Mazella v. Beals
| Decision Date | 21 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | 975 CA 13-01421 |
| Parties | Janice MAZELLA, as Administratrix of the Estate of Joseph Mazella, Deceased, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. William BEALS, M.D., Defendant–Appellant, et al., Defendant. (Appeal No. 3.). |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Gale Gale & Hunt, LLC, Syracuse, Meiselman, Packman, Nealon, Scialabba & Baker P.C., White Plains (Myra I. Packman of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.
Del Duchetto & Potter, Syracuse (Ernest A. Del Duchetto of Counsel), and Alessandra Deblasio, New York City, for Plaintiff–Respondent.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., FAHEY, LINDLEY AND VALENTINO, JJ.
In this medical malpractice and wrongful death action, William Beals, M.D. (defendant) appeals from an amended judgment awarding money damages to plaintiff. We reject defendant's contention that Supreme Court erred in denying his posttrial motion seeking to set aside the verdict on the ground that plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice. To establish his entitlement to that relief, defendant was required to establish that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the verdict, i.e., “that there [was] simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [persons] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial” (Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499, 410 N.Y.S.2d 282, 382 N.E.2d 1145 ). On this record, we conclude that “there is a valid line of reasoning supporting the jury's verdict that defendant deviated from the applicable standard of care in [his treatment] of plaintiff's [decedent] ..., and that such deviation was a proximate cause of [the] injuries” of plaintiff's decedent (Winiarski v. Harris [Appeal No. 2], 78 A.D.3d 1556, 1557, 910 N.Y.S.2d 814 ; see generally Sacchetti v. Giordano, 101 A.D.3d 1619, 1619–1620, 956 N.Y.S.2d 361 ). We also reject defendant's alternative contention in support of his posttrial motion that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, i.e., that the evidence so preponderated in defendant's favor that the verdict in favor of plaintiff could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence (see generally Lolik v. Big V Supermarkets, 86 N.Y.2d 744, 746, 631 N.Y.S.2d 122, 655 N.E.2d 163 ). Here, we conclude that “the ‘trial was a prototypical battle of the experts, and the jury's acceptance of [plaintiff's] case was a rational and fair interpretation of the evidence’ ” ( Holstein v. Community Gen. Hosp. of Greater Syracuse, 86 A.D.3d 911, 912, 926 N.Y.S.2d 785, affd. 20 N.Y.3d 892, 956 N.Y.S.2d 475, 980 N.E.2d 523 ). With respect to our dissenting colleague's summary of the testimony of plaintiff's expert, we respectfully note that there may have been more than one proximate cause of decedent's injuries (see generally Argentina v. Emery World Wide Delivery Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 554, 560 n. 2, 693 N.Y.S.2d 493, 715 N.E.2d 495 ), and that the jury was entitled to credit plaintiff's theory that defendant's actions constituted one of those proximate causes.
Defendant further contends that the verdict must be set aside and a new trial granted because, inter alia, he was denied a fair trial by the admission in evidence of certain documents of the Office of Professional Medical Conduct. Even assuming, arguendo, that the court erred in admitting those documents in evidence, defendant's contention lacks merit inasmuch as “that ... error ‘would not have affected the result’[,] and ... any such error therefore is harmless” (Cook v. Oswego County, 90 A.D.3d 1674, 1675, 935 N.Y.S.2d 813 ).
Contrary to defendant's further contention, the court's failure to submit a special verdict sheet to the jury was not prejudicial and does not require a new trial (see Suarez v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 216 A.D.2d 287, 287, 628 N.Y.S.2d 161 ; see also Kolbert v. Maplewood Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 21 A.D.3d 1301, 1301–1302, 801 N.Y.S.2d 668 ). We have considered defendant's remaining contentions and, to the extent that they are properly before us, we conclude that they lack merit.
All concur except SMITH, J.P., who dissents and votes to reverse the amended judgment insofar as appealed from in accordance with the following Memorandum:
Because I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the negligence of defendant William Beals, M.D. (defendant) was a proximate cause of the suicide of Joseph Mazella (decedent), I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the amended judgment insofar as appealed from, grant defendant's motion to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence (see generally Dentes v. Mauser, 91 A.D.3d 1143, 1145–1146, 937 N.Y.S.2d 409, lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 811, 2012 WL 3930665 ; Rivera v. Greenstein, 79 A.D.3d 564, 568–569, 914 N.Y.S.2d 94 ), and dismiss the complaint with respect to defendant.
The evidence at trial established that defendant treated decedent for depression and other mental health conditions for many years before 2009 by, inter alia, prescribing medications. The evidence further established that defendant did not personally see decedent during approximately the last 10 years of that time, and defendant admitted that such was negligent conduct. Decedent's condition flared up again and, on August 9, 2009, he telephoned defendant, who was on vacation. There is evidence in the record from which the jury could have concluded that decedent had either reduced the dosage of the medication prescribed by defendant or had stopped taking the medication prior to telephoning defendant, although there is also evidence in the record from which the jury could have drawn the contrary conclusion. During that telephone call, defendant changed the dosage of decedent's medication and prescribed an additional medication. During a telephone call the next day, defendant again adjusted decedent's medications.
The day after that, plaintiff telephoned defendant and informed him that she was concerned about decedent's condition. Defendant advised her to take decedent to a nearby hospital's Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program (CPEP), which she did, and decedent was hospitalized overnight. Defendant met with decedent and plaintiff at defendant's office several days later, on August 17, 2009. Although the record contains varying descriptions of the interactions between those three people during that meeting, it is clear that defendant's last contact with decedent occurred at that time, and defendant referred decedent to CPEP for further treatment.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the above evidence and the other evidence introduced by plaintiff at trial was sufficient to establish that defendant was negligent in his treatment of decedent up until that time, it is undisputed that decedent received significant medical treatment after his last contact with defendant. The evidence at trial established that, after his last meeting with defendant, decedent went to CPEP, where the physicians recommended that decedent enter an inpatient psychiatric facility, but decedent declined to follow that advice. Decedent was treated overnight at CPEP and then released, and the treating physician who released decedent prescribed different medications than those that had been prescribed by defendant. The physician at CPEP thought that decedent should not be released, but decedent and plaintiff convinced the physician that plaintiff and decedent's other family members could care for him at home. Decedent returned to CPEP the next day and was admitted, and he was later transferred to the inpatient psychiatric unit of another hospital. Decedent remained there for about a week, during which time another psychiatrist changed his medications again and prescribed other treatment for his condition. Decedent was released from that facility because the physicians there concluded that he was not suicidal, and that his condition had improved sufficiently to allow him to continue treatment on an outpatient basis. None of the medical professionals who saw decedent during the week after his discharge from the inpatient psychiatric unit thought he was suicidal, and plaintiff wrote a note during that time frame indicating that she thought decedent was “80–90% better.”
Decedent was released from inpatient psychiatric treatment under a regimen of medications that was different from the medications prescribed by defendant, and some of those medications carried warnings that they were not to be prescribed to those at risk of suicide. Rather than referring decedent to a psychiatrist upon discharge, the psychiatrist at the hospital referred him to a psychiatric clinic that had approximately a four-week intake process. When plaintiff spoke with the hospital's psychiatrist after decedent's discharge and expressed concern regarding the newly-prescribed medications, the psychiatrist told her to have decedent continue taking one of the medications, but also said that decedent could discontinue the other. Before decedent's application to be accepted for treatment at the psychiatric clinic was completed, decedent committed suicide.
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