Mayor, etc., of Shellman v. Saxon

• Decision Date: 17 February 1910
• Citation: 67 S.E. 438,134 Ga. 29
• Parties: MAYOR, ETC., OF SHELLMAN et al. v. SAXON.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

67 S.E. 438

134 Ga. 29

MAYOR, ETC., OF SHELLMAN et al. v. SAXON.

Supreme Court of Georgia

February 17, 1910

Syllabus by the Court.

The general rule is that courts exercising equitable jurisdiction will not enjoin criminal prosecutions; and this rule is ordinarily applicable to proceedings to punish for violations of municipal ordinances, which are quasi criminal in their character.

In some cases, involving special facts, injunction may be granted against the unlawful enforcement of municipal ordinances although they are penal in character, for the protection of property or property rights or franchises against irreparable injury; as, for instance where, under the guise of enforcing a penal ordinance, it is manifest that prosecutions and arrests are threatened for the sole purpose of unlawfully taking or destroying property, or preventing the exercise of a franchise granted by the state.

The present case falls within the general rule, and is not one of those involving facts where a court of equity or a court exercising equitable powers will grant an injunction to restrain prosecutions under a municipal ordinance.

(a) The question of the validity of the ordinances under which the complainant was tried and convicted in the mayor's court and from which judgment be carried the cases to the superior court by writs of certiorari, could be determined in those proceedings.

Error from Superior Court, Randolph County; W. C. Worrill, Judge.

Action by W. T. Saxon against the Mayor and Council of Shellman and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error. Reversed.

M. O Edwards, for plaintiffs in error.

T. T Miller and Jas. W. Harris, for defendant in error.

LUMPKIN J.

The mayor and council of Shellman adopted two ordinances at the same meeting; one prohibiting the selling, within the corporate limits, of any imitation of or substitute for beer, ale, wine, whisky, or other spirituous or malt liquors which contained more than one-fourth of 1 per cent. of alcohol; and the other imposing a number of stringent regulations, restrictions, and requirements upon persons selling such imitations or substitutes within the corporate limits. W. T. Saxon filed his equitable petition against the municipal authorities, seeking to have them enjoined from enforcing such ordinances by means of criminal prosecutions. It was alleged that he had obtained from the ordinary a license which authorized him to engage in such business in Shellman; that the authorities had no power to enact the ordinances in question; that the second of the two was unreasonable, and in effect placed a burden upon the business, seeking rather to prohibit than to regulate it; that he had been tried before the mayor under a charge based on each ordinance, had been convicted, and had carried each case to the superior court by writ of certiorari; and that repeated arrests would be made, and interference with his business would result, if he continues to sell, thereby causing him irreparable damage. The defendants contended that the ordinances were valid, and that they had a right to prosecute and punish the plaintiff if he violated the municipal laws. They alleged that at the time when the application for injunction was made the cases pending on writs of certiorari in the superior court would have been heard within two weeks, and that they could be heard and the validity of the ordinances determined on the day when the application for injunction was set to be heard. There were also contentions as to the character of the business conducted by the plaintiff, and other matters not material to be recited. The presiding judge granted the injunction restraining the municipality, its officers, agents, and servants, from arresting the plaintiff or in any manner interfering with his business under and by virtue of either of the ordinances. The defendants excepted.

We need not enter into a discussion of whether the ordinances adopted by the municipal authorities were invalid for want of power to enact them, or because they were unreasonable. Under former rulings of this court, and under the facts of this case, we are compelled to differ with our learned brother of the circuit bench as to the mode of testing those questions. The general rule is that a court of equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin criminal proceedings; and, in pursuance of this general rule, it has been said that "Chancery takes no part in the administration of criminal law. It neither aids the criminal courts in the exercise of jurisdiction, nor restrains nor obstructs them." Phillip v. Mayor, etc., of Stone Mountain, 61 Ga. 386, 388; Pope v. Mayor, etc., of Savannah, 74 Ga. 365. This announcement has been codified in section 4914 of the Civil Code of 1895. The rule that a court of equity will not generally enjoin criminal prosecutions has also been commonly applied to proceedings to punish for violations of municipal ordinances, which are quasi criminal in their nature. In some decisions the general rule is expressed broadly, and without noting any exception, that courts of equity will not enjoin or prevent the institution of prosecutions for violations of penal ordinances, or inquire into the validity or reasonableness of ordinances making punishable the acts for the doing of which prosecutions are threatened. But while this is the rule, there are cases where equity will protect property or franchises against invasion by municipalities, although it is sought to enforce or accomplish such invasion by using criminal process. In cases where courts of equity have granted injunctions against prosecutions under municipal ordinances, it will usually be found that this was ancillary to the exercise of some acknowledged equity jurisdiction for the protection of property or property rights against...