McArthur v. Cook
| Decision Date | 20 December 1957 |
| Citation | 99 So.2d 565 |
| Parties | B. B. McARTHUR, d/b/a B. B. McArthur Dairy, Appellant, v. Otis COOK, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Fleming, O'Bryan & Fleming and Theodore R. Hainline, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Robbins, Cannova & Franza, Hollywood, for appellee.
Appellant McArthur, who was defendant below, seeks reversal of a final judgment in favor of appellee Cook, plaintiff below, in a suit for damages for personal injuries resulting from the alleged negligence of appellant.
Our conclusion turns on a determination of the question as to whether a witness in a civil action may be discredited by proof of conviction of a crime.
Appellee Cook was an employee of appellant McArthur in the operation of a dairy. Cook, the employee, alleges that he was injured when he fell from a horse while in the performance of the duties of his employment. He contends that appellant failed to furnish him safe equipment with which to work. Cook alleged that while riding the horse a cincture strap, which is a part of the saddle, broke. Because of the alleged defective saddle, he claims that he fell to the ground, that the horse fell on top of him, breaking his leg and causing severe personal injuries.
In the course of the trial Cook testified as a witness in his own behalf. In fact, his testimony was the only direct evidence of the circumstances immediately surrounding the occurrence of the injury. On cross-examination appellant's counsel undertook to question Cook as to whether he had ever been convicted of a crime. After permitting a series of questions on this line, the trial judge on further reflection sustained a motion to strike all of the questions and answers, holding such testimony to be inadmissible. The trial resulted in a jury verdict for Cook. Reversal of the final judgment entered pursuant to the verdict is now sought.
The appellant cites several alleged errors but the one which influences our judgment is grounded on the contention that the trial judge committed error in refusing to permit the cross-examination with reference to prior convictions of crimes.
On the critical point the appellee contends that proof of conviction of a crime is inadmissible in a civil action for the purpose of discrediting a witness.
At the outset we should bear in mind that we are here dealing with the matter of the credibility of a witness rather than his competency. At common law a prior conviction of various types of crimes completely incapacitated the convicted person to testify in a court of justice. This rule has now been changed by statute in most of the states. Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, Vol. 6, Sec. 2440. The ultimate effect of these statutes generally has been to eliminate conviction of a crime (with various exceptions) as an element which completely disqualifies the witness. In lieu of disqualification the statutes generally have substituted a provision which permits proof of conviction as an element reflecting on the credibility of the witness.
In Florida two statutes deal with the problem. Section 90.07, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which is not here involved completely disqualifies one who has been convicted or perjury from testifying in any court in this state. Section 90.08, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which is the act here involved eliminates conviction of crimes other than perjury as a disqualification, but specifically provides that evidence of conviction may be given to reflect on the credibility of the witness. Section 90.08, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., reads as follows:
'Witnesses; conviction of other crimes as disqualification
It appears to us that the language of this statute is quite clear and requires no construction. The application of the act, however, has presented some problems which we herewith undertake to eliminate for the guidance of the Bar and the trial courts.
In the first place appellee contends that the act is applicable only to criminal cases in view of the revisors' catch line 'conviction of other crimes as disqualification' appearing in the statutory revision. We think this contention is not supported by the language of the act itself. Further, to support this conclusion we have examined Chapter 4966, Laws of Florida 1901, which was the legislative enactment now cited as Section 90.08, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. The title to the original act read:
'An Act to Provide for the Admission in Evidence of the Testimony of Parties Convicted of Crime, and Providing for the Admission of Evidence...
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Dawson v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
...number of convictions. Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1992)(citing Fulton v. State, 335 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1976); McArthur v. Cook, 99 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1957); Leonard v. State, 386 So.2d 51, 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). If the witness denies having been convicted, or misstates the number ......
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Fulton v. State
...been a prior conviction, only the fact of the conviction can be brought out, unless the witness denies the conviction. See McArthur v. Cook, 99 So.2d 565 (Fla.1957); Mead v. State, 86 So.2d 773 (Fla.1956). If the witness denies ever having been convicted, or misstates the number of previous......
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Huggins v. State
...90.610, Florida Statutes (2004). See, e.g., Gavins v. State, 587 So.2d 487, 489-90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). See generally McArthur v. Cook, 99 So.2d 565, 567 (Fla.1957) ("[T]he proper procedural approach is simply to ask the witness the straight-forward question as to whether he had ever been c......
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Fotopoulos v. State
...restricted to the existence of prior convictions and the number of convictions. Fulton v. State, 335 So.2d 280 (Fla.1976); McArthur v. Cook, 99 So.2d 565 (Fla.1957); Leonard v. State, 386 So.2d 51, 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). However, when a defendant attempts to mislead or delude the jury about......