Mcalister v. Graham

• Decision Date: 11 November 1918
• Docket Number: No. 12984.,12984.
• Citation: 206 S.W. 393,200 Mo. App. 279
• Parties: McALISTER et al. v. GRAHAM.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

206 S.W. 393

200 Mo. App. 279

McALISTER et al. v. GRAHAM.

No. 12984.

Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.

November 11, 1918.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Grundy County; G. W. Wanamaker, Judge.

Suit for mandatory injunction by John McAlister and others against T. L. Graham, wherein temporary writ was granted, and defendant filed motion to dissolve the writ and dismiss the bill. From judgment sustaining the motion, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed, and cause remanded.

S. W. Brandon, of Gallatin, for appellants. George Hall, of Trenton, for respondent.

ELLISON, J.

This is a proceeding for a mandatory injunction. A temporary writ was granted. Afterwards the cause came on for hearing, when defendant filed a motion to dissolve the temporary writ and dismiss the bill on the ground that on the face of the bill no cause of action was stated and no ground for relief averred. The trial court sustained the motion, and plaintiff comes here for relief.

The record shows that defendant filed an answer in which various matters were set up; but as the case was disposed of on the motion of defendant, without the hearing of evidence, we have only to examine the petition to ascertain whether it states facts entitling him to the injunction he seeks.

It is alleged therein: That defendant had leased a certain described farm from A. R. Cannady from March, 1917, to March, 1918, and that he was in possession under said lease. That in the fall of 1917 plaintiff contemplated leasing the same lands for one year from March, 1918, but before doing so he, in October, 1917, inquired of defendant whether he (defendant) wanted to continue to hold the lands, telling him that if he did not he (plaintiff) intended to lease them. Whereupon defendant assured plaintiff he did not desire the lands longer than the then following March, 1918, and for plaintiff to go ahead and lease them and that he might bring his machinery and farming implements at any time before the 1st of March if he desired. That, relying on these representations and assurances, plaintiff rented the land and then informed defendant that he had. Defendant again assured him it was all right and to bring "his machinery and any other stuff he wanted to bring" at any time; that he (defendant) would give up possession on the 1st of March. Thereafter, in reliance on these assurances, plaintiff moved a lot of his farming implements onto the premises. That, in consequence of these representations and assurances of defendant, plaintiff refrained from renting the farm on which he was then living, or any other, until it was too late to do so. But that afterwards, in February, after plaintiff had partly moved his implements and other property onto the premises, defendant, in violation of his former assurances, informed plaintiff that he intended to keep the Premises and would not give them up. That defendant then threatened and still persists in his determination not to permit plaintiff to complete his entry into possession.

It is then averred in the petition that plaintiff is compelled to remove from the premises he now occupies; that he has live stock, grain, and farm property, including household goods, that have to be cared for and protected, that he has no place to go to unless defendant be restrained from carrying out his threat; that he will be irreparably damaged; and that the law will not afford him an adequate remedy. He therefore prayed that defendant be restrained from keeping plaintiff out of possession and use of the premises, and from interfering with plaintiff's property brought upon the premises in the manner stated.

We think it clear that the petition stated a case entitling him to the relief asked. In the circumstances alleged and described in the petition, there is no adequate legal remedy. There is no doubt, as expressed in Horn v. Cole, 51 N. H. 287, 12 Am. Rep. 111, that if one's "representations are such, and made in such circumstances, that all persons interested in the subject have the right to rely on them as true, their truth cannot be denied * * * against any one who has trusted to them and acted on them." This proposition is well supported by the adjudications in this state. Reynolds v. Kroff, 144 Mo. 433, 447, 46 S. W. 424; Spence v. Renfro, 179 Mo. 417, 421 78 S. W. 597; Williams v. Verity, 98 Mo. App. 661, 73 S. W. 732.

It is quite true that an injunction should not be allowed to take the place of the...