Mazza v. Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist.
| Citation | 942 F.Supp. 187 |
| Decision Date | 08 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 94 Civ. 8463 (BDP).,94 Civ. 8463 (BDP). |
| Parties | Joan Ann MAZZA and Robert Porr, Plaintiffs, v. The HENDRICK HUDSON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Virginia C. Rederer, individually and as Superintendent, the Hendrick Hudson Board of Education, Gail Horgan, individually and as President, Peter Walker, individually and as Vice-President, Edward J. Flynn, individually and as Trustee, Robert Laibowitz, individually and as Trustee, Russell Markman, individually and as Trustee, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
James B. Fishman, Jeffrey E. Glen, Fishman & Neil, New York City, for Plaintiff.
Raymond G. Kuntz, Leah Murphy, Raymond G. Kuntz III, Bedford Village, NY, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs, Joan Ann Mazza and Robert Porr ("plaintiffs"), bring claims for violation of First Amendment rights of free speech under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for malicious prosecution, and for defamation. Defendants, Hendrick Hudson School District, ("the District"), Virginia C. Rederer ("Rederer"), the Hendrick Hudson Board of Education ("the Board"), Gail Horgan ("Horgan"), Peter Walker ("Walker"), Edward J. Flynn ("Flynn"), Robert Laibowitz ("Laibowitz"), Richard Levinson ("Levinson"), and Russell Markman ("Markman"), move for summary judgment pursuant to F.R.C.P. 56(c) on the free speech claim, and move to dismiss the malicious prosecution and defamation claims pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiffs allege the facts in the complaint as follows: Mazza served as the President of the Parent Teacher Association ("PTA") of the Furnace Woods Elementary School ("FWS") in Cortlandt Manor, New York from 1991 to 1993. In 1993, Porr was a candidate for election as a trustee to the Hendrick Hudson Board of Education.
In 1993, defendants began taking steps to remove the school's Principal, Dr. Joanne Falinski ("Falinski"). Defendants' reasons for removing Falinski were not made public at that time, although it was later revealed that Falinski allegedly denied certain students their special education entitlements. Many members of the community, including Mazza and Porr were Falinski supporters; they proceeded, on their own volition, to thwart defendants' attempt to remove her.
In September, 1993, the Board voted 6-1 to suspend Falinski. In October, 1993, Falinski pursued her rights under New York Education Law § 3020-a to have a public hearing on the charges against her. Falinski released to the general public the information that she had been charged with denying certain special education services to several FWS students. Falinski denied engaging in this conduct.
In late October, defendants commenced an action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Westchester, against Mazza and Porr. Defendants alleged that Mazza and Porr acted as agents for Falinski by distributing the written charges against her, and by threatening to disclose the identity of the student complainants. Defendants sought a temporary restraining order ("TRO") which would enjoin Mazza and Porr from:
distributing the charges filed against Joanne Falinski by the Hendrick Hudson Board of Education under § 3020-a of the Education Law, or any version thereof ... (and)
from disseminating any information which would identify or reasonably lead to the identity of any student named in the charges filed against Joanne Falinski by the Hendrick Hudson Board of Education under section 3020-a of the Education Law.
Mazza and Porr allege that the defendants failed to provide the court with any legal authority or memoranda supporting their TRO application.
On October 27, 1993, Judge Colabella of the Supreme Court granted defendants' motion for a temporary restraining order. On November 12, 1993, counsel for both sides appeared before Justice Rosato of the Supreme Court of the State of New York of the County of Westchester, for oral arguments on defendants' motion for a preliminary injunction against Falinski, her attorney, Mazza, and Porr. Plaintiffs assert that defendants' memorandum of law in support of the preliminary injunction cited no legal authority for the court to enjoin plaintiffs.
On November 23, 1993, Justice Rosato dismissed the complaint against plaintiffs with prejudice, finding that defendants had failed to present any evidence which demonstrated that Mazza and Porr had engaged in the conduct alleged by the District. Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Second Department, and sought another preliminary injunction to enjoin not only Falinski, her attorney, and also "all persons acting on their behalf." On April 13, 1994, the Appellate Division denied defendants' application. Defendants moved to reargue on April 19, 1994. On May 9, 1994, the Appellate Division denied that application.
Mazza and Porr filed this action in Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York on January 4, 1995. Defendants move for summary judgment on the § 1983 claim, and for dismissal on the pendant state claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes summary judgment if:
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Court's responsibility is to perform "the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." McNeil v. Aguilos, 831 F.Supp. 1079, 1082 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
The responding party "must set forth facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A summary judgment motion cannot be defeated through mere speculation or conjecture. Pollis v. New School for Social Research, 829 F.Supp. 584, 589 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (). Rather, the responding party must show the existence of a disputed material fact in light of the substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. McNeil, 831 F.Supp. at 1082 (). See also Coach Leatherware Co., Inc. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir.1991) (Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins., 804 F.2d 9 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932, 107 S.Ct. 1570, 94 L.Ed.2d 762 (1987)) (other citations omitted).
Mazza and Porr first claim that defendants retaliated against them for exercising their First Amendment rights.
We note at the outset that central to our constitutional democracy is the right to speak freely on political or social matters without fear of retribution by the government. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 1787-88, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-327, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152-53, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937). Moreover, "[w]henever under color of state law unfavorable action is taken against a person on account of that person's political activities or affiliation, it raises First Amendment concerns." Lieberman v. Reisman, 857 F.2d 896, 900 (2d Cir.1988). The Supreme Court has additionally held that "[a]ny prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a `heavy presumption' against its validity." Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 1577-78, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (citations omitted).
Defendants mount several arguments in opposition to plaintiffs' § 1983 claim. They assert that (1) Mazza and Porr have failed to show the requisite "chilling" effect that the TRO may have had on their First Amendment rights, (2) Mazza and Porr have similarly failed to show a requisite constitutional injury in order to make out a claim for "retaliation" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (3) in the alternative, all defendants are entitled to immunity for any wrongdoing.
It is well established in the Second Circuit that there is no cause of action available for damages under section 1983 against a school board or its members in their official capacities. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (); Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193, 195 (2d Cir.1977); Mazurek v. Wolcott Board of Education, 815 F.Supp. 71, 77 (D.Conn.1993); Lombard v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 440 F.Supp. 577, 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). Thus, plaintiffs' claim for damages against defendants in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is dismissed.
We must now address whether Mazza and Porr have made out a prima facie case under § 1983 against defendants in their individual capacities. If the alleged violation is based on a "chill" of one's First Amendment rights, a plaintiff must prove that she was "actually chilled" in the exercise of her rights. Davis v. Village Park II Realty, 578 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.1978). "Allegations of a subjective `chill' are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present...
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