Mazzola v. Lowe's Home Ctr.
| Decision Date | 20 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO.1:19-CV-00469-TH,1:19-CV-00469-TH |
| Parties | JERRY MAZZOLA, Plaintiff, v. LOWE'S HOME CENTER, LLC, EULISICA MOFFETT, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
This case is assigned to the Honorable Thad Heartfield, United States District Judge, and has been referred to the undersigned for pretrial management. This is a trip-and-fall case in which the Plaintiff, Jerry Mazzola ("Mazzola"), brings a premises liability claim. Pending before the court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendant, Lowe's Home Center, LLC ("Lowe's"). Doc. No. 16. Lowe's argues that Mazzola's premises liability claim fails because there is no evidence that (1) the wooden pallet display Mazzola tripped over posed an unreasonable risk of harm; or (2) Lowe's knew or should have known about the purportedly dangerous condition. Doc. No. 16, 26. After reviewing the parties' briefs, exhibits, and applicable authorities, the undersigned finds that there is a genuine dispute as to both elements. Accordingly, Lowe's is not entitled to summary judgment.
On December 1, 2018, Mazzola visited the Lowe's store located in Beaumont, Texas. Doc. No. 11 ¶ 7. He dropped off some paint to be shaken, and then he searched for an item in the hardware aisle. Doc. No. 25 Ex. 5 at 29:4-25. According to Mazzola, he approached the end of the aisle where a small pallet supporting a product display jutted out at a forty-five-degree angle. Id. at 30:1-12, 33:13-24. He allegedly made eye contact with a passing employee just before he tripped. Id. at 30:13-15, 86:20-87:17. Mazzola claims he Doc. No. 11 ¶ 7. Lowe's moved for summary judgment, arguing that Mazzola has failed to adduce any evidence showing that Lowe's had actual or constructive knowledge of an unreasonably dangerous condition on its premises, or that a dangerous condition even existed. Doc. No. 16.
Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute about a material fact exists if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is material when it is relevant or necessary to the ultimate outcome of the case. Id. The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine disputes of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Harvill v. Westward Commc'ns, LLC, 433 F.3d 428, 433 (5th Cir. 2005). The movant must support its assertion by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . or showing that the materials cited do not establish the . . . presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B).
"If the moving party fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). "Ifthe movant does, however, meet this burden, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 1075. The nonmovant cannot satisfy its burden with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
The court resolves any doubts and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); United States ex rel. Longhi v. United States, 575 F.3d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 2009). But the court "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255.
Premises liability is a branch of negligence law in which a property owner's standard of care changes depending on the status of those on the property. Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Jenkins, 478 S.W.3d 640, 644 (Tex. 2016). No one disputes that Mazzola was an "invitee" because he was a customer at Lowe's. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (invitee defined). Under Texas law, "a property owner owes invitees a duty to use ordinary care to reduce or eliminate an unreasonable risk of harm created by a premises condition about which the property owner knew or should have known." Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762, 767 (Tex. 2010); CMH Homes, Inc. v. Daenen, 15 S.W.3d 97, 101 (Tex. 2000).
To prevail in a trip-and-fall case, an invitee must prove that (1) the owner/operator had actual or constructive knowledge of some condition on the premises, (2) the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm, (3) the owner/operator did not exercise reasonable care to reduce oreliminate the risk, and (4) the owner/operator's failure to use such care proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries. Wal-Mart Stores v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1998); Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. 1992); Corbin v. Safeway Stores, 648 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex. 1983).
Lowe's focuses on the first two elements—the "duty" elements. First, Lowe's argues that Mazzola "has no evidence to show that the condition he complains of posed an unreasonable risk of harm." Doc. No. 16 ¶ 14. Second, Lowe's contends that "Plaintiff has no evidence to support the proposition that Lowe's knew or should have known of such a danger, thus triggering a duty to warn or make the condition safe." Doc. No. 26 ¶ 8; see also id. ¶¶ 15-16. Lastly, Lowe's originally argued in its motion (but not in its reply) that Mazzola had no evidence of damages. See Doc. No. 16, 26.1
In Texas state court, a party may move for summary judgment purely "on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements." TEX. R. CIV. P. § 166a(i). But "the concept of a 'no evidence' summary judgment neither accurately describes federal law nor has any particular import in the vernacular of federal . . . procedure." Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Brownsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 404 F. Supp. 2d 942, 948 (S.D. Tex. 2005); Cardner v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 640, 643 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (). "The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying thoseportions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Royal Surplus, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 948 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). While the movant need not support its motion with evidence negating the opponent's case, the movant must at least point out the absence of evidence. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25; FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B); see also In re Hydro-Action, Inc., 341 B.R. 186, 193 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2006) .
Here, Lowe's might not have met its burden because its motion is debatably a no evidence motion. In the brief, Lowe's cites to some federal cases and FED. R. CIV. P. 56,2 but Lowe's does not point to any depositions, affidavits, or the like to demonstrate an absence of evidence. See generally Doc. No. 16. In the argument section, Lowe's never mentions the broken board that Mazzola allegedly tripped over, and only once does Lowe's specifically refer to "a pallet of fire extinguishers" as opposed to a "condition."3 Id. ¶ 16. Lowe's summary judgment motion appears to be a no evidence motion. It is not enough for Lowe's to say that Mazzola has no evidence. Royal Surplus, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 948. Therefore, Lowe's fails to meet its burden and the motion could be denied for that reason. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d at 1075.
However, Lowe's does argue the merits in its reply. See Doc. No. 26 at 2-7. In its reply, Lowe's frequently cites to depositions and exhibits in the record to try to show that there are no genuine disputes of material fact. See id. In an effort to rule on the merits, the undersigned will treat Lowe's reply as part of its motion and continue the analysis in the alternative. Even if the court considers the substantive arguments in Lowe's reply, Mazzola still overcomes summary judgment because he has raised a genuine dispute about Lowe's knowledge of a dangerous condition on the premises.
A premises owner is not an insurer of its invitees. Brinson Ford, Inc. v. Alger, 228 S.W.3d 161, 162 (Tex. 2007). Therefore, a plaintiff in a premises liability case must prove that some condition on the premises posed an unreasonable risk of harm. Corbin v. Safeway, 648 S.W.2d at 296. A condition that presents an unreasonable risk of harm is "one in which there is a sufficient probability of a harmful event occurring that a reasonably prudent person would have foreseen it or some similar event as likely to...
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