McArty v. Turner
| Docket Number | Civil 6:20-CV-06071-SOH-MEF |
| Decision Date | 22 July 2022 |
| Parties | RANDALL THOMAS McARTY PLAINTIFF v. DAN TURNER, Prosecuting Attorney, Clark County, Arkansas; and LESLIE RUTLEDGE, Arkansas Attorney General DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas |
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation.
Currently before the Court are Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30) and Plaintiff's Motion for Evidentiary Hearing Motion for Counsel, and Motion for Expert Witness (ECF Nos 41, 43, 44).
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”) Varner Unit. (ECF No. 28 at 1-2). Plaintiff filed his Complaint on July 2, 2020. (ECF No. 1). He filed a Motion to Amend on July 23, 2021 (ECF No. 9), which was granted on December 9, 2021 (ECF No. 13). Plaintiff's Amended Complaint was filed that same day. (ECF No. 14).
On January 11, 2022, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 24). On January 13, 2022, the Court entered an Order directing Plaintiff to submit either a Response to the motion or a Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 26). Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on January 31, 2022. (ECF No. 28).
Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of Act 1780,[1] the Arkansas Post-Conviction DNA statute, “as construed and applied to me by the Defendants and the Arkansas Courts.” (ECF No. 28 at 7). Plaintiff clarifies that he “is not challenging the adverse decisions of the Arkansas Courts.” (Id.). He also asserts that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply in this circumstance.[2] (Id.). He argues that Defendants have construed the statute in such a way as to deny him the opportunity to have DNA testing performed on a knife that was a key piece of evidence in his murder trial and conviction. (Id. at 7). He argues that this construction of the statute was a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (Id. at 4). He also argues he was denied the right to establish that “identity was at issue,” and denied the right to address the rebuttable presumption against timeliness under the Act. (Id. at 4, 7).
Plaintiff proceeds against Defendants in their official and personal capacities. (Id. at 5). He seeks injunctive and declaratory relief. (Id. at 11). More specifically, he asks the Court to enjoin the enforcement of Act 1780 “as its being construed, interpreted, and applied to me by the Defendant and the Arkansas courts”; for a declaratory judgment by the Court concerning the rights of the parties; and for an Order that DNA testing be performed “on the knife and on other evidence secured/seized at the crime scene.” (Id.).
As the details of Plaintiff's conviction were not clear from Plaintiff's allegations in this case, the Court reviewed Plaintiff's state criminal history. After a jury trial in Clark County, Arkansas, Plaintiff was convicted of first-degree murder on June 23, 1993, in State v. McArty, Case No. 10CR-92-111.[3] He was sentenced to life imprisonment. Plaintiff appealed the conviction, which was upheld by the Arkansas Supreme Court on February 21, 1994, in McArty v. State of Arkansas, 316 Ark. 35, 871 S.W.2d 346 (1994). On February 28, 2018,[4] Plaintiff filed a post-conviction petition in the Clark County circuit court for scientific testing for habeas relief under Act 1780,[5] in State v. McArty, Case No. 10CR-92-111.[6] The state circuit court denied this petition on August 20, 2018, finding that the petition was untimely and presented no cognizable claims that present scientific testing would be more probative than that which was available at the time of his trial.[7] Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration on August 30, 2018, raising several arguments, including that the time limit contained in Act 1780 violated the Arkansas Constitution.[8]The state circuit court denied the motion for reconsideration on October 3, 2018, finding that McArty had “failed to offer any argument(s) or evidence sufficient to require” either reconsideration or reversal.[9]
Plaintiff appealed the denial of his petition to the state supreme court, which provided a succinct summary of the facts in Plaintiff's criminal case:
McArty and [Teresa] Chamberlain shared a home, and they were arguing when McArty shot Chamberlain. McArty called the sheriff from a neighbor's house, and when an officer asked him what had happened, he said that he had shot Chamberlain. Daniel Blasingame, who was staying at McArty's home, heard Chamberlain call out before the shot, and when he entered the kitchen, he saw her body on the floor and McArty with the gun. McArty's defense at trial concerned his intent, and he testified that he shot Chamberlain in self-defense when she attacked him with a knife. There was evidence of a knife found in Chamberlain's hand, but Blasingame testified that he did not see it, and under the State's theory of the case, McArty had placed the knife in Chamberlain's hand after the fact.
McArty v. State, 2020 Ark. 68, at 2, 594 S.W.2d at 56.
On February 20, 2020, the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the denial of Plaintiff's Act 1780 petition. Because Plaintiff argued at trial that he shot Chamberlain in self-defense, the court held that he had not met one of the predicate requirements of the Act. Specifically, the court reasoned that:
the Act does not provide relief when the identity of the perpetrator was not at issue during the investigation and prosecution of the offense being challenged. McArty contends that the identity of the person who grabbed the knife was in question, but that issue was not one concerning the identity of the person who committed the offense reflected in the judgment that McArty would challenge, and he cannot satisfy the predicate requirements of the Act. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-202(7).
Id. at 5, 594 S.W.2d at 57-58. Because he failed to meet this requirement, the court held it was “not necessary to examine McArty's arguments concerning the circuit court's ruling on timeliness.” Id. at 5, 594 S.W.2d at 58. Justice Hart dissented, citing City of Fort Smith v. Wade, 2019 Ark. 222, 578 S.W.3d 276, for the premise that Act 1780 was remedial legislation that must be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose. She would have remanded for further proceedings because “[i]f McArty's proposed testing revealed that the knife was, in fact, in the victim's hand when McArty shot her, that would significantly advance his claim of actual innocence, i.e., that he shot the victim in self-defense.” McArty v. State, 2020 Ark. 68, at 9, 594 S.W.2d at 59-60.
Defendants filed their second Motion to Dismiss and brief on February 14, 2022. (ECF Nos. 30, 31). They argue Plaintiff's case should be dismissed because: (1) Plaintiff's lawsuit is time-barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations in a section § 1983 action; (2) the doctrine of res judicata bars Plaintiff's lawsuit; and (3), Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a procedural due process claim, and the case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 31 at 2).
Plaintiff filed his Response and brief on February 28, 2022. (ECF Nos. 34, 35). He argues his case is not time-barred because he filed this case within five months of the state supreme court's opinion denying his petition for relief under Act 1780. (ECF No. 35 at 5). He also argues the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable because he sued the State of Arkansas in his state petition, and he is suing Defendants Turner and Rutledge in this action. (Id. at 7). Finally, he argues he has stated sufficient facts to support a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim. (Id. at 8).
Rule 8(a) contains the general pleading rules and requires a complaint to present “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “In order to meet this standard, and survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), ‘a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While the Court will liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's complaint, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support his claims. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).
Prior to March 7, 2011, it was unsettled as to whether § 1983 claims for post-conviction DNA testing were permissible, or if they were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S 477 (1994). See Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 524 (2011) (comparing cases permitting: McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2007); Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2006); and Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1290-1291 (11th Cir. 2002), with cases denying: Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 375 (4th Cir. 2002) and Kutzner v. Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). On March 7, 2011, the Supreme Court held a request for post-conviction DNA testing was not barred by Heck, because “[s]uccess in [the] suit for DNA testing would not ...
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