Mayorga v. Alorica Inc.
| Decision Date | 25 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO.: 12-21578-CIV-HUCK/BANDSTRA |
| Parties | SILVIA CURTIS MAYORGA, Plaintiff, v. ALORICA, INC. d/b/a P.R.C. LLC a/k/a Precision Response Corp., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Plaintiff, Silvia Curtis Mayorga, a female residing in Miami-Dade County, Florida, brings this action against Alorica, Inc. d/b/a P.R.C. LLC a/k/a Precision Response Corporation ("Alorica") pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Fla. Stat. § 760.10 et seq. ("FCRA"). Mayorga asserts claims of (1) unlawful sex and pregnancy discrimination, and (2) unlawful disability discrimination. This matter is presently before the Court on Alorica's Motion to Dismiss Counts Two and Three of the Plaintiff's Complaint (D.E. # 24), filed July 11, 2012. Alorica seeks dismissal of Counts II and III of the Complaint (D.E. # 1) on the basis that Mayorga has not stated a cause of action upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Mayorga began her employment with Alorica in 2010 as a customer service representative in the company's DirectTV bilingual retention and cancellation department in Miami-Dade County, Florida. In January 2011, Mayorga became pregnant. Having suffered complications during her previous pregnancies, Mayorga's obstetrician determined that herpregnancy was high-risk, and that she needed to be closely monitored. Mayorga informed her direct supervisor, Luis Sola, as well as representatives from Alorica's human resources department, of her high-risk pregnancy.
In April 2011, Mayorga informed Sola that she needed to undergo ultrasound testing at weeks 14 and 18 of her pregnancy, and requested two days off from work to undergo the tests. Mayorga alleges that she offered to find another employee with whom she could swap shifts, and to work on her days off to make up for her absences. Sola initially denied Mayorga's request for an excused absence, as well as her proposal to swap shifts with another employee. Mayorga alleges that Sola stated, with respect to her undergoing testing for Down's syndrome: Compl., ¶ 13. After this interaction, Mayorga's request to take time off to undergo ultrasound testing was granted by a human resources representative.
Mayorga's ultrasound tests revealed that her baby was, and would be, in a breech presentation throughout her entire pregnancy. Mayorga alleges that she suffered from "premature uterine contractions, irritation of the uterus, increased heart rate, severe morning sickness, severe pelvic bone pains, severe back pain, severe lower abdominal pain, extreme headaches, and other pregnancy-related conditions." Id. ¶ 15. The Complaint goes on to allege that Mayorga was admitted to the emergency room on three separate occasions for "severe complications relating to her pregnancy." Id. ¶ 16 As a result, Mayorga's doctor ordered her on bed rest for three weeks. Mayorga requested three weeks of unpaid leave from Sola, who, again, initially denied the request, stating: "I am not going to treat you special because you are pregnant." Id. ¶ 17. However, a human resources representative subsequently approved three weeks of unpaid leave.
Upon returning to work from her three-week leave-of-absence on June 27, 2011, Mayorga was informed by Alorica's Human Resources Department that she had been terminated. A representative told her: Id. ¶ 19.
As a consequence, Mayorga commenced the instant action on April 26, 2012 against Alorica. The Complaint alleges three counts: Sex and Pregnancy Discrimination in violation of Title VII (Count I), Disability/Perceived Disability Discrimination and Failure to Accommodatein violation of the ADA (Count II), and Handicap Discrimination and Failure to Accommodate in violation of the FCRA (Count III). Mayorga is seeking compensatory damages, lost wages, past and future wages, lost benefits, mental anguish, emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and costs.
In its Motion to Dismiss, Alorica argues that Count II of the Complaint should be dismissed because Mayorga was neither disabled nor regarded as disabled. Alorica also argues that Count III should be dismissed because the FCRA does not recognize a cause of action for pregnancy discrimination. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Alorica's Motion to Dismiss as indicated.
When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all of a complaint's factual allegations as true, construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, "[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," and that "[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1). "[T]he statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the ground upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (). The plaintiff must nevertheless articulate "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rule 8 "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. Thus, a pleading that offers mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" will not survive dismissal. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In applying the Supreme Court's directives in Twombly and Iqbal, the Eleventh Circuit has provided the following guidance to the district courts:
In considering a motion to dismiss, a court should 1) eliminate any allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions; and 2) where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Further, courts may infer from the factual allegations in the complaint obvious alternative explanation[s], which suggest lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to infer.
Kivisto v. Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, PLC, 413 F. App'x 136, 138 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010)). "This is a stricter standard than the Supreme Court described in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), which held that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim 'unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Mukamal v. Bakes, 378 F. App'x 890, 896 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 577). These precepts apply to all civil actions, regardless of the cause of action alleged. Kivisto, 413 F. App'x at 138.
The ADA prohibits discrimination "against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she is disabled under the ADA, (2) she is a qualified individual, and (3) she was unlawfully discriminated against because of her disability. Knowles v. Sheriff, 460 F. App'x 833, 835 (11th Cir. 2012); Rossbach v. City of Miami, 371 F.3d 1354, 1356-57 (11th Cir. 2004); Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000). To satisfy the requirement that an individual is "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA, the individual must demonstrate: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)-(C). With respect to Count II, Mayorga is proceeding under both subsections (A) and (C), alleging in the alternative thatAlorica discriminated against her and refused to provide a reasonable accommodation based on her actual disability, and based on Alorica regarding her as disabled. As discussed below, the Complaint pleads sufficient allegations under both theories to survive the Motion to Dismiss.
Mayorga first alleges that Alorica discriminated against her based on her actual disability—her pregnancy-related complications—in violation of the ADA. As noted above, to meet the ADA's definition of actual disability, Mayorga must demonstrate that she had "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). The Equal Employment...
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