Mays v. Chevron Pipe Line Co.

• Decision Date: 03 August 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-30535,19-30535
• Citation: 968 F.3d 442
• Parties: Peggy MAYS, Individually & as Personal Representative, on behalf of James L. Mays Estate; Daphne Lanclos; Brent Mays; Jared Mays, Plaintiffs—Appellees, v. CHEVRON PIPE LINE COMPANY, Defendant—Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

968 F.3d 442

Peggy MAYS, Individually & as Personal Representative, on behalf of James L. Mays Estate; Daphne Lanclos; Brent Mays; Jared Mays, Plaintiffs—Appellees,

v.CHEVRON PIPE LINE COMPANY, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 19-30535

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED August 3, 2020

REVISED August 4, 2020

Jill Swearingen Pierce, Attorney, Lance P. Bradley, Attorney, Bradley & Steele, P.L.L.C., Port Arthur, TX, Jane Swearingen Leger, Attorney, Ferguson Law Firm, L.L.P., Beaumont, TX, Darrel James Papillion, Esq., Walters, Papillion, Thomas, Cullens, L.L.C., Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiffs - Appellees

Sean Thomas McLaughlin, Louis Matthew Grossman, James Robert Silverstein, Esq., Kean Miller, L.L.P., New Orleans, LA, for Defendant - Appellant

Before Barksdale, Higginson, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.

STUART KYLE DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

James Mays was killed in an explosion on an offshore platform owned by appellant Chevron Pipe Line Company ("Chevron"). Mays was directly employed by a Chevron subcontractor, Furmanite American ("Furmanite"), which serviced valves on Chevron's platforms. Mays’ widow and children sued Chevron for state-law wrongful death, and Chevron claimed immunity under the state workers’ compensation scheme. The parties agree that state immunity does not protect Chevron if Mays’ accident was covered by the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 – 50, which extends to injuries "occurring as the result of" natural-resource extraction on the Outer Continental Shelf ("OCS"). 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b). This question of LHWCA coverage was submitted to the jury, based on evidence that even though the platform Mays was working on was in Louisiana waters, it was connected to Chevron's OCS platforms; that the fatal explosion was caused by gas flowing from those platforms; and that those platforms had to be shut down due to the accident. The jury found Mays’ death was caused by Chevron's OCS activities, which meant that the LHWCA applied and that Chevron did not enjoy state immunity. The jury found Chevron 70% at fault for Mays’ death and awarded his widow $2 million for her loss of Mays’ affection.

Chevron's central argument on appeal concerns the jury instructions. Chevron insists they violated the Supreme Court's decision in Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid , which interpreted the federal law extending LHWCA coverage to OCS activities. 565 U.S. 207, 132 S.Ct. 680, 181 L.Ed.2d 675 (2012). Chevron argues that under Valladolid , the jury should have been asked only whether the OCS activities of Mays’ direct employer, Furmanite, caused his death. According to Chevron, Furmanite had no OCS activities, and so the LHWCA could not have applied to supplant Chevron's state immunity. Asking instead about the link between Mays’ death and Chevron's OCS operations, Chevron urges, was legal error that requires reversing the jury verdict and rendering judgment in Chevron's favor.

Chevron misreads Valladolid . That decision, consistent with the language of the statute it interpreted, requires only a link "between the injury and extractive operations on the shelf." Id. at 211, 132 S.Ct. 680. It does not specify which employer's OCS operations are relevant in a case, like this one, where a subcontractor's employee does work for a contractor with OCS operations. Chevron would extract from Valladolid a limitation it does not contain. We therefore reject Chevron's argument that the jury instructions violated Valladolid . We also reject Chevron's alternative arguments that the evidence failed to link Mays’ death with Chevron's OCS operations and that the district court abused its discretion in not reducing Mrs. Mays’ damages.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

I.

James Mays worked as a valve technician for Furmanite. On September 13, 2014, Mays was killed while servicing a valve at the Lighthouse Point natural gas platform, which is part of Chevron's Henry Gas Gathering System ("Henry System"). The platform lies in Louisiana's territorial waters, but the Henry System includes other platforms outside Louisiana waters on the OCS.¹ Two such platforms are connected by pipeline to the platform on which Mays was killed. To stop the gas flowing through the breached valve that caused Mays’ death, Chevron had to shut off gas flow from the two connected OCS platforms. At the time of the accident, Mays was working pursuant to a contract between Chevron and Furmanite, under which Furmanite provided maintenance and repair services to several Henry System platforms.

Mays’ estate, wife, and children (collectively, "plaintiffs") sued Chevron in federal district court, invoking the court's diversity jurisdiction and raising tort claims under Louisiana law. Specifically, they alleged Chevron failed to maintain the valve Mays was working on and also misinformed him about the valve's manufacturer. They asserted these mistakes led Mays to inadvertently breach the pipeline's pressure barrier, triggering an explosion that killed him.

Chevron moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity as Mays’ "statutory employer" under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act ("LWCA"), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:1020 –1470. A statutory employer is one that receives work from someone by contracting with his direct employer. See id . § 23:1061(A)(1). The statutory employer may owe the employee workers’ compensation under certain circumstances. In exchange, the statutory employer, like the direct employer, is immune from tort liability. Id .; see also id . § 23:1032(A)(1).

In response, the plaintiffs argued this state-law immunity did not apply because Mays was covered by the federal LHWCA. By its terms, the state LWCA does not apply where the LHWCA does.²

The plaintiffs argued the LHWCA applied to Mays’ death because of the accident's ties to the OCS. Another federal law, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA"), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331 – 56, extends the LHWCA to injuries "occurring as the result of" OCS operations. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b). This extension applies where (1) an employee's injury "result[s] from" OCS extractive operations, and (2) his employer is an "employer" under OCSLA.³ See Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. , 692 F.2d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 1982) ; Stansbury v. Sikorski Aircraft , 681 F.2d 948, 950 (5th Cir. 1982).⁴ An injury "result[s] from" OCS extractive operations if it has a "substantial nexus" to those operations. Valladolid , 565 U.S. at 222, 132 S.Ct. 680. Chevron responded that it was not Mays’ "employer" under OCSLA and that Mays’ death could have had no nexus to OCS operations because his direct employer, Furmanite, had no such operations.

The district court initially agreed with Chevron and granted summary judgment. It ruled that whoever the relevant employer might be under OCSLA (Chevron or Furmanite), the plaintiffs failed to identify any evidence showing a "substantial nexus" between Chevron's OCS operations and Mays’ death. On the plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend the judgment, however, the court changed its mind. It found a genuine dispute of material fact as to the substantial-nexus requirement because, contrary to its prior understanding, the incident involved "gas being transported by pipeline from the [OCS]" and caused Chevron to shut down two OCS platforms. The court denied Chevron's motion to certify that ruling for interlocutory appeal.

The case proceeded to trial before a different district judge.⁵ At the close of the plaintiffs’ case and again at the close of evidence, Chevron moved for judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL"), relying on its contention that there was no connection between Mays’ death and any OCS operations of Furmanite. The motions were denied, and the jury was instructed to determine whether there was a substantial nexus between Mays’ death and Chevron's OCS operations. The jury found there was. It assigned 70% of the fault for Mays’ death to Chevron and 30% to Mays, and awarded damages of over $2.9 million, including $2 million to Mrs. Mays for loss of affection. The district court denied Chevron's renewed motion for JMOL. Chevron also moved for remittitur of the $2 million awarded to Mrs. Mays. The district court sustained all but $527.54 of the award and entered an amended judgment. Chevron timely appealed.

II .

We review a district court's ruling on a renewed JMOL motion de novo , applying the same standards as the district court. MultiPlan, Inc. v. Holland , 937 F.3d 487, 494 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. , 898 F.3d 461, 473 (5th Cir. 2018) ). A party is entitled to JMOL when "[the] party has been fully heard on an issue ... and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). We examine the evidence as a whole and "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Herster v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ ., 887 F.3d 177, 184 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Carmona v. Sw. Airlines Co. , 604 F.3d 848, 854 (5th Cir. 2010) ). A jury verdict lacks a legally sufficient evidentiary basis "where the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that reasonable jurors could not arrive at a contrary verdict." Id . "[T]he court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, as those are jury functions." N. Cypress Med. Ctr ., 898 F.3d at 473 (quoting Fairchild v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc. , 815 F.3d 959, 966 (5th Cir. 2016) ). "Where a jury verdict has been rendered, ... we are ‘especially deferential’ to the verdict." MultiPlan , 937 F.3d at 494 (quoting Johnson v. Thibodaux City , 887 F.3d 726, 731 (5th Cir. 2018) ).

We review the district court's ruling on a remittitur motion for abuse of discretion. Longoria v. Hunter , 932 F.3d 360, 364 (5th Cir. 2019) ; Esposito v. Davis , 47 F.3d 164, 167 (5th Cir. 1995).

III.

Chevron raises...