McAlexander v. Siskiyou Joint Community College

• Decision Date: 30 July 1990
• Citation: 222 Cal.App.3d 768,272 Cal.Rptr. 70
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 61 Ed. Law Rep. 1008 Tanya McALEXANDER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SISKIYOU JOINT COMMUNITY COLLEGE, et al., Defendant and Respondent. 3 Civ. C005657.

Page 70

272 Cal.Rptr. 70

222 Cal.App.3d 768, 61 Ed. Law Rep. 1008

Tanya McALEXANDER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SISKIYOU JOINT COMMUNITY COLLEGE, et al., Defendant and Respondent.

3 Civ. C005657.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

July 30, 1990.

[222 Cal.App.3d 772] T. James Fisher, Redding, for plaintiff and respondent.

Larry B. Moss, Law Firm of Moss & Enochian, Redding, for defendant and respondent.

DeCRISTOFORO, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff, Tanya McAlexander, appeals from a judgment granting defendant Siskiyou Joint Community College's (the College) motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff, a student in an emergency medical technician (EMT) training class offered by the College, filed suit after suffering injuries during a belay rope training exercise. On appeal, plaintiff contends triable issues of fact exist as to: whether Health and Safety Code section 1799.100 provides the college with immunity from suits brought by students; whether the rope belay was within the scope of EMT training; the instructor's qualifications; and whether section 1799.100 violates due process. We shall affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, in an effort to obtain EMT certification, enrolled in "Health 15-A," an EMT training course offered by the College.

The College's EMT training program operated with the approval of the approving agency, Northern California Emergency Medical Services, Inc. The College's EMT-1A program director approved the assignment of Bill Balfrey as a course consultant to teach the rope belay technique as a part of the extrication and rescue portion of Health 15-A. The discretion to teach the rope belay technique as part of the extrication and rescue portion of EMT training was left up to the College by Northern California Emergency Medical Services, which also encouraged the use of consultants.

On the day of the accident, plaintiff and other class members met on a cliff near a Belay is a technique in which one individual who is going down a hill ties one end of the rope around himself, while the other end is tied around a person at the top of the slope. The person at the top of the slope stabilizes the person going downhill by offering friction against the rope.

rest stop on Interstate 5. The day's curriculum consisted of automobile extrication, the tearing and ripping apart of cars to extricate accident victims, and rope techniques including rope belay.

The belay instructor, Balfrey, advised the students that participation in the belay exercise was not required. However, according to plaintiff, Balfrey conveyed the impression he expected everyone to participate. Everyone present that day participated; this was the only time this phase of the course would be offered.

Plaintiff performed the belay exercise, acting as the anchor or belayer at the top of the cliff. While standing with her right leg slightly forward, plaintiff felt a sudden, violent jerk of the belay rope as the other student was lowered down the cliff. The rope caused a great deal of torque and downward force, causing plaintiff to twist to the left while being dragged to the ground. This incident caused injury to plaintiff's right knee, resulting in several surgeries and knee damage.

Plaintiff brought an action for personal injury, contending the instructor's negligence caused her injury. The College filed a motion for summary judgment contending that plaintiff's cause of action was barred by immunity granted to EMT training programs under Health and Safety Code section 1799.100. Following a hearing, the court granted the motion. Judgment was entered and plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.

I. Standard of Review

"Since a summary judgment motion raises only questions of law regarding the construction and effect of the supporting and opposing papers, we independently review them on appeal, applying the same three-step analysis required of the trial court. First, we identify the issues framed by the pleadings since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond by establishing a complete defense or otherwise showing there is no factual basis for relief on any theory reasonably contemplated by the opponent's pleading. [p] Secondly, we determine whether the moving party's showing has established facts which negate the opponent's claim and justify a judgment in movant's favor. The motion must stand self-sufficient and cannot succeed because the opposition is weak. A party cannot succeed without disproving even those claims on which the opponent would have the burden of proof at trial. [p] When a summary judgment motion prima facie justifies a judgment, the third and final step is to determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue. Counter-affidavits and declarations need not prove the opposition's case; they suffice if they disclose the existence of a triable issue." (AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064-1065, 225 Cal.Rptr. 203; citations omitted.)

"The affidavits of the moving party are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against granting the motion." (Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 35-36, 210 Cal.Rptr. 762, 694 P.2d 1134; citations omitted.) Although the affidavits and declarations of the nonmoving party are liberally construed, even if they contain conclusory terms, the party opposing the motion must submit competent evidence in opposition showing sufficient facts to substantiate its allegations. (Cory v. Villa Properties (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 592, 601, 225 Cal.Rptr. 628.)

When conflicts appear in the papers submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion, we resolve those conflicts in favor of the nonmoving party. (Gregorian v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 944, 946, 220 Cal.Rptr. 302.) In addition, all reasonable inferences are considered in favor of the nonmoving party. (Rubio v. Swiridoff The summary judgment procedure is designed to test whether any material triable issues of fact exist, but not to resolve disputed factual issues. (Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Fibreboard Corp. (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 462, 465, 227 Cal.Rptr. 203.) An order of summary judgment will not be reversed in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion. (Fireman's Fund, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 466, 227 Cal.Rptr. 203.)

(1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 400, 403, 211 Cal.Rptr. 338.)

II. Scope of Immunity Under Health and Safety Code section 1799.100

The statute at the core of this dispute, Health and Safety Code section 1799.100, states: "In order to encourage local agencies and other organizations to train people in emergency medical services, no local agency, entity of state or local government, or other public or private organization which sponsors, authorizes, supports, finances, or supervises the training of people, or certifies those people, excluding physicians and surgeons, registered nurses, and licensed vocational nurses, as defined, in emergency medical services, shall be liable for any civil damages alleged to result from those training programs." (Emphasis added.)

Plaintiff contends a question of fact exists as to whether the immunity granted by section 1799.100 applies to the claims of students injured in an EMT training class. Plaintiff points out that several other Health and Safety Code statutes, which also pertain to limitations of liability and EMT personnel and services, only provide for immunity from third party liability. Therefore, according to plaintiff's reasoning, the legislature must have intended section 1799.100 to provide immunity only from third party liability.

We disagree. Section 1799.100 is not susceptible to a construction limiting its application to only third party claimants. As Code of Civil Procedure section 1858 states: "In the construction of a statute or instrument, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all." Section 1799.100 is clear and unambiguous on its face, and to attempt to read a limitation of immunity into the statute would be to overstep the bounds of our authority.

As this court stated in Hennigan v. United Pacific Ins. Co. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 1, 7-8, 125 Cal.Rptr. 408: "We may not disregard or enlarge the plain provisions of the statute, nor may we go beyond the meaning of the words used when they are clear and unambiguous.... [p] It is a prime rule of construction that the legislative intent underlying a statute must be ascertained from its language; if the language is clear, there can be no room for interpretation, and effect must be given to its plain meaning. An intent that finds no expression in the words of the statute cannot be found to exist. The courts may not speculate that the legislature meant something other than what it said. Nor may they rewrite a statute to make it express an intention not expressed therein. The court in People ex. rel. Thain v. City of Palo Alto (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 400, 406, 78 Cal.Rptr. 240 stated: 'It will be assumed that the Legislature, in enacting a statute, has in mind existing related laws, including ... the acts of previous Legislatures.' " (Citations omitted.)

Plaintiff fails to point out any ambiguity in the language of section 1799.100. Therefore, we cannot "read into" the statute plaintiff's proposed third party limitation.

Moreover, plaintiff's contention regarding a statutory scheme of providing immunity only for third party liability in the EMT statutes is not convincing. Plaintiff points to Health and Safety Code sections 1799.102, 1799.104, 1799.106, 1799.107, 1799.108, and 179...