McAnulty v. Mooney
| Decision Date | 08 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-03104 |
| Parties | RICHARD ALAN MCANULTY, Plaintiff v. SUPT. VINCENT MOONEY, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(CAPUTO, J.)
(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)
Presently before the Court is pro se prisoner- Plaintiff Richard Alan McAnulty's second amended complaint submitted in accordance with the District Court's Memorandum and Order dated January 4, 2016, permitting Plaintiff leave to amend his pleadings concurrently with its disposition of a number of motions to dismiss filed by Defendants. Having conducted its statutory screening review of the amended complaint, the undersigned respectfully recommends the amended complaint (Doc. 64, at 13) be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (ii), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1).
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action was initiated upon the filing of a complaint in this matter on December 30, 2013 by Plaintiff Richard Alan McAnulty, an inmate currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution in Coal Township, Pennsylvania, alleging several violations of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution against eleven (11) Department of Corrections employees, the prison's contracted medical provider, and three (3) of the contracted medical provider's employees. An amended complaint was subsequently filed, wherein the Plaintiff alleged that the Superintendent Vincent Mooney, Superintendent David A. Varano, Deputy Superintendent Michael Miller, Deputy Superintendent Anthony Luscavage, Unit Manager Charles Custer, Unit Manager Ms. Shaffer, Registered Nurse Supervisor Donna Dressler,1 Health Care Administrator Kathryn McCarty,2 Grievance Counselor Trish Kelley, and Counselor D. Picarelli (the "DOC Defendants"); Defendant Wexford Health Network; and Defendants M. Landsberg, A. Popick, and J. Daya (the "Medical Defendants"), failed to provide proper medical care for his chronic and ongoing illnesses in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.3 (Doc. 19). Specifically, Plaintiff challenged Defendants' failure to refill his prescriptions, schedule follow-up appointments, maintain accurate medical records, provide him with properly fitting diabetic shoes and socks, and transfer him to SCI-Laurel Highlands. (Doc. 19). Plaintiff also contested the refusal of Defendants to accommodate his non-medical requests, such as allowing him additional time in the law library, assisting him with locating a confiscated storage box containing legal materials, facilitating a conference call with the Department of Justice, and mailing various legal documents via certified mail. (Doc. 19).
A number of motions to dismiss were filed on April 15, 2014; April 22, 2014; May 9, 2014; and December 30, 2014, respectively. (Doc. 24; Doc. 30; Doc. 37; Doc. 47). On July 21, 2015, the undersigned Magistrate Judge entered a Report and Recommendation, recommending that Defendants' motions dated April 15, 2014; April 22, 2014; and May 9, 2014 be granted (Doc. 24; Doc. 30; Doc. 37), that Defendants' December 30, 2014, motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute be denied as moot (Doc. 47), and that Plaintiff's claims be dismissed as to all named Defendants. (Doc. 51). The Court recommended, however, that Plaintiff be permitted leave to amend his complaint to set forth an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against the Medical Defendants, and Wexford Health Network. (Doc. 51, at 22). On January 4, 2016, the District Court entered a Memorandum and Order adopting in part and rejecting in part the undersigned's Report and Recommendation. Specifically, the District Court departed from the undersigned's Report and Recommendation with respect to the recommendation that Defendants Doctors Landsberg and Popick be dismissed from the action with leave to amend, as the District Court found that Plaintiff adequately stated a claim against these Defendants for failure to reorder his prescription medications. In its Memorandum and Order, the District Court permitted Plaintiff an opportunity to re-plead his claims in a second amended complaint.
On March 11, 2016, the Court received and docketed a motion paper entitled "Declaration in Support of Plaintiff['s] Motion for the Appointment of Counsel," that was submitted together with approximately 137 pages of miscellaneous material. (Doc. 64). While Plaintiff's declaration in support of his motion for appointment of counsel is plainly untimely, given that the District Court previously denied his motion for appointment of counsel in itsMemorandum and Order dated January 4, 2016, the extraneous documents appended to this declaration contain what appears to be Plaintiff's second amended complaint as well as a number of relevant exhibits that shed light on his claims.
In Plaintiff's second amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts violations of his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution resulting from Defendants' failure to provide proper medical care for his chronic and ongoing illnesses; namely, diabetes, high blood pressure, cervical pain, hearing loss, and fibromyalgia. Upon review of this second amended complaint, it is clear that Plaintiff has merely repeated the factual allegations asserted against the exact same Defendants contained within his amended complaint, albeit in a slightly condensed form and in a slightly different order.
Having conducted its statutory screening review of the second amended complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1), the Court now enters this Report and Recommendation.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated to screen a civil complaint in which a prisoner is seeking redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 230 F. App'x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007) (not precedential). The Court must dismiss the complaint if it "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The Court has a similar obligation with respect to actions brought in forma pauperis and actions concerning prison conditions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). See generally Banks v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 568 F. Supp. 2d 579, 587-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (). "The [C]ourt's obligation to dismiss a complaint under [these] screening provisions is not excused even after defendants have filed a motion to dismiss." Banks, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 589. In performing this screening function, a district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010); Banks, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 588.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). A court "need not credit a complaint's 'bald assertions' or 'legal conclusions' when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. AssociatedGen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). In order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief, which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted, and should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). "[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as "documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).4 Additionally, a document filed pro se is "to be liberally construed." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards...
To continue reading
Request your trial