Maziarka v. Mills Fleet Farm, 99-2655

Decision Date16 October 2000
Docket NumberNo. 99-2655,99-2655
Citation245 F.3d 675
Parties(8th Cir. 2001) MICHAEL D. MAZIARKA, APPELLANT, v. MILLS FLEET FARM, INC., APPELLEE. Submitted:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Wollman, Chief Judge, Beam, and Morris Sheppard Arnold, Circuit Judges.

Wollman, Chief Judge.

Michael D. Maziarka appeals from the district court's 1 grant of summary judgment on his employment discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. 363.01-363.15, in favor of his former employer, Mills Fleet Farm, Inc. (Fleet Farm). We affirm, but for a reason other than that relied upon by the district court. See Phillips v. Marist Soc'y, 80 F.3d 274, 275 (8th Cir. 1996).

I.

We recite the facts in the light most favorable to Maziarka. Maziarka suffers from a condition known as irritable bowel syndrome that causes diarrhea, severe cramping, and vomiting. Less common symptoms include nausea, joint pain, and fever, all of which afflict Maziarka. According to Maziarka's treating physician, Dr. Mark Liebow of the Mayo Clinic, one-sixth of the population suffers from irritable bowel syndrome, but Maziarka's case is unusually severe, one of the cases that "represent less than 1/10 of 1% of all those suffering with irritable bowel syndrome." Treatment may alleviate the symptoms, but the condition is incurable and flares up unpredictably. When Maziarka is symptomatic, he is essentially bedridden for a period of time, often as long as two days.

In November of 1995, Fleet Farm hired Maziarka as a full-time clerk in the hardware department of its store in Winona, Minnesota. In December of 1995, Maziarka was absent from work due to illness on four occasions and twice left early for the same reason. A performance review for this month noted this absenteeism as unsatisfactory. Maziarka received a good performance review for January of 1996, however, having arrived late to work on only two occasions and having no absences related to illness. In early 1996, Maziarka was transferred to the receiving department.

According to the written job description for receiving clerk, Maziarka's primary job responsibility was "to receive and properly record merchandise off the carrier's manifest." Receiving clerks inspect freight bills and merchandise shipments, have the freight driver acknowledge any discrepancies in the order, check in and scan merchandise, and respond to calls for help in all areas of the store. Performance is judged on accuracy and speed and on the ability to follow up on damage and other discrepancies. Maziarka stated that the workload was sporadic; some days were busy, particularly during July when holiday merchandise arrives, but some days Maziarka "pushed a broom for eight hours." The receiving department's work depended on the arrival of various delivery trucks, and thus the level of work varied with no recognizable pattern. The department consisted of three to four full-time employees plus a couple of part-time employees, who generally worked alone or with one other person during their shifts. The assistant manager stated that he had called in other receiving clerks to fill in for absent employees only once or twice. Clerks from other departments were not trained to fill in for absent receiving department employees.

From February 9, 1996, to Maziarka's termination date, December 9, 1996, Maziarka was absent from work because of illness an average of two days per month and left early or arrived late approximately six times. Maziarka's performance reviews during this time marked his "attendance/dependability" as unsatisfactory. Although Maziarka brought in numerous notes from Dr. Liebow explaining his condition and excusing his absences, he received repeated oral warnings about his absenteeism and received numerous written disciplinary warnings. In September of 1996, Maziarka received a final written warning that required him to provide a written medical excuse for every absence. Maziarka met this requirement and called Fleet Farm promptly when he would be absent from work. Also in September, Maziarka filed for medical leave on an intermittent basis, which was denied because he had not worked for Fleet Farm for a year. 2 Maziarka was told during one of his meetings with the store manager that "[i]f you knew you had this condition, you should have never applied here."

On December 5 and 6 of 1996, Maziarka was unable to come to work because of a flare up of irritable bowel syndrome. On December 9, 1996, Fleet Farm fired him for excessive absenteeism.

Maziarka brought claims under the ADA and the MHRA against Fleet Farm for terminating him because of his disability and for failing to accommodate his disability. The district court granted summary judgment to Fleet Farm, concluding that Maziarka had failed to show that he was substantially limited in any major life activities.

II.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Henerey v. City of St. Charles, 200 F.3d 1128, 1131 (8th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is proper if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The ADA 3 affords protection from discrimination to any "qualified individual with a disability." 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, Maziarka must show (1) that he has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, (2) that he is qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) that he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability. Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1135 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Discrimination includes "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical and mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of [the employer]." 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)(A). The proof necessary to establish a prima facie case in discrimination cases is flexible and varies with the specific facts of each case. Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 152 F.3d 1018, 1022 (8th Cir. 1998).

Maziarka contends that there are genuine issues of fact about whether he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA and about whether he could perform the essential functions of the job with reasonable accommodation.

A. Disability

The relevant statutory definition of disability in this case is: "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual. . . ." 42 U.S.C. 12102(2)(A). Fleet Farm does not dispute that Maziarka suffers from a physical impairment, that is, a "condition . . . affecting one or more of the following body systems: . . . digestive." 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(h). According to the regulations that guide the interpretation of the ADA, an impairment is "substantially limiting" if it renders an individual unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform, or if it significantly restricts the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform such an activity compared to the general population. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii). Major life activities include caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, breathing, learning, and working, 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(i), as well as sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching. Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 1999).

Several factors are considered in determining whether a person is substantially limited in a major life activity: (1) the nature and severity of the impairment; (2) its duration or anticipated duration; and (3) its long-term impact. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii). To be substantially limited in the life activity of working, a plaintiff must be "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Inability to perform one particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation on working. Id. A plaintiff must show that because of his impairment he has suffered a significant reduction in meaningful employment opportunities. Webb v. Garelick Mfg. Co., 94 F.3d 484, 488 (8th Cir. 1996).

Fleet Farm contends that because the flare ups in Maziarka's condition are too infrequent to constitute a substantial limitation, his periods of incapacitation do not demonstrate that he is substantially limited in any life activity. The determination of disability is a highly fact-intensive one, Land v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 164 F.3d 423, 425 (8th Cir. 1999), and thus a conclusion that a certain condition, or a particular manifestation of a condition, does not substantially limit a particular plaintiff does not foreclose a determination that another individual with the same or analogous condition may be disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Otting v. J.C. Penney Co., 223 F.3d 704, 710-11 & n.4 (8th Cir. 2000) (discussing epilepsy). The cases on which Fleet Farm relies, therefore, do not foreclose Maziarka's claim. E.g., Zirpel v. Toshiba America Info. Sys., Inc., 111 F.3d 80, 81 (8th Cir. 1997) (panic disorder "very manageable;" attacks infrequent and mild); Todd v. Academy Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 448, 453 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (epilepsy under control; seizures very brief and plaintiff aware of their approach).

Maziarka's irritable bowel syndrome is...

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