Mayor of Lexington v. Long

• Decision Date: 31 January 1861
• Citation: 31 Mo. 369
• Parties: THE MAYOR, &c., OF CITY OF LEXINGTON, Respondents, v. LONG, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

31 Mo. 369

THE MAYOR, &c., OF CITY OF LEXINGTON, Respondents,

v.LONG, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

January Term, 1861.

1. In a proceeding to widen a street, as provided in the act incorporating the City of Lexington, (Acts 1844-5, p. 162, § 12,) the fact that the mayor is the owner of a lot on the street sought to be widened, does not disqualify him from the performance of the duties assigned to him as presiding judge of the mayor's court before which the proceeding is held.

2. All the owners of lots on a street sought to be widened are not required to join in appeal from the mayor's court, whether they acquiesce in the verdict of the jury or not. The charter allows any person interested, who considers himself aggrieved by the verdict, to appeal.

3. The question for the jury to determine in a proceeding to widen a street is, what damage the person whose lot is taken would sustain by the proposed alteration of the street; and the amount of benefit to lot owners on the other side of the street should not be taken into consideration in assessing such damage to the person, a part or whole of whose lot is taken.

Appeal from Lafayette Circuit Court.

This was a proceeding commenced by the respondent against the appellant, together with a number of others, in the mayor's court of the city of Lexington, in which action the city, under and by virtue of certain ordinances, sought to widen South street sixteen feet, by taking a part of the lots of appellant and the other owners on the north side of said street alone. A part of defendants appeared in the mayor's court and made a motion to dismiss the proceeding, because the mayor, Silas Silver, was a party to the action, being owner of a lot on the south side of said street and summoned as one of the defendants with appellant and others. To avoid this objection, the attorney for the city dismissed as to Silas Silver. The case was tried in the mayor's court and the jury made their verdict, in which they assessed damages to only a part of defendants owning lots on north side of the street, but assessed damages to appellant, Long; they assessed various sums as benefits to persons owning lots on south side of the street, (among whom was Silas Silver,) in sufficient amount in the aggregate to meet the damage assessed to lot owners on the north side of street.

The appellant Long, with others, prayed for an appeal to the circuit court of Lafayette county. The mayor required each defendant to take his separate appeal. The appellant appealed, and, in the circuit court, moved the court to issue a writ of summons to bring in all the other defendants before that court, in order to give them an opportunity of uniting with or refusing to join in the appeal. The circuit court ordered the writ to issue. The defendants, owning lots on south side of the street, appeared and moved the court to quash the writ of summons, which motion was sustained.

Ryland & Son, for appellant.

I. The mayor, Silas Silver, had no authority to sit as a court and try his own case, whether he be plaintiff or defendant, and most surely has no jurisdiction or authority to sit as a court and decide a controversy judicial, in which he is one of the plaintiffs and one of the defendants. Judgment in such case is a nullity. It is against every principle of right and justice, and the whole proceedings should be set aside. A party can not sit in judgment in his own case. (State v. Jion, 3 Mo., top pages, 124, 125.)

II. The court should not have quashed the writ of summons which was issued in this case. It was necessary and proper to bring all the parties again before the court, in order that the defendants might have the chance to unite in the appeal, or to refuse to do so; and that in the latter event appellant might sever and go on with her appeal alone.

III. The whole case, as appears from the record, was not tried on proper principles. The jury should have been permitted to have had the evidence before them in order to see how much the increased width of the street would benefit the lot owners on the south side of the street, as well as how much it would have injured those owning lots on the north side. This was denied, and consequently but half of the case was actually before the jury, or tried in the court below.

Adams, for respondent.

I. The law of this case is furnished by section twelve of the act entitled “An act to incorporate the City of Lexington,” approved March 8, 1845, and the ordinances of the city passed in pursuance of that section. By the section referred to, each lot holder, where property is sought to be condemned, is a separate party to the proceedings, and the verdict as to each is several and not joint, and his appeal must necessarily be a separate matter of his own, and therefore the action of the circuit court was right in refusing to coerce the unwilling parties to join in the appeal. (McKee v. City of St. Louis, 17 Mo. 189; Coby v. Trustees of Williamsburg, 10 Wend. 665.)

II. The benefits resulting to lot holders on the opposite side of the street were not a proper subject of inquiry in this case. The rights of those lot holders had already been adjudicated and settled before the mayor. They had acquiesced in the verdict of the mayor's jury. No one but themselves had a right to complain. All the appellant can ask is to have her damages paid; whether they be paid out of the city treasury or by benefits, collected from other lot holders, is not material to her rights in this case. (17 Mo. 189; Garnett v. City of St. Louis, 25 Mo. 505; 10 Wend. 665; 4 Conn. 420; 8 Wend. 101; 3 Paige, 45.)

NAPTON, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

The maxim that no person should be allowed to act as a judge in his own cause, or a cause in which he is interested, is founded on principles of natural justice, and is therefore enforced in the judicial systems of all civilized nations; but it is a maxim which has its limits, and those limits are determined by the legislative department of the government. Its application may be carried to such refinements as, in the practical administration of justice, would produce the greatest inconvenience without being attended with the slightest benefit. We must therefore look to the statute law to ascertain where it...