Maysteel Products, Inc. v. CIR

• Citation: 287 F.2d 429
• Decision Date: 27 February 1961
• Docket Number: No. 13124.,13124.
• Parties: MAYSTEEL PRODUCTS, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

287 F.2d 429 (1961)

MAYSTEEL PRODUCTS, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

No. 13124.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

February 27, 1961.

Marvin E. Klitsner, William J. Willis, Milwaukee, Wis. (Foley, Sammond & Lardner, Milwaukee, Wis., of counsel), for petitioner.

Charles K. Rice, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tax Division, Gilbert E. Andrews, Jr., Lee A. Jackson, Harry Baum, Grant W. Wiprud, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for respondent.

Hugh Satterlee, Rollin Browne, New York City, Amici Curiae.

Before SCHNACKENBERG, KNOCH and CASTLE, Circuit Judges.

CASTLE, Circuit Judge.

Maysteel Products, Inc., petitioner, prosecutes this appeal from a Tax Court decision ruling that Maysteel was not entitled to a deduction claimed for amortizable bond premium and determining a deficiency in the amount of $9,618.25 in connection with taxpayer's corporate income tax for its fiscal year ending November 30, 1953. In that year taxpayer purchased certain bonds, borrowing the major portion of the purchase price, and shortly thereafter transferred its equity in the bonds to a tax-exempt corporation. The Tax Court held the taxpayer was entitled to a deduction claimed for the charitable contribution but not entitled to a deduction for amortizable bond premium.

The contested issues are:

(1) Whether there was clear error in the Tax Court's finding that the taxpayer's purchase and disposition of the bonds were for a non-business purpose — a charitable donation — and were motivated solely by the purpose of obtaining an additional tax deduction by virtue of the premium paid.

(2) And, if not, does such lack of commercial purpose coupled with the co-existent tax deduction motive preclude application of Sections 23(v) and 125 of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S. C.A. §§ 23(v), 125?

Pertinent facts established by the record may be summarized as follows:

Taxpayer is a Wisconsin corporation. Prior to 1953 its stockholders organized a separate corporation, Maysteel Foundation, Inc., for the purpose of receiving donations to be disbursed for religious, educational and related purposes. During 1953 the Foundation was exempt from income tax under Section 101(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 26 U.S.C.A. § 101(6), and contributions to the Foundation were deductible.

On September 22, 1953, the taxpayer purchased $100,000.00 in principal amount of 3¾ per cent Appalachian Electric Power Company bonds due June 1, 1981. The purchase price of the bonds was 114 1/8. The total cost to the taxpayer was $115,843.75, which included $500.00 commission and $1,218.75 accrued interest. The bonds were subject to call for redemption by their issuer on thirty-days' notice at 100 plus a special redemption premium of 2 3/8 per cent.

The taxpayer borrowed $100,000.00 of the purchase price of the bonds from a bank, paying the balance from its own funds. It gave its promissory note to the bank in the amount of $100,000.00, dated September 30, 1953, due thirty-five days after date, with interest at 3¾ per cent. The bonds were held as collateral for payment of the loan.

On October 23, 1953, taxpayer recorded on its books an amortization of the premium paid for the bonds in the amount of $12,250.00 (cost plus commission less call price) which it deducted on its income tax return for the fiscal year as part of its general and administrative expenses.

On October 26, 1953, taxpayer made a gift of the bonds to the Foundation, subject to the taxpayer's indebtedness to the bank. The Foundation sold the bonds October 27, 1953 for $119,000.00, plus accrued interest of $1,572.92, less a commission of $500.00, and federal tax of $50.00, for a net amount of $120,022.92. Taxpayer also claimed a deduction for the charitable contribution.

The Commissioner disallowed both the claimed deductions. The Tax Court allowed the charitable deduction but not the deduction for amortization of bond premium.

The entire transaction was proposed to the taxpayer, and carried out on its behalf, by an investment broker who was soliciting business of clients interested in the cumulative tax benefits of an amortization deduction and a charitable contribution. This broker handled the purchase of the bonds, arranged for the bank financing, prepared all of the documents necessary for the taxpayer's execution and handled the final closing of the transaction, including the sale of the bonds and satisfaction of the loan.

From our review of the record we are satisfied that it amply supports the Tax Court's findings that the transaction, and each of the component steps, was designed to effect a charitable gift with the concurrent motive of generating an amortization deduction in addition to the charitable deduction. We turn to the question of whether the character of the transaction here involved and the motive which prompted the form it took preclude taxpayer from the benefits of the deduction for amortizable bond premium.

Section 23 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 authorizes a deduction for amortizable bond premium, as provided in Section 125 of the Code. So far as relevant, Section 125, in substance, defines amortizable bond premium as the difference between a bondholder's basis for determining loss on sale or exchange of bonds (generally purchase price) and the amount payable on redemption of the bond at maturity or at the earliest call date. In effect, Section 125 allows the amortization (and deduction) of the entire bond premium within the year of purchase of callable bonds, where the earliest call date falls within such year.

The transaction here involved meets the literal requirements of the provisions authorizing amortization deductions. The Government contends, however, that it lies outside the plain intent of the statute.

The Government relies on cases such as Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 81 S.Ct. 132, 5 L.Ed.2d 128; Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S.Ct. 266, 79 L.Ed. 596; and Gilbert v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 2 Cir., 248 F.2d 399, affirmed after remand, 2 Cir., 262 F.2d 512. But those cases involved instances where the transaction relied upon was a mere sham or lacked economic reality. In such situations the courts properly disregard form for substance. While the end result here was a gift — not a business transaction — the bond purchase, loan, note and pledge of collateral, sale of the bonds, and satisfaction of the loan were in every respect genuine financial and commercial transactions. They were real in every sense. And the taxpayer was exposed to all of the usual risks involved in such transactions. It incurred genuine obligations; risks and obligations beyond its control. The transaction here had economic substance, was not a sham nor rigged device without real substance or risk, and inducement or motive is without significance. Taxpayer incurred the risk of loss in event of decline in the market; was entitled to benefit from any advance; it was not bound to make the gift it ultimately did but could have retained the benefits of the transaction. Substantive and economic reality were present.

The motivation involved does not destroy the...