Mayweather v. Guice

• Decision Date: 28 September 2018
• Docket Number: 1:17-cv-100-FDW
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
• Parties: ALFUTIR KAREEM I-DEEN MAYWEATHER, Plaintiff, v. W. DAVID GUICE, et al., Defendants.

ALFUTIR KAREEM I-DEEN MAYWEATHER,¹ Plaintiff, v. W. DAVID GUICE, et al., Defendants.

1:17-cv-100-FDW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA ASHEVILLE DIVISION

September 28, 2018

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, (Doc. No. 11). He is proceeding in forma pauperis. See (Doc. No. 5).

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se incarcerated Plaintiff filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with regards to incidents that allegedly occurred at Hyde C.I. and Marion C.I. The Complaint passed initial review on claims of retaliation against Defendant Auer and for due process violations against Defendants Banks, Swink, and Locklear. See (Doc. No. 7). Plaintiff has now filed an Amended Complaint which is before the Court on initial review.

Plaintiff names as Defendants in the Amended Complaint: Department of Public Safety ("DPS") Commissioner W. David Guice; DPS Commissioner George T. Solomon; Hyde C.I. Captain Auer; Hyde C.I. Disciplinary Hearing Officer Locklear; Hyde C.I. Correctional Officer John Doe; Marion C.I. Lieutenant Banks; and Marion C.I. Correctional Planner G. Swink.

Construing the Amended Complaint liberally and accepting the allegations as true, Plaintiffasked North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services ("NCPLS") requesting caselaw but they declined, saying there was not funding to provide case law to inmates. Defendants Solomon and Guice have failed to correct NCPLS's practices. Plaintiff wrote a grievance on August 8, 2016, about the materials that North Carolina Prisons are supposed to provide inmates. Officer John Doe submitted a step-one response and Sergeant Auer also responded to the grievance. They failed to provide Plaintiff with case law and other materials that were needed to properly present and argue his habeas corpus petition in his criminal case. Guice and Solomon enforce a policy of only providing inmates with carbon paper. Inmates are not given access to case law or case reports to properly present their claims.

When Plaintiff filed the grievance, he was preparing a habeas petition raising Fourth Amendment allegations in his criminal case. His appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress in the criminal case was denied in 2013 on the grounds that a five-minute delay to search his vehicle with a canine was de minimis and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. This is contrary to United States Supreme Court case law that a dog sniff of a vehicle that prolongs a vehicle stop that is not supported by reasonable suspicion violates the constitution's prohibition of unreasonable seizures. Whether or not there was reasonable suspicion was never addressed at Plaintiff's trial or on appeal. After PLS refused to assist Plaintiff with his habeas petition, he had no way to adequately respond to the State's motion for summary judgment. As a result of the lack of access to legal materials, Plaintiff's habeas corpus petition was denied. Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari that was dismissed because Plaintiff could not properly argue or present his constitutional claims to the court.

Officer Auer charged Plaintiff with instigating an assault, which Plaintiff did not commit, just to get Plaintiff away from Hyde C.I. due to the grievances he filed about violations of accessto the courts. Disciplinary Hearing Officer Locklear refused to allow Plaintiff to present evidence that he had nothing to do with the assault. Plaintiff was found guilty of the infractions that he did not commit.

Plaintiff claims that, as a result of the infractions, he lost his phone privileges for six months, during which time two family members died, was placed on lockdown for 12 months, was demoted from medium custody to close custody status, lost days off of his sentence, and was enrolled in the Challenge Program as part of which property was confiscated to from him. Defendants Corpening and Jenkins are "over the challenge program" and enforce the policy of taking inmates' property. (Doc. No. 11 at 12). Defendants Swink and Bank confiscated Plaintiff's property (books and movie scripts that Plaintiff wrote) even though it was not over the three shipping bag limit. Swink and Bank followed the prison policy created or enforced by Corpening and Jenkins. Defendant Guice directed officers to take inmates' property when they enter the challenge program. Defendants Corpening and Jenkins are "over the challenge program" and enforce the policy of taking inmates' property. (Doc. No. 11 at 12). Defendants Swink and Bank confiscated Plaintiff's property (books and movie scripts that Plaintiff wrote) even though it was not over the three shipping bag limit. They followed the prison policy created or enforced by Corpening and Jenkins. Defendant Guice directed officers to take inmates' property when they enter the challenge program.

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and any other relief the Court deems appropriate.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is "(i) frivolous ormalicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In its frivolity review, a court must determine whether the Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim "unless 'after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief.'" Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999)).

A pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see also Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4^th Cir. 2009) ("Liberal construction of the pleadings is particularly appropriate where ... there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights issues."). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4^th Cir. 1990). A pro se complaint must still contain sufficient facts "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (the Twombly plausibility standard applies to all federal civil complaints including those filed under § 1983). This "plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to demonstrate more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4^th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). He must articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate he has stated a claim entitling him to relief.Id.

III. DISCUSSION

(1) Parties

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that, "[i]n the complaint the title of the action shall include the names of all the parties." Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); see Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551 (7^th Cir. 2005) ("to make someone a party the plaintiff must specify him in the caption and arrange for service of process."). Although pro se litigants are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed, Haines, 404 U.S. at 520, "[d]istrict judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants," Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 (2004). The Rules require a short and plain statement of the claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific allegations of material fact are not sufficient. Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 35 (4^th Cir. 1990). A pleader must allege facts, directly or indirectly, that support each element of the claim. Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 201-02 (4^th Cir. 2002).

The body of the Complaint refers to NCPLS, H. Corpening, and J. Jenkins, but they are not named as defendants in the caption as required by Rule 10(a). This failure renders Plaintiff's allegations against NCPLS, Corpening, and Jenkins nullities. See, e.g., Londeree v. Crutchfield Corp., 68 F.Supp.2d 718 (W.D. Va. Sept. 29, 1999) (granting motion to dismiss for individuals who were not named as defendants in the compliant but who were served). The Complaint is insufficient to proceed with regards to these Defendants and will be dismissed as to them.

Moreover, even if NCPLS was named as a defendant, the claims against it would not be able to proceed NCPLS is operated and overseen by Legal Services of North Carolina, Inc. ("Legal Services"). See Smith v. Bounds, 657 F.Supp. 1327, 1328 n. 1 (E.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd, 813 F.2d 1299 (4^th Cir. 1987). A private entity such as NCPLS is not a state actor and is therefore notamenable to suit under section 1983 except in certain narrow circumstances, none of which apply here. See Bryant v. N.C. Prisoner Legal Servs., Inc., 1 F.3d 1232, 1232 (4^th Cir. 1993) ("NCPLS and its attorneys are not state actors amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."); see, e.g., Murray v. Pollard, 2014 WL 49963 at *3 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 7, 2014), aff'd, 576 Fed. Appx. 209 (4^th Cir. 2014).

For all the foregoing reasons, the claims against NCDPS, Corpening, and Jenkins are dismissed.

(2) Access to Courts

Inmates have a constitutional right to a "reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts"...