Mazariegos-Paiz v. Holder
| Decision Date | 25 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 12–1382.,12–1382. |
| Parties | Henry MAZARIEGOS–PAIZ, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Randy Olen, on brief, for petitioner.
Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Anthony C. Payne, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, and Ali Manuchehry, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, on brief, for respondent.
Before TORRUELLA, SELYA and HOWARD, Circuit Judges.
Our consideration of the petition for judicial review in this immigration case starts with a jurisdictional puzzle. After piecing together this puzzle, we hold, as a matter of first impression in this circuit, that the administrative exhaustion requirement is satisfied as to particular issues when the agency, either on its own initiative or at the behest of some other party to the proceedings, has addressed those claims on the merits, regardless of whether the petitioner himself raised them.1 This holding establishes our authority to review the issues advanced in the present petition. Concluding, as we do, that those issues lack bite, we deny the petition.
The historical facts are straightforward. The petitioner, Henry Mazariegos–Paiz, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States without inspection on August 20, 2006. He reunited there with his cousin, Deny Adolfo Mazariegos–Mazariegos, who had entered illegally at an earlier date.
On February 11, 2008, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) commenced removal proceedings against the petitioner.See8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). He conceded removability, but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). In support, he claimed both past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution based on both his political opinion and his membership in a particular social group.2 He also claimed a likelihood that he would face torture if he returned to Guatemala.
The DHS also initiated removal proceedings against his cousin Deny, who likewise conceded removability and cross-applied for similar relief. The two sets of proceedings were consolidated.
Before the consolidated proceedings got underway, the Immigration Judge (IJ) noted, without objection, that the only files on record were each man's application for asylum and withholding of removal (Form I–589). Deny took the lead before the agency and testified that he and the petitioner left Guatemala because they had become targets of persecution. Specifically, he asserted that in August of 2005—roughly one year after their political party, the Great National Alliance (GANA), won the general election—a group of men, ostensibly from the rival Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), beat the cousins, threatened their lives, and warned that their family would be wiped out unless they “withdrew from politics.”
On cross-examination, Deny was asked why his application for withholding of removal was unsupported by affidavits or other corroborating evidence. His counsel interjected that she had prepared affidavits for her clients and had assumed that they were on file with the Immigration Court. She then produced three untranslated Spanish-language documents. Two of these—a police report and a medical report—pertained to an attack against the petitioner's uncle. The third document was a copy of Deny's report to a Guatemalan human rights counselor about the August 2005 incident.
Deny's attorney then requested a continuance in order to submit the missing affidavits, translate the proffered documents, and supply other corroborating evidence. Observing that the case had been pending for over a year, the DHS opposed this request. The IJ denied the continuance and marked the untranslated documents for identification only.
When it came time for the petitioner to testify, his counsel offered to waive direct examination. She told the IJ that the petitioner's testimony was “expected to corroborate that of [his cousin] so it would be mostly repetitive.” The IJ accepted this representation, and the DHS proceeded to cross-examine the petitioner.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the IJ denied the cousins' applications for withholding of removal and protection under the CAT. She grounded this decision principally on a determination that neither man had testified credibly. In this regard, she noted numerous discrepancies between the applications for relief and the testimony offered at the hearing. She found that the story that the two cousins told was vague, implausible, and wholly uncorroborated.
Both the petitioner and his cousin appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). In his brief, the petitioner focused solely on the IJ's (allegedly erroneous) decision to consolidate the two cases. In contrast, Deny's brief challengedboth the adverse credibility determination and the refusal to continue the hearing.
The BIA consolidated the two appeals, adopted and affirmed the IJ's adverse credibility determination, and upheld the other disputed rulings. The BIA made no distinction as to who had raised which claims but, rather, proceeded as if each man had advanced every claim. Based on the foregoing, the BIA affirmed the orders of removal.
The petitioner secured new counsel and filed this timely petition for judicial review. For aught that appears, his cousin has not sought judicial review.
We divide our analysis into three segments. First, we ponder the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction. Thereafter, we mull two separate merits-related rulings.
The government argues that this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the petitioner's claims because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to those claims. In elaboration, it points out that even though the petitioner in this venue tries to advance two merits-related claims—one dealing with the adverse credibility determination and one dealing with the denial of a continuance—he, himself, did not raise either claim before the BIA. The petitioner's best chance to parry this thrust boils down to the following sequence of events: his case and his cousin's were consolidated; his cousin squarely raised before the BIA the issues that the petitioner now seeks to argue; and the BIA actually adjudicated those issues. So viewed, this sequence sufficiently exhausted the issues.
We begin our inquiry into the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction with first principles. As a court of limited jurisdiction, our authority to act in any given case depends upon the extent to which Congress has imbued us with jurisdiction. See Am. Fiber & Finishing, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP, 362 F.3d 136, 138 (1st Cir.2004). Pertinently for present purposes, Congress has granted us jurisdiction to review non-constitutional claims arising in the removal context only if “the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). This exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional; that is, it constitutes a limitation on our power of review. See Athehortua–Vanegas v. INS, 876 F.2d 238, 240 (1st Cir.1989).
We have interpreted this exhaustion requirement as demanding that issues be exhausted in agency proceedings. See, e.g., Makhoul v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 75, 80 (1st Cir.2004); Ravindran v. INS, 976 F.2d 754, 761 (1st Cir.1992). Ordinarily, then, an alien who neglects to present an issue to the BIA fails to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to that issue and, thus, places it beyond our jurisdictional reach.
This method of exhaustion, however, is not exclusive. We think that, short of an alien's direct presentation of an issue to the agency, there is at least one other way in which exhaustion may occur. We explain briefly.
The primary rationale behind the exhaustion requirement is apparent. At bottom, the role of a court on a petition for judicial review of agency action is to appraise the agency's handiwork. Were the court free to delve into the merits of issues not presented to the agency, it would effectively usurp the agency's function. See Unemp't Comp. Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 155, 67 S.Ct. 245, 91 L.Ed. 136 (1946). The exhaustion requirement stands as a sentinel against such usurpation. At the same time, it creates a carefully calibrated balance of responsibilities, affording the parties the full benefit of the agency's expertise and allowing the agency the first opportunity to correct its own bevues. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 200–01, 209, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947); Sidabutar v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116, 1121 (10th Cir.2007).
In the classic case, this rationale permits a finding of exhaustion when a party has squarely presented an issue to the agency. See, e.g., Sunoto v. Gonzales, 504 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir.2007). But it also permits a finding of exhaustion whenever the agency has elected to address in sufficient detail the merits of a particular issue. Cf. INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (). Where an agency has opted to follow the latter course, there is no logical reason why exhaustion should turn on which party (if either) brought the issue to the agency's attention. We hold, therefore, that an issue is exhausted when it has been squarely presented to and squarely addressed by the agency, regardless of which party raised the issue (or, indeed, even if the agency raised it sua sponte).
We do not write on a pristine page. Our holding today is consonant with the holdings of several of our sister circuits. See, e.g., Lopez–Dubon v. Holder, 609 F.3d 642, 644–45 (5th Cir.2010); Lin v. Att'y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 123–26 (3d Cir.2008); Sidabutar, 503 F.3d at 1121;Abebe v....
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