow was awarded a jury verdict upon which the court rendered judgment in the amount of $10,000. The Town's motion for new trial was overruled by the Circuit Court and it has appealed in error to this court.
The death was caused by the collision of two automobiles at nighttime on a public street in Morristown. The deceased was operating one of the automobiles, a 1950 model Ford. Jimmy Blount, a police officer of the defendant town, was operating the other, a 1959 Chevrolet, owned by the Town and equipped and used as a police cruiser. It is not disputed that the police officer was at the time and place acting as the agent or employee of the Town and within the scope of his authority as such.
The widow charges that the Town was guilty of common-law negligence causing the death, in that defendant's agent (1) was operating the police cruiser at a high, dangerous and reckless rate of speed; (2) drove the police cruiser to the left of the centerline of the street; and (3) operated the police cruiser without lights.
It is further charged that the Town was guilty of common-law negligence in knowingly allowing and permitting an inexperienced, young, reckless, childish and immature driver to operate its police cruiser and in selecting such a person as one of its police officers.
The widow further charges that the Town's police officer was guilty of violating the statutory Rules of the Road in driving on the left side of the street and in driving in wanton and willful disregard for the safety of others on the highway.
It is further charged by the widow that the police officer was operating the Town's police cruiser in excess of thirty miles per hour in violation of an ordinance of the Town of Morristown.
The Town's defense is a denial of the charges of negligence and the further defense that the deceased's negligence contributed to and proximately caused his own death.
The sequence of events leading up to the death commenced at about five minutes to one on the morning of May 9, 1959. The police officer was then seated in the cruiser while parked on a public street when he observed the Inman automobiles run a red light at a street intersection while proceeding on the left side of the street at a speed of from thirty to thirty-five miles per hour.
The police officer immediately turned on the lights of the cruiser and started in pursuit of the offending vehicle. At that moment he recognized it as the Inman car but not until later did he learn it was being operated by Inman. Both cars picked up speed and as the pursuit took place over the streets of Morristown, the two vehicles at times attained a speed of from fifty to sixty miles per hour.
During the the pursuit the police officer flashed the spotlight of the cruiser across the pursued vehicle some ten or fifteen times but this failed to bring the deceased to a stop. The police officer did not sound the siren or the horn of the cruiser during the pursuit.
When the pursuit had continued for about a mile or more along the streets, the deceased pulled his vehicle off the traveled portion of the highway to his right and into a filling station area, circled around the gasoline pumps and re-entered the street in front of the approaching police cruiser. At that instant the collision occurred when the front of the cruiser struck the left side of the deceased's car broadside about midway at the driver's seat. Both vehicles were crushed in at the places of impact. Death resulted almost immediately to Inman.
The cruiser which police officer Blount was operating came within the definition of an 'authorized emergency vehicle' of T.C.A. § 59-808. The driver was in pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law. He was therefore privileged and it was his duty, if necessary, to exceed the speed limits but only 'so long as he [did] not endanger life or property.' Furthermore, the exemption so conferred by T.C.A. § 59-808 applies 'only when such vehicle is making use of audible and visual signals meeting the requirements of the applicable laws of this state.'
It is shown that the police cruiser was equipped with a siren, which is a requirement under T.C.A. § 59-901(b). The police officer failed to sound this siren.
In order for the emergency vehicle to be exempt from the rules governing other vehicles, the driver thereof must make use of audible and visual signals and the flashing of his searchlight alone was insufficient to apply the exemption to this vehicle.
Under the facts shown in evidence the police officer was subject to all the Rules of the Road and common-law duties to which an ordinary motorist is subject.
The trial judge therefore correctly submitted to the jury the disputed issues of fact as to whether the police officer was violating the common-law and statutory Rules of the Road as to excessive speed, driving on the left of the highway and driving in wanton and wilful disregard for the safety of others.
The instructions of the court on the issue of whether the police officer violated the ordinance of the Town setting a maximum speed of thirty miles per hour were likewise proper and correct.
The assignments of error now made are largely directed to the charge of the court to the jury and therefore we are considering the charge as a whole in order to pass upon the sufficiency and legal correctness of the instructions complained of.
The first assignment complains of instructions submitting to the jury the issue of whether or...
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